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i 
ABSTRACT 
The Arctic Council is an international institution made up of the eight states that have 
territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
the United States, as well as six indigenous peoples’ organizations. When states created the 
Council in 1996, it was a research institution that addressed environmental issues and a loosely 
defined version of sustainable development. It was a weak institution, without a permanent 
secretariat. By 2014, it had become a policy-making body, as well as a research body, that 
addressed a wide range of issues, with the aid of a permanent secretariat. New states and 
institutions sought to become a part of the Council, which potentially challenged the role of the 
indigenous peoples’ organizations. This thesis answers the following question: how can we 
explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? It examines the Council’s evolving mandate, 
policy-making role, institutional capacity and membership. It addresses this question by 
analyzing three international relations theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism. This thesis concludes that the economic opportunities in the region made 
possible by climate change best explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. Neoliberal 
institutionalism best explains the evolution of the Council, while neorealism provides the best 
explanation for the outcome of that process. 
KEYWORDS 
Arctic governance, Arctic Council, international institution evolution 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, many Arctic policy-makers
1
 and activists believed the newly created Arctic 
Council was a weak, informal research institution offering limited opportunities to address issues 
that are important to people who live in the Arctic region.
2
 By 2013, the Council appeared more 
robust than ever as it created major international agreements that responded to the consequences 
of climate change in the Arctic. The major research question addressed in this thesis is: how can 
we explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? The Council is an international institution 
charged with the promotion of environmental conservation and sustainable development in the 
Arctic region. It is evolving from a research institution that addresses environmental issues to a 
forum for policy-making on a wide variety of issues. This institution is worthy of serious 
scholarly attention because the Council is the premier governance institution for the Arctic 
region and it addresses profoundly important global issues such as climate change. The evolution 
of this institution will have consequences for the global community. Thus, the trajectory of its 
evolution is of interest not only to those who study the region, but also to those concerned with 
broader global politics. This thesis explains the Council’s evolution by assessing the predictive 
validity and reliability of three theories of international co-operation: functionalism, neorealism 
and neoliberal institutionalism. This work argues that the Arctic’s economic potential has created 
an incentive for states to facilitate governance through the Council, though great powers are the 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, “policy-maker” refers to an official who attended Council meetings representing a state, non-
governmental organization, international institution or indigenous peoples’ organization. This group includes 
government officials, political activists, political actors (such as elected representatives) and scientists.  I use the 
term “policy-maker” as a generic term because 1) all of these actors sought to contribute to the development of 
policy through the Council and 2) they were entrusted to represent the views of their organization in a diplomatic 
capacity.  
2
 Interviews with eleven different Council policy-makers, winter, spring and summer 2013. This group includes a 
former senior Canadian foreign affairs official, a junior Canadian foreign affairs official, two senior United States 
Environmental Protection Agency officials, one former senior government of Alaska official, one senior United 
States State Department official, one former senior United States Department of the Interior official, a senior 
Norwegian foreign affairs official, two senior Icelandic foreign affairs officials and a Russian scientist who has 
worked with the Council. The comment arose in response to a discussion that the Council, over time, has become a 
more professional body.  
  
 
2 
most influential actors in this process. Chapter 1 outlines the scope and method of this project, as 
well as an overview of the necessary background information about the Council. It answers nine 
major questions. First, what is the Arctic Council? Second, what is the history of the Arctic 
Council and why did it come into being? Third, what is the mandate of the Arctic Council? 
Fourth, how does the Council operate? Fifth, how is the Arctic Council evolving? Sixth, how 
have others assessed the Council? Seventh, how is the thesis structured? Eighth, what is the 
contribution of this thesis? Finally, what methodology is employed?  The thesis consists of seven 
chapters, including this introduction.  
1.1 – What is the Arctic Council?  
 The Arctic Council is an international institution comprising the eight countries that have 
some territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the United States. It is the only Arctic regional organization that includes all eight 
Arctic countries. It is also the only international institution that includes indigenous peoples’ 
organizations as members, albeit second-class members without voting rights. These groups have 
many of the same rights as states, as they are able, for example, to participate in all Council 
meetings,
3
 set the Council agenda
4
 and create Council projects.
5
 
Six indigenous peoples’ organizations are members of the Council, although the rules of 
procedure allow up to seven indigenous members. They are referred to as “permanent 
participants.” The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) represents 32,000 Athabaskan people who 
                                                 
3
 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998), 
Article 4 and Article 5.  
4
 Ibid., Article 12 and Article 19.  
5
 Ibid., Article 26. 
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live mostly in northwestern Canada and Alaska.
6
 The group formed in 2000, specifically to 
participate in the Arctic Council. It is currently the most recent group to join the institution. The 
Aleut International Association (AIA) represents 18,000 Aleutian people who live in Greenland, 
Russia and the United States.
7
 It formed in 1998, also to participate in the Council. The Gwich’in 
Council International (GCI) represents 9,000 Gwich’in people who live in the Canada and the 
United States.
8
 The organization formed in 1999 to advocate for Gwich’in people in the Council. 
The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) represents 150,000 Inuit people who live in Canada, 
Greenland, Russia and the United States.
9
 It came together in 1977 as a major international 
advocacy association. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) 
represents 300,000 Russian aboriginal peoples. It is an umbrella organization for 41 Russian 
aboriginal groups that are part of 35 different indigenous peoples’ organizations.10 The 
organization formed in 1990, specifically to participate in the precursor of the Arctic Council, the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). RAIPON was originally called the USSR 
Association of Small Peoples of the North. It was renamed in the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The Saami Council, originally called the Nordic Saami Council at the founding of 
the AEPS in 1991, represents 150,000 people who live in Finland, Norway, Russia and 
                                                 
6
 Arctic Council, “Arctic Athabaskan Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/arctic-athabaskan-council-aac (accessed May 21, 2013). 
7
 Arctic Council, “Aleut International Association,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/aleut-international-association-aia (accessed May 21, 
2013). 
8
 Arctic Council, “Gwich’in Council International,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/gwich-in-council-international (accessed May 21, 2013). 
9
 Arctic Council, “Inuit Circumpolar Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/inuit-circumpolar-council (accessed May 21, 2013). 
10
 Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: RAIPON,” Arctic Peoples, 2012, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/596-permanent-participant-article-series-raipon 
(accessed January 14, 2013). 
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Sweden.
11
 The group was founded in 1956 and is thus the oldest indigenous peoples’ 
organization in the Council. Together, these groups represent 659,000 people from all the 
Council countries, except mainland Denmark and Iceland. 
The Council also includes observers. The original observers of the precursor to the Arctic 
Council, the AEPS, were West Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the 
International Arctic Science Committee.
12
 There are currently 32 permanent observers in the 
Council. The Council’s rules of procedure officially refer to them as “accredited observers,” 
although they are often referred to as permanent observers.
13
 This group includes twelve states, 
eight international institutions and twelve non-governmental organizations.
14
 China, France and 
Germany are examples of state observers. International institution observers include the Nordic 
Council of Ministers and the United Nations Development Program. Examples of non-
governmental organizations are the Association of World Reindeer Herders and the World 
Wildlife Fund. Observers can attend Council meetings, unless uninvited by states, and make 
comments when states allow. They can propose, sponsor and participate in Council projects with 
the permission of states.
15
 State delegations re-approve all observers every two years, in 
summative Ministerial Meetings.
16
 At this point, states can remove an observer, though this has 
never happened. In addition, Council meetings typically include “ad hoc observers” that can 
attend with special permission. They have all the same rights as permanent observers, though 
                                                 
11
 Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: The Saami Council,” Arctic Peoples, 2012, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/589-permanent-participant-article-
series-saami-council (accessed January 14, 2013). 
12
 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, 
Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991).  
13
 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Article 37. 
14
 Arctic Council, “Observers,” About Us, April 27, 2011, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/arctic-council/observers (accessed July 17, 2014).  
15
 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Article 37.  
16
 Ibid.  
  
 
5 
states need to re-approve their participation before every Council meeting.
17
 An example of a 
high-profile organization or state that frequently acts as an ad-hoc observer is the European 
Union. Typically, a new observer attends Council meetings for between two and five years 
before states approve its status as a permanent observer. Observers are typically international 
entities that have some broad interest in the Arctic region.  
Most of the substantive work takes place in the Council’s working groups, of which there 
are six: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and 
the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). States formed the ACAP from an 
AMAP project in 2006. The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR were working groups of the 
AEPS and so formed in 1991. States established the SDWG in 1996 along with the rest of the 
Council. The ACAP takes action to research and address contaminants in the Arctic region. The 
AMAP monitors levels of Arctic pollution. The CAFF researches levels of Arctic flora and fauna 
and also helps develop conservation strategies by providing baseline information. Studying 
Arctic marine pollution and developing strategies to combat pollution by providing baseline 
information is the responsibility of the PAME. The EPPR identifies safety issues in the Arctic 
and prepares for emergency situations. The SDWG broadly carries out projects to encourage 
human social, political and economic development in the Arctic region. Government scientists 
and academics serve in the working groups and usually meet bi-annually. The nature of the work 
completed by the working groups reveals that the Council exists to facilitate action on 
environmental issues and sustainable development. 
                                                 
17
 Ibid.   
  
 
6 
The official mandates of the working groups show they complete separate yet inter-
related work. The ACAP exists to “reduce emissions of pollutants into the environment in order 
to reduce the identified pollution risks.”18 It prepares proposals and supplies information for 
technical projects to physically clean up contaminant sites, particularly in Russia. The mandate 
of the AMAP is to supply “reliable and sufficient information on the status of, and threats to, the 
Arctic environment, and providing scientific advice on actions to be taken in order to support 
Arctic governments in their efforts to take remedial and preventive actions relating to 
contaminants.”19 Examples of its work include projects to monitor UV radiation, radioactivity 
and mercury levels in the Arctic.
20
 The CAFF exists to “address the conservation of Arctic 
biodiversity, and to communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic, 
helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources.”21 
An example of its work is the ongoing Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, which is 
“an international network of scientists, government agencies, indigenous organizations and 
conservation groups working together to harmonize and integrate efforts to monitor the Arctic's 
living resources.”22 The mandate of the PAME is to “address policy and non-emergency 
pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine 
environment from both land and sea-based activities.”23 An example of this work is the ongoing 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Arctic Council, “Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme,” Working Groups, April 15, 2011, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/arctic-monitoring-and-assessment-
programme-amap (accessed July 11, 2013).  
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Arctic Council, “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/conservation-of-arctic-flora-and-fauna-caff (accessed July 11, 
2013). 
22
 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, “Monitoring: The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Programme 
(CBMP),” Monitoring, 2013, http://www.caff.is/monitoring (accessed July 12, 2013).  
23
 Arctic Council, “Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/protection-of-the-arctic-marine-environment-
pame (accessed July 11, 2013). 
  
 
7 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, which is an evaluation of the level of Arctic shipping.
24
 The 
mandate of the EPPR is to “exchange information on best practices and conduct projects to 
include development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, and 
training.”25 An example of this work includes its ongoing Behaviour of Oil and Other Hazardous 
Substances in Arctic Waters project, which studies what would happen to oil should it spill in 
Arctic waters, thus helping states prepare for that possibility.
26
 These mandates all reveal a focus 
on research rather than policy-making, as their missions seek to “promote,” “exchange” and 
provide “advice” rather than to develop formal policy. They also emphasize that these groups 
provide policy recommendations, particularly the mandates of the ACAP and the PAME. The 
ACAP, AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have mandates that are environmental. 
The SDWG has a different type of mandate than those of the other working groups in that 
it aims to “provide practical knowledge and contribute to building the capacity of indigenous 
peoples and Arctic communities to respond to the challenges and benefit from the opportunities 
emerging in the Arctic region.”27 Its work is broad and encompasses a wide variety of issue 
areas, all under the rubric of human development and human security. Human security is an 
understanding of security that emphasizes freedom from deprivation and threats to safety. The 
group does not limit its work to projects that concern sustainable development in the traditional 
sense. Sources often define sustainable development as “meeting the needs of today without 
                                                 
24
 Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, “About AMSA,” Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2013, 
http://www.pame.is/about-amsa (accessed March 1, 2013).  
25
 Arctic Council, “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/emergency-prevention-preparedness-and-
response-eppr (accessed July 11, 2013).  
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Arctic Council, “Sustainable Development Working Group,” Working Groups, April 14, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sustainable-development-working-group-sdwg (accessed July 
11, 2013). 
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compromising the needs of future generations.”28 In a practical sense, sustainable development 
typically refers to “any construction that can be maintained over time without damaging the 
environment.”29 However, the SDWG carries out the Council’s projects with the most direct 
human element that need not include a strong environmental element. Its current priorities are 
socio-economic problems, climate change adaptation, sustainable communities, resource 
development, human health, cultural survival and language.
30
 An example of this work is the 
2011 report Comparative Review of Circumpolar Health Systems, which provides an overview of 
the contrasting qualities of health care in the Arctic region.
31
 It is a project with a strong human 
security element but not a strong environmental element. The SDWG carries out more human-
centric work than do the other working groups.  
The Council employs task forces to carry out research projects outside of the mandate of 
the working groups. Officially, there are four: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Pollution 
Prevention, the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane, the Scientific Co-operation Task 
Force and the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum.
32
 Marine pollution 
prevention, for example, is outside of the mandate of any one working group because it involves 
the work of the PAME, CAFF and the EPPR. In addition, its work is more policy-centric than 
those of the working groups. Black carbon and methane involves taking action on a type of air 
pollution not covered by the other working groups. The AMAP might have been a venue to 
address these issues, but it provides monitoring rather than policy action, which is a key goal of 
the task force. A circumpolar business forum is not an environmental issue or a human security 
                                                 
28
 Environment Canada, “Sustainable Development,” Sustainable Development, July 7, 2014, 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/ (accessed July 22 2014).  
29
 Sustainable development, (n.d.), 21
st
 Century Lexicon.  
30
 Arctic Council, “Sustainable Development Working Group.” 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Arctic Council, “Task Forces of the Arctic Council,” Task Forces, December 29, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces (accessed July 17, 2014).  
  
 
9 
issue and so did not fit within any of the working groups. Three task forces have completed 
projects and ceased operations, namely the Task Force on Institution Issues (2011-2013), the 
Task Force on Search and Rescue (2009-2011) and the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response (2011-2013).
33
 The Council also has expert groups, made 
up of academics and scientists, to execute projects mandated by states on an ongoing basis, in 
contrast to temporary task forces that cease to exist when its project is completed. Currently, 
there is one Council expert group, the Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group.
34
 Individual 
working groups have expert groups and task forces to carry out specific projects and provide 
advice for the broader working groups. Task forces are becoming increasingly common as the 
Council takes on policy-making work.  
In September 2014, a new Council side-line institution came into being, called the Arctic 
Economic Council.
 35
 Its goal is to “foster business development in the Arctic,” to “engage in 
deeper circumpolar co-operation” and “provide a business perspective to the work of the Arctic 
Council.”36 Each Council member state and permanent participant sends three business 
representatives to review Council programs and provide recommendations to the Council.
37
 The 
new institution represents an expansion of the mandate of the Council from an environmental 
and sustainable development institution to one that facilitates economic development. The new 
institution does not have an environmental component in that its work is to represent business 
interests. Chapter 2 discusses this shift in detail.  
                                                 
33
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34
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1.2 – What is the History of the Arctic Council? 
 It is necessary to understand why the Council came into being in order to understand its 
evolution. This chapter provides a brief history, with further elaboration provided in subsequent 
chapters. The Council was established as an environmental organization to facilitate co-operation 
in the wake of the end of the Cold War. From 1945 until 1989, the two Arctic great powers, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, stood at opposite ends of an ideological divide marked by 
the ever-present possibility of nuclear war. Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were allies of 
the United States through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Finland and 
Sweden officially attempted to maintain neutrality, though these states were closer to the West 
than the East. Relations between the two superpowers improved throughout the 1970s during the 
period of détente, after strained relations in the 1960s. For example, the governments of the 
United States and Soviet Union held various negotiations beginning in 1969 to discuss limits on 
strategic arms, which resulted in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States 
government issued an Arctic policy in 1983 indicating its openness to “mutually beneficial 
international co-operation in the Arctic.”38 Still, tensions and military spending increased 
throughout the 1980s as a new hawkish United States presidential administration upped its 
rhetoric. The Arctic states, in particular the government of Finland, hoped that Arctic co-
operation would ease Cold War tensions between West and East. In 1985, an article by political 
scientist Oran Young proposed that the declaration of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” could ease 
Cold War tensions.
39
  In October 1987, amid a weakening Soviet economy, the governments of 
the Soviet Union and United States signed a nuclear stockpile reduction agreement marking the 
                                                 
38
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beginning of the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev 
delivered a speech in Murmansk, Russia, calling for the establishment of the Arctic as a “zone of 
peace” and new environmental co-operation.40 At the same time, there was considerable interest 
among policy-makers in international co-operation to understand the amount of pollution in 
Russia’s Arctic, which experts in the other Arctic states expected would be very high and would 
have trans-boundary consequences.
41
 The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster raised concerns over 
Russian environmental standards.
42
 The other Arctic governments doubted whether Gorbachev’s 
proposal for a “zone of peace” was serious.43 Murmansk is home to a large Russian military 
base, which Gorbachev did not propose to close as part of his initiative.
44
 The government of 
Finland, which sought to improve relations between the West and Russia, its closest neighbour, 
attempted to organize a conference in response to Gorbachev’s proposal, which finally occurred 
in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989. The government of Finland had lobbied the United 
States and Russia to draft an agreement on nuclear submarines in the Arctic (in 1983) and held a 
summit on Cold War nuclear issues (in 1987). Three rounds of non-contentious negotiations, 
slowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in the creation of the AEPS in June 1991.
45
 
The AEPS was mandated to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans.”46 It was a 
joint research strategy, rather than an international institution. States created four working groups 
(the AMAP, CAFF, EPPR, PAME) staffed by government scientists and academics from each 
Arctic country, who would collect information and meet bi-annually to share their conclusions. 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations were mere observers in the organization, without any 
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privileged status. The AEPS was successful in uncovering the dangerous level of pollution in the 
Russian Arctic, such as the fact that Russia had produced more than 180,000 tonnes of dangerous 
polychlorinated biphenol coolants in the Arctic region during the Cold War without proper 
environmental safety procedures.
47
 State officials also became aware that there were significant 
human security challenges in the Arctic.
48
 Perhaps most alarmingly, the life expectancy of 
indigenous peoples in Russia declined by 4.8 years between 1990 and 1995 due to poor 
economic conditions leading to high stress levels and high alcohol consumption.
49
 From 1991 to 
1996, indigenous peoples’ organizations lobbied governments to increase their role in Arctic 
governance and to establish a more robust Arctic international institution to respond to these 
environmental and social problems. In particular, the ICC lobbied the Government of Canada to 
push such action.
50
 For example, its Canadian president at the time, Mary Simon, had access to 
the Government of Canada through her work negotiating and implementing the 1993 Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement, which led to the creation of the Canadian northern territory Nunavut. 
She helped organize a meeting between Canadian foreign affairs officials and advocates to 
encourage Canada to create the Arctic Council in December 1992. This meeting did not yield 
immediate results,
51
 but, the Arctic Council, in part, emerged from the lobbying work of the ICC.  
After years of lobbying by indigenous peoples’ organizations, Canadian Prime Minister 
Jean Chretien and United States President Bill Clinton held a meeting in February 1995, at which 
Chretien proposed that the AEPS become a formal institution.
52
 Clinton agreed to the proposal.
53
 
The Canadian government brought the other Arctic states on-board and negotiations occurred in 
                                                 
47
 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, PCBs in the Russian Federation: Inventory and Proposals for 
Priority Remedial Actions (Oslo, Norway: Arctic Council, 2000), 14. 
48
 Arctic Council, Arctic Human Development Report (Reykjavik, Iceland: SDWG, 2004), 46-48 
49
 Ibid., 158.  
50
 English, Ice and Water, 172.  
51
 Ibid., 182. 
52
 Ibid., 202. 
53
 Ibid.  
  
 
13 
1995 around AEPS meetings and through informal communication as well as a meeting in 
Ottawa in June.
54
 There had been significant informal discussion among policy-makers to 
formalize the co-operation that had begun in the AEPS and so states at least tentatively 
undertook discussions to create the Arctic Council. State delegations debated and disagreed 
about six items: 1) whether security would be a part of the new institution, perhaps signalling a 
move toward earlier proposals for an Arctic “zone of peace;” 2) the role of human security and 
sustainable development in the new institution, as the AEPS had increasingly dealt with 
sustainable development issues; 3) the policy-making role of the institution; 4) whether the 
institution would have a permanent secretariat; 5) the access of observers to the Council, and; 6) 
whether the permanent participants would be full members of the Council.
55
 Subsequent chapters 
elaborate on the process of these negotiations.  
Canada and the Nordic delegations favoured a strong yet flexible Arctic Council that 
could take action on a wide range of Arctic issues, while the United States and Russian 
delegations favoured a less formal Council that would facilitate targeted action in a small number 
of priority areas. Some negotiators characterized the United States and Russia as favouring the 
continuation of the AEPS with a new name.
56
 The 1995 negotiations did not make major 
headway on issues and gave way to three major formal negotiations in Ottawa in December 
1995, as well as April and June 1996. The issue of the permanent participants dominated these 
negotiations, leaving little time to address the other items. Delegations made major 
breakthroughs in June, resolving the permanent participants issue and agreeing in principle to 
resolutions on the other matters, allowing work to move forward on a document finalizing the 
Council’s structure.  
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The Council’s first meeting occurred in September 1996 in Ottawa, where state 
delegations finalized the basic mandate and the structure of the Council. State officials agreed 
that: 1) traditional military security would not be part of the new Council’s agenda; 2) 
sustainable development would be part of the institution through the creation of the SDWG, 
though its exact mandate would be negotiated over the next two years; 3) creating formal policy 
would not be an immediate goal of the Council; 4) the institution would not have a permanent 
secretariat because the rotating chair country would organize and host a rotating secretariat; 5) 
observers would be allowed to attend Council meetings with permission, and; 6) indigenous 
peoples’ organizations would be members of the Council but would not be able to vote on 
Council matters. Each alignment could claim some success. Nothing prevented the Council from 
becoming a robust body in the future, though at its onset it was a small, flexible body in line with 
the preferences of the United States and Russian delegations. The Council had not yet developed 
formal rules of procedure, which it would do at five Council meetings in 1997 and 1998.
57
 In 
these years, it would transition the environmental work of the AEPS to the Council and establish 
the mandate for the sustainable development program.
58
 A key difference between the AEPS and 
Arctic Council was that the Arctic states’ environmental departments administered the AEPS and 
set state preferences, whereas departments of foreign affairs administered and organized the 
Council as well as determined official state positions.
59
 The Council emerged as an 
environmental research institution with a new emphasis on human development issues through 
the sustainable development program.  
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1.3 – What is the Arctic Council’s Mandate? 
 The Council’s mandate is to promote co-operation on environmental issues and 
sustainable development in the Arctic region. It is found in the 1998 Iqaluit Declaration, the 
summative statement document that closed Canada’s inaugural two-year term as chair. The 
Council is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among 
the Arctic States . . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic.”60 As noted, the Council’s work may address any issue 
except military security.
61
 Its mandate allows it to discuss other types of security, such as human 
security or environmental security, though in practice the Council does not use the language of 
security to characterize issues. The mandate does not precisely define “sustainable development” 
although it indicates it will include “areas of Arctic children and youth, health, telemedicine, 
resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology transfer to 
improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development strategies.”62 The 
document establishes that all projects with a strong “human” element will fall under the rubric of 
sustainable development. In practice, about 80 per cent of the Council’s work is strongly 
environmental in nature, as exhibited by the fact that only one of the Council’s six working 
groups expressly addresses sustainable development. Increasingly, the Council’s work is 
economic in nature, although until the development of the Arctic Economic Council, all of the 
Council’s economic work had some environmental element. In some ways, the Council has a 
broad yet narrow mandate, charged to focus on environment and sustainable development yet 
open to other issues.  
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1.4 – How Does the Council Operate?  
 The chair of the Council rotates every two years. The first country to chair was Canada 
from 1996 until 1998, followed by the United States from 1998 until 2000, Finland from 2000 
until 2002, Iceland from 2002 until 2004, Russia from 2004 until 2006, Norway from 2007 until 
2009, Denmark from 2009 until 2011 and Sweden from 2011 until 2013. Canada was chair from 
2013 until 2015, followed by the United States. The chair is responsible for organizing Council 
meetings and providing themes for Council work, though the other Council states have a lot of 
power to shape the agenda. The Council held 42 meetings from 1996 until 2013.
63
 It typically 
holds three meetings annually, usually in the spring and fall. There are three types of meetings. 
Senior Arctic Officials Meetings (also known as SAO meetings) usually occur twice a year. 
States send delegations of typically six to twelve officials, while permanent participants usually 
send two to six people. The head of the state delegations is referred to as the “Senior Arctic 
Official.” Ministerial Meetings (also known as MM meetings or ACMM meetings) occur every 
other year in the spring. At these meetings, ministers of foreign affairs or other high-ranking 
officials review the Council’s previous two-year term and initiate a new research program. States 
articulate the results by signing a declaration that sets the Council’s agenda for the next two 
years. Ministerial Meetings close a country’s turn as chair and pass the chair to another country. 
Deputy Ministers Meetings (DMM) occur in the years that there is not a Ministerial Meeting. In 
these meetings, foreign affairs deputies from each Council state review progress, as well as 
permanent participant representatives. The first DMM was held in 2010. Canada has opted not to 
hold a DMM, indicating that they may not become permanent fixtures on the Council calendar. 
Working groups meet roughly two times a year, in between other Council meetings.  
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 The substantive work of the Council occurs through projects. To accomplish goals, states 
sponsor projects, sometimes co-sponsored by permanent participants or observers. To sponsor a 
project, the sponsor must conceive of the project, design its contents, fund agreed-upon costs and 
execute the agenda. Projects might include a scientific assessment or a technical project such as a 
search and rescue practice exercise or a plan to clean up a contaminant. States and sponsors 
typically bring these projects to a Council working group for consideration. Other states, 
observers or permanent participants can join the leadership of a project by co-sponsoring. The 
working group adopts the project under the leadership of the sponsors, unless another state 
vetoes the project. The working group then presents the project at a SAO meeting, at which point 
states have another opportunity to veto the project. States then approve the project at the 
Ministerial Meeting. At this point, working groups have likely carried out substantial work on 
the project, though a veto is still possible. After approval at the Ministerial Meeting, the working 
group completes the project between meetings and gives updates at its own meetings. As noted, 
the Council may establish a task force to complete a project at Ministerial Meetings or may defer 
the matter to an expert group.  
 The Council operates by consensus. This measure, in essence, gives each state a veto 
over any Council project. In Council meetings, states offer their support for projects, but need 
not comment. Thus, sometimes a state may oppose a project but not speak on it or exercise its 
veto. Therefore, we do not know definitely if states that do not directly voice support for a 
project indeed favour a course of action. Alternatively, once a state vetoes a project, discussion 
stops. Thus, it is difficult to know if countries that do not speak in this situation truly support a 
project or would have vetoed it had another state not vetoed it first. Each state has a de-facto veto 
in the Council as the institution operates according to consensus.  
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The Council has a robust agenda, sponsoring dozens of projects.  It undertook an average 
of 57 projects at a time from 1998 until 2004. This number tripled between 2004 and 2013, as 
currently the Council has more than 150 projects ongoing at any one time. About 90 per cent of 
Council projects proceed without negotiation or real debate. States, observers and permanent 
participants may provide statements of support for a project or technical suggestions, such as 
collaboration with a particular research program or employment of a certain database. In about 
ten per cent of cases, discussion turns into negotiations, with states vetoing projects in Council 
meetings, negotiating compromises or attempting to alter the intent of a project. An example of a 
project that proceeded without great political interference is the Survey of Living Conditions in 
the Arctic, which was a straightforward survey of Arctic residents. Chapter 6 discusses this 
project. An example of a project that provoked great debate, negotiation and compromise with 
threats of vetoes is the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), with the controversial issue 
being whether the final assessment would include a policy document. Chapters 2, 3 and 6 discuss 
this project. Major projects include the ACIA (2004) and the Arctic Human Development Report 
(2004). Other major projects include:  
- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (the CAFF)  
- Annual AMAP pollution assessments (2005-2013) (the AMAP) 
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)  
- Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)  
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)  
- Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic (completed 2011) (Task Force)  
- Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the PAME) 
- Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)  
- Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic (completed 2013) (Task Force)  
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task 
Force)  
- Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)  
- Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)  
The Council completes a variety of projects in seemingly disparate areas.  
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Each Council meeting agenda contains about 15 items. In other words, states discuss 
roughly 15 projects per meeting. In some cases, updates are brief and do not include discussion. 
In other cases, discussions can drag on for most of a meeting. States do not comment on every 
agenda item. For example, from 2004 until 2013, based on a sample of 10 meetings, states 
provided an average of 3.3 comments on 2.6 agenda items.
64
 Permanent participants commented 
on only one agenda item. About 15 observers attended each meeting, but only about five 
provided comments and those five only commented approximately once.  
A good case study to understand the process of a Council project is the assembly of the 
Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), a report synthesizing the state of, and threat to, 
biodiversity in the Arctic region. It is a project that was not overly contentious as it was a 
scientific assembly of data about biodiversity in a particular region, but had some small issues in 
its research design. State officials jointly authored the project between 2007 and 2013. The goal 
of the project was to “synthesize and assess the status and trends of biological diversity in the 
Arctic.”65 As with all Council projects, a state sponsored the assessment. Finland initially 
sponsored it in 2006, creating the work plan and providing initial funding. The United States, 
Denmark, Canada and Sweden contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the project and 
joined as co-sponsors in subsequent years.  States organized the project between 2004 and 2007. 
The idea for the ABA originated from the CAFF in meetings between 2004 and 2006, during 
Russia’s term as chair, as a means to fulfill obligations under a previously approved project, the 
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program.
66
 It also emerged from a goal of states in the 
CAFF to initiate a project that would support the work studying the consequences of climate 
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change commenced under the ACIA.
67
 Finnish representatives in the CAFF initially conceived 
of the project as a reasonably apolitical environmental scientific assessment responding to these 
two priorities. The CAFF and Finland announced the idea for the project at the Ministerial 
Meeting in Salekhard, Russia, in October 2006. Finnish officials then commenced on the project 
work plan.
68
 There was brief discussion of the project at the April 2007 SAO meeting in Tromsø, 
Norway, initiated by sponsor Finland.
69
 During this discussion, officials from the AAC and the 
GCI urged approval of the project work plan, while officials from the RAIPON stated optimism 
about the project.
70
 There were technical suggestions, as well. ICC officials suggested that the 
CAFF coordinate the ABA work plan with International Polar Year projects (an international 
Arctic science program), while Finnish officials stated that the CAFF must ensure that the ABA 
does not overlap with other projects before approval of the work plan.
71
  
 The CAFF presented the work plan and states gave formal approval of the project at the 
November 2007 SAO meeting in Narvik, Norway.
72
 The CAFF was instructed to deliver the 
report in four phases, namely: 1) a summary to be delivered in 2010; 2) a scientific report in 
2012; 3) a summary for policy-makers in 2013; and finally 4) policy recommendations later in 
2013.
73
 This schedule meant that work occurred during Norway, Denmark and Sweden’s terms 
as chair. At the November 2007 meeting, the United States delegation offered to co-sponsor the 
project, which the Finnish delegation accepted, eager to obtain funding for it.
74
 United States 
officials wanted to co-sponsor the project because it was scientific in nature and so presented a 
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good opportunity to fulfill Council obligations. There were no problems getting further 
consensus on the project. The permanent participants did not protest against the project and the 
CAFF stated specifically that the project would include traditional indigenous knowledge.
75
 
Delegations from Denmark, Canada and Russia all directly stated support for the project.
76
 The 
delegations from Norway, Iceland and Sweden did not state support or exercise a veto at this 
meeting. It was unclear whether these countries supported the project, though it was the type of 
scientific assessment they would likely support. The lack of explicit support could have indicated 
disapproval but an unwillingness to exercise a veto; however, such a situation was not the case. 
Norway’s delegation expressed support for the project at the November 2008 SAO meeting in 
Kautokeino, Norway.
77
 Delegations from Iceland and Sweden stated support for the project in 
October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, and contributed data to the project before that point.
78
  
The project proceeded smoothly and no contentious negotiations resulted. A steering 
committee of eight people directed the project, comprising representatives from Sweden, Iceland, 
the AAC, Canada, Finland, Denmark, Russia and the U.S.
79
 Sixteen people worked on the 
steering committee at various points, including representatives from the GCI and the United 
Nations Environment Program.
80
 There were 35 authors, drawn from every Council country, as 
well as non-Arctic countries.
81
 The project included contributions from more than 240 authors.
82
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Updates on progress were given at nine Council meetings between 2008 and 2012.
83
 Council 
state and permanent participants gave statements of support and offered kudos for the progress 
made at these meetings, such as providing technical comments on drafts, making financial as 
well as personnel contributions and suggesting how the CAFF might disseminate the report. For 
example, at the November 2009 SAO meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, representatives from 
the RAIPON suggested that some of the information regarding reindeer herding was 
inaccurate.
84
 The CAFF delegates said that they would contact the World Reindeer Herders 
Association, an international reindeer herding organization, to verify the data.
85
 In these 
meetings, more sponsors emerged as progress proceeded smoothly and the project looked to be 
of a high quality. The Danish delegation announced Denmark would join the ABA as a co-
sponsor at the April 2008 SAO meeting in Svolver, Norway.
86
 Canada and Sweden joined as a 
co-sponsor in October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, after making financial contributions to the 
project.
87
 Funding ultimately came from every Arctic country, except Iceland and Russia, and 
additional funds came from the Nordic Council of Ministers, to which Iceland contributes.
88
  
The report revealed that 21,000 species are found in the Arctic and that climate change 
threatens the biodiversity of the region.
89
 Finland’s policy-makers conceived of the project as a 
scientific assessment within the existing mandate of the Council that would not create formal 
policy for states. The report included 17 policy recommendations, most of which are reasonably 
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unspecific, offering directions for further work and research.  For example, the report 
recommends that states “actively support international efforts addressing climate change, both 
reducing stressors and implementing adaptation measures, as an urgent matter,” to “require the 
incorporation of biodiversity objectives and provisions into all Arctic Council work and 
encourage the same for ongoing and future international standards, agreements, plans, operations 
and/or other tools specific to development in the Arctic” and to “reduce the threat of invasive 
alien/non-native species to the Arctic by developing and implementing common measures for 
early detection and reporting, identifying and blocking pathways of introduction, and sharing 
best practices and techniques for monitoring, eradication and control.”90 Each of these 
recommendations is relatively vague. The report does not indicate how states should “support” 
international climate change policy. The incorporation of “biodiversity measures” into all 
Council projects is not binding on states or other Council groups. It says states should develop 
“measures” to “reduce the threat of invasive” species, but does not initiate this process or 
indicate what these measures should include.  
This case illustrates a typical four-stage process in the development of a Council project. 
First, a state conceives a project in a working group and presents it to other Council states for 
approval. Second, the sponsor organizes and designs the project. Third, a working group 
completes the project between meetings by directing a steering committee or a group of 
researchers. During this stage, the working group or sponsoring nation updates other Council 
countries about the progress between meetings. Other countries can give comments or co-
sponsor the project as it unfolds, pending vetoes and objections. Fourth, once state delegations 
approve of a project at a ministerial meeting, the project is complete.  
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1.5 – How is the Arctic Council Evolving?  
 This section examines the five ways in which the Council is evolving. First, the Council’s 
mandate is growing to include economic issues. The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
highlighted that climate change will make the Arctic more accessible to potential resource 
extraction and shipping. It found that, “The average extent of sea-ice cover in summer has 
declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.”91 The Arctic has more than 90 billion barrels 
of oil in reserve as well as trillions of cubic metres of natural gas.
92
 As a result, after 2004 Arctic 
states increasingly emphasized emergency preparedness and search and rescue projects, which 
this dissertation will show are partly economic issues.
93
 The government of Canada has stated 
that its priorities are to encourage “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic 
shipping” and “sustainable communities.”94 As noted, the Council is establishing the Arctic 
Economic Council, its first overtly economic project without a strong environmental element.
95
  
 Second, the policy-making role of the Council is growing. “Policy-making role” refers to 
action undertaken to facilitate the creation of formal agreements or policy. When states created 
the Council, there was the hope or expectation among some commentators that the Council 
would be a strong body that would create policy, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. It became clear 
that this would not be the case soon after the Council began operations. The United States and 
Russia, in particular, opposed a policy role for the Council. The Council became a research 
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institution and a policy-recommendation body but it did not facilitate the creation of policy. 
Take, for example, the ACIA. It is a research assessment that collected information about climate 
change. It contains a set of policy recommendations, but it does not impose any obligations on 
states.
96
 States could have created an agreement on climate change in the Council, but did not. In 
fact, state policy-makers never seriously considered this option. However, in 2009, states began 
work on the creation of an agreement on Arctic search and rescue, followed by an agreement on 
response to oil spills in 2011. Earlier, states did not create formal policy in the Council on 
principle. Today, states are more willing to use the Council as a policy-making forum.  
 Third, the institutional power of the Council is evolving in that states created a permanent 
Council secretariat in 2011. The Council did not have a strong bureaucratic structure to organize 
and implement action for most of its history. The Council secretariat rotated between member 
countries every two years prior to April 2007, when Norway, Sweden and Denmark announced a 
temporary secretariat over six years that the three countries would host together in Tromsø, 
Norway. The Council announced that Norway would host a permanent secretariat when this 
temporary arrangement ended in 2013. (All of the working groups had permanent secretariats. 
The permanent participants had the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, formed, funded, at a cost of 
more than one million dollars a year, and hosted by Denmark since 1994.)
97
 This development of 
a permanent secretariat could give the Council a greater ability to initiate programs and organize 
action between Council countries. The bureaucratic robustness of the Council is increasing and 
thus the institutional capacity of the Council is growing.  
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 Fourth, an increasing number of observers wish to join the Council. The European Union, 
in particular, is seeking to become a permanent observer, creating controversy about what 
countries and organizations should be part of the Council and what they should be able to do.98 
This interest in the Council is challenging ideas about which actors can participate in Arctic 
politics, as well as the power of states and indigenous peoples in the region.  
Fifth, it is less clear if the role of permanent participants is evolving. There was optimism 
among many onlookers that permanent participants would be equal in influence with states when 
states founded the Council in 1996 with help from these groups.
99
 However, the permanent 
participants have faced numerous obstacles to their full participation, such as states being 
unwilling to treat them as equals and consider their contributions, and a lack of funds and 
resources to contribute to Council projects and meetings, as well as a new flood of observers and 
interest in the Council that demands even greater resources that these groups mostly do not 
have.
100
 The permanent participants are only able to contribute to about 20 per cent of Council 
projects.
101
 Each of the major evolutionary changes are discussed in its own chapter.  
1.6 – How Do Others Theorize the Arctic Council?  
How do other authors understand the Arctic Council? The Council represents an instance 
of international co-operation and many theories attempt to understand why states co-operate. 
Three such theories are functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism.  
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Functionalists argue that states are rational and seek to solve problems.
102
 States will co-
operate to solve problems automatically, without prompt, especially to address issues that spill 
over from other instances of co-operation.
103
 They will begin to co-operate on areas of low 
politics, which are issue areas where vital state interest and survival is not at stake.104 
Functionalist scholar David Mitrany writes that part of the explanation for international co-operation 
is the “general wish for a collective security system . . . after the shock of the two World wars.”105 
According to Mitrany, co-operation in areas less vital than collective security builds trust between 
states, which leads to further co-operation in more political issue areas.
106
 For example, in the 
words of noted functionalist scholar Ernst B. Haas, “The [European] Community began life with 
the collective commitment to change the basic rules of industrial development by widening the 
market for producers.”107 The theory first emerged in the 1950s to explain the emergence of the 
European Union. Haas writes, “Converging practical goals provided the leaven out of which the 
bread of European unity was baked.”108 Functionalist Karl W. Deutsch adds that it is possible to 
“abolish finally national conflict by speeding up economic growth and intercommunication 
everywhere.” 109 According to functionalists, international institutions will evolve automatically 
when new problems emerge.  
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Neoliberal institutionalists agree that states are rational, but argue states seek to make 
absolute gains as opposed to solve problems.
110
 According to neoliberal institutionalists, states 
could co-operate without attempting to resolve a pressing issue. They argue that when state goals 
change, so do international institutions, although change can be tempered by three elements: 1) 
path dependency, 2) norms and 3) the form of negotiation.
111
  
Neorealists argue that rational states seek to maintain independence in international 
relations above all other goals. Thus, relative gains, rather than absolute gains, motivate and 
constrain states when they co-operate.
112
 In other words, states co-operate when they stand to 
gain more than a rival. Neorealists do not rule out the possibility that an absolute gain could 
motivate a state. In the words of neorealist Kenneth Waltz, “Structurally we can describe and 
understand the pressures states are subject to.”113 He goes on, “We cannot predict how they will 
react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.”114 However, realists such 
as Joseph Grieco predict “the likely prevalence of the relative gains problem for cooperation.”115 
Neorealists assume relative gains considerations will motivate states in most cases, especially in 
instances where vital interests are at stake.116 The theory emerged in the 1970s to explain pattern of 
international relations during the Cold War in a scientifically rigorous manner. Neorealists affirm 
                                                 
110
 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory: Response to John Mearsheimer," 
International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 42. 
111
 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 
(1988): 386. 
112
 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in the Globalization of World Politics, 3rd edition, eds. John Baylis 
and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 143.  
113
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 71. 
114
 Ibid.  
115
 Joseph Grieco, “Modern Realist Theory and the Study of International Politics in the Twenty-First Century,” in 
Millennial Reflects on International Studies, eds. Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 70 
116
 For example see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 99; Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of 
Realism,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 932; Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell and Ducan 
Snidal, “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Co-operation,” The American Political Science Review 87, 
no. 3 (1993): 727; John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 
no. 3 (1995): 10.. 
  
 
29 
that to ensure survival, states must maintain a balance of power, where states “establish a formal 
alliance and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing 
side.”117 Great powers should be most influential in this process.118 Thus, international 
institutions will evolve in response to changes in the international balance of power and to help 
states make relative gains. Co-operation will be very difficult in such situations, but may be more 
possible when the balance of power is not at stake. Each of these three theories is explored in 
greater depth in subsequent chapters.  Suffice it to say at this point that they clearly disagree 
about how and why states co-operate. 
There is a great deal of empirical literature on the Arctic Council that seeks to understand 
the role of the institution in international governance. Some scholars see the institution as a non-
policy-making research forum with an environmental mandate. This group of authors includes 
political scientist Oran Young,
119
 diplomat Evan T. Bloom
120
 and political consultant Terry 
Fenge.
121
 Other scholars see the Council as a soft-law body that helps create international norms 
within its environmental mandate. This group of authors includes international lawyer Timo 
Koivurova,
122
 and political scientists Andrea Charron,
123
 Rob Huebert,
124
 Leena Heinamaki,
125
 
Alison Ronsen,
126
 Olav Schram Stokke
127
 and Monica Tennberg.
128
 Still, other authors write 
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outside of this debate. Political scientist Klaus Dodds conceives of the Council as an “actor-
network,”129 while historian John English examines the history of the Council and attributes its 
growth to broad international interests and domestic political concerns.
130
 The works of authors 
who write about particular areas of the Council are addressed in the individual chapters relevant 
to their work.   
In terms of the normative literature, many authors argue that the Council should address a 
wider range of issues and take stronger policy action. They include political scientist Michael 
Byers,
131
 lawyer Oded Cedar
132
 political scientist Franklyn Griffiths,
133
 historian Whitney 
Lackenbauer,
134
 the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program,
135
 legal scholar David 
Vanderzwaag
136
 and consultant Brooks B. Yeager.
137
 Their works see the Council as a major 
institution to improve Arctic governance. For example, the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security 
Program released a report in 2012 that advocated the Council become a stronger, more robust 
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international body. It encouraged Canada to push for a “new funding mechanism” so the Arctic 
Council can undertake more projects.
138
 An example might be a stable budget. It also proposed, 
“Any candidate for Arctic Council observer status must publicly declare its respect for the 
sovereignty of Arctic states and the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples.”139 This measure would 
increase the influence of indigenous peoples in the organization, as it would recognize their 
inalienable governance rights. The organization also encouraged Canada to “work to continue 
the evolution of the Arctic Council from a decision-shaping body into a negotiating forum for 
new binding agreements.”140  
1.7 – How is the Thesis Structured?  
 Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the reasons for the evolution and 
growth of the Council’s mandate. Functionalism would expect the mandate to expand 
automatically when doing so is in states’ technical interests, while neorealists would credit 
regional balance of power concerns. Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that state interest, 
as well as the form of negotiation, explain mandate growth. Chapter 2 argues that the mandate of 
the Council is growing because climate change is creating economic opportunities states want to 
exploit. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the growth of the 
Council’s mandate, although institutional competence as predicted by functionalism also is 
important.  
 Chapter 3 explores the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. Functionalism 
would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand automatically in response to issue 
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spillover, whereas neorealists would expect the policy-making role to evolve as the result of 
regional balance concerns and the desires of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars 
would expect the policy-making role of the Council to expand when doing so offers potential, 
absolute gains for states. Chapter 3 argues that the policy-making role of the Council is growing 
because formal policy helps states make economic gains in the Arctic region. Neoliberal 
institutionalism explains the reasons states have opted to create policy in the Council, but 
neorealism explains the types of policy created in the Council.  
Chapter 4 discusses the reasons for the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the 
Arctic Council and the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Functionalism would 
expect states to have established the secretariat to ensure efficiency and trust between Council 
countries, whereas neorealism would expect the evolution in terms of power concerns. 
Neoliberal institutionalism would argue that the evolution took place to enhance state absolute 
gains and economic interest. Chapter 4 argues that the institutional capacity of the Council is 
expanding because it helps states make absolute gains, as per the expectations of neoliberal 
institutionalism. However, states have deliberately designed the secretariat to ensure the Council 
will not challenge state autonomy in the Arctic, in line with predictions of neorealism.  
Chapter 5 examines the evolving role of the observers and explains the reasons for their 
increased interest in the Council. Functionalism would expect observers to have influence if their 
participation contributes to the work of the Council, whereas neorealism predicts that regional 
position concerns explains their participation and influence. Neoliberal institutionalism predicts 
that observers can be influential in the Council, especially if they can provide compelling 
information and ideas to states. The chapter argues that economics partly explain the 
participation of observers. States seek to become observers in the Council to gain influence over 
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the economic development of the region and environment protection. Arctic members accept 
new observers when their participation promises to improve the economic prospects of the Arctic 
region and provide economic opportunities. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis 
on the importance of absolute gains in international relations, provides the best explanation for 
why observers seek to join the Council.  
 Chapter 6 addresses the role, evolution and influence of permanent participants in the 
Arctic Council. Functionalism would predict that the permanent participants could be full and 
influential members of the Council, in contrast to neorealist theorists who would expect them to 
be powerless actors. Neoliberal institutionalism would predict that the permanent participants 
could be influential depending on the effectiveness of their agency, or their ability to persuade 
states of the merit of their views. Chapter 6 argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the 
best explanation for the influence of permanent participants. Permanent participants are less 
influential than states in the Council, but can have influence based on their agency, or their 
ability to lobby and ally with states to achieve desirable outcomes.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the major conclusions of each chapter, and the contributions of 
this thesis to literature on the Arctic Council as well as international relations theory. It then 
proposes some directions for further research. It concludes that the economic potential of the 
Arctic region explains the growth of the Council, tempered by the interests of great powers, and 
that this evolution is relatively unaffected by the needs of Arctic residents. If the economic 
potential of the Arctic region were not as strong as it is currently, we would not see the same 
evolution of the Council. This conclusion is no doubt distressing for commentators and scholars 
concerned about the environmental future of the Arctic. The Council is evolving from an 
environmental institution dedicated to studying and preventing environmental damage to a forum 
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promoting the economic future of the Arctic, possibly at the expense of the environment. This 
thesis concludes that neoliberal institutionalism is correct in emphasizing state action motivated 
by absolute gains, but underestimates the importance of great power gains in determining 
outcomes.  
Chapters in this thesis are summarized as follows: 
Table 1.1: Summary of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Explaining the Expanding Mandate of the Council 
Chapter 3 Explaining the Policy-Making Role of the Council  
Chapter 4 Explaining the Evolving Institutional Capacity of the Arctic Council 
Chapter 5 Explaining the Role of Observers in the Arctic Council 
Chapter 6 The Evolution of the Arctic Council Permanent Participant’s Status, 
Rights and Influence 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
1.8 – What Are the Contributions of the Thesis?  
As a whole, the thesis enhances our understanding of the Arctic Council and its 
evolution.  Each chapter contributes a case study to the empirical literature on the Council and 
tests the ability of three theories to explain institutional evolution. Chapter 2 provides the first 
comprehensive understanding of the ongoing, contemporary political debates around the 
Council’s mandate. As noted, earlier work attempted to understand the Council’s role in regional 
governance, concluding that it is either a research institution
141
 or a soft-law institution.
142
 Many 
authors debate whether the Council’s mandate should expand.143 This chapter concludes that the 
Council is increasingly an economic institution and mandate expansion outside of this area is not 
likely.  
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Chapter 3 addresses the debate in literature about the role of the Arctic Council in two 
ways. First, some writers do not see the Council as a policy-making body, but rather as a 
research body,
144
 while others identify the Council as a “soft-law” body, or an international 
institution that helps create norms.
145
 This thesis examines whether either of these 
characterizations is accurate and ultimately argues for a new understanding of the Council as a 
policy-facilitating forum. Second, as noted, a large body of literature argues that the Council’s 
policy-making role should expand, in that it should make more policy, more often.
146
 This thesis 
helps understand the realities of the Council’s current expansion and finds that the Council’s 
policy-making role is already growing due to the economic potential of the Arctic region. Policy-
making outside of issue areas with a strong economic dimension is unlikely. 
Chapter 4 explains a change in the Council that current literature did not expect; namely, 
the growth in its institutional capacity. Instead, many authors expected the Council to remain a 
weak institution, with some informal capacity stemming from soft-law or norms;
147
 however, 
institutional growth is ongoing. This thesis argues that the expansion of institutional capacity is 
occurring because state policy-makers have deemed it is necessary to help the Council carry out 
its expanded mandate. It lends support to calls for the Council to undertake more work.
148
 A 
greater bureaucratic capability will be necessary to allow such work to take place. Chapter 4 
argues that the current bureaucratic arm of the Council will not allow it to become the strong 
governance body, desired by many scholars.  
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Chapter 5 examines a controversy in the literature. Many authors see the observers as 
relatively non-consequential actors in the Council that contribute relatively little of substance to 
it.
149
 In contrast, Timo Koivurova argues that the observers’ presence in the Council is changing 
norms about what actors have the right to participate in Arctic governance.
150
 For Koivurova, the 
observers make the Council a more international body, in which a variety of actors come 
together to address environmental issues of global consequence. This thesis examines which of 
these two perspectives is most accurate in the contemporary Arctic Council by thoroughly 
examining the history of observers in the institution. It concludes that the observers are relatively 
minor contributors, but that their interest in the Council demonstrates state enthusiasm for the 
region’s economic future and environmental importance.  
Chapter 6 addresses a debate in literature on the Council permanent participants. Earlier 
literature debated whether the permanent participants would have “full participation” in the 
Council,
151
 while later literature saw the permanent participants as minor yet important 
contributors to a fundamentally state-centric institution,
152
 whose presence grants the Council a 
certain amount of legitimacy.
153 
 The chapter evaluates the merits of these arguments and 
concludes that the permanent participants are more influential now than ever before, but they still 
have significantly less influence than do states.  
This thesis contributes to international relations theory by testing the assumptions of 
functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 test predictions 
about the influence of international institutions, while Chapter 5 assesses assumptions about the 
                                                 
149
 Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 13. 
150
 Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 146.  
151
 Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712; Jennifer McIver, “Environmental Protection, Indigenous 
Rights and the Arctic Council: Rock, Paper, Scissors on the Ice?,” Geographical International Environmental Law 
Review 10, no. 147 (1997): 147. 
152
 Young, “Governing the Arctic” 13. 
153
 Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 151. 
  
 
37 
composition of international institutions. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also examine predictions as to 
whether international institutions can influence international politics. Chapter 5 tests whether 
non-member states are important in this process. Chapter 6 tests assumptions about the 
composition of international institutions vis-à-vis the permanent participants. It evaluates the 
assumptions that these theories make about non-state actors in international institutions, as 
permanent participants are non-state actors with membership in the Council. These theories 
assume that they are outsiders, lobbying states. Chapter 6 assesses their power as insiders that are 
seemingly able to compete with states for influence. As such, the thesis provides insights into the 
validity and reliability of international relations theories. It suggests the relevance of neoliberal 
institutionalism, if adjusted to include aspects of neorealism and functionalism.  
Overall, the thesis tests the following broad theoretical questions of relevance to 
international relations:  
Functionalism 
 Are states allowing the Council to evolve automatically in response to issue spillover and 
clear issues demanding a policy response? Do non-state actors participate fully in the 
Council? 
Neorealism 
 Are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and 
accommodate great power interest? Are non-state actors powerless in the Council?  
Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Are states allowing the Council to evolve to fulfill absolute gains? Do non-state actors 
have influence in the Council based on their agency?  
By answering these questions in regards to the various ways in which the Arctic Council is 
evolving, it contributes both an empirical case study and theoretical insights.  
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1.9 – What Methodology is Employed?  
This thesis as a whole presents a case study of international co-operation. Each instance 
of evolution represents its own case study. The use of a single case study to understand 
circumstances of international co-operation is advantageous because a narrow study makes it 
easier to thoroughly and systematically understand complex dynamics, the operation of a 
phenomenon or a causal mechanism.
154
 A single case study is limiting because conventional 
methodological wisdom says that it is not possible to generalize from a single case.
155
  
Nonetheless, each case study adds to the body of knowledge from which generalizations can be 
drawn. Single cases also can reveal scientific facts, hypotheses and theoretical propositions to be 
confirmed through further case work or studies with a large number of cases.
156
 Some scholars, 
such as economic geographer Bent Flyvbjerg, argue that the type of in-depth understanding 
gleaned from single case studies is particularly suited to innovative learning.
157
 The single case 
study also can be of value because one can communicate a level of complexity and contradiction 
that multiple case study research makes more difficult.
158
 Simple and eloquent theory is still 
possible while understanding the complexity of events.
159
 
This thesis employs historical process tracing, which is “the systematic examination of 
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in the light of research questions and hypotheses 
posed by the investigator.”160 It “inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation” and 
“gives close attention to sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables.”161 
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Historical process tracing involves mapping and thoroughly understanding the stages and steps in 
an event, which in this case is the evolution of the Arctic Council. This process unveils causal 
mechanisms, or the cause of a phenomena or event.
162
 A major advantage of process tracing is 
that understanding the process of an event can help overcome common problems in research, 
such as “reciprocal causation, spuriousness and selection bias.”163 Reciprocal causation refers to 
situations in which multiple factors impact one another, making causation difficult to deduce. 
Spuriousness refers to situations in which a relationship between two variables is a coincidence, 
yet mistakenly understood as a causal relationship. Selection bias occurs when an inappropriate 
variable or piece of data is chosen to study a relationship. Understanding the order of events and 
process tracing helps untangle these complex relationships.  
Using historical process tracing, the thesis examines Council meetings and studies the 
significant events outside those meetings. It explains why these events took place and provides a 
comprehensive history of the Arctic Council. It examines the discussions, agenda items, projects 
and decisions undertaken by the Council and how these changed over time. It analyzes the key 
bargaining coalitions and explains the reasons these coalitions emerged. Most of the events in 
Council meetings are routine and straightforward. The historical process tracing focused on 1) 
discussions that spurred great controversy, which reveal areas of potential evolution, and 2) 
events related to debates about the five instances of evolution that this thesis examines. 
The results of the historical process tracing form the dependent variables for the analysis. 
The expectations of the major international relations theories form the independent variables for 
the analysis. Chapter 2 examines the output of the Council and its discussions on projects. It 
looks specifically for instances in which states argued for or discussed expanding the mandate of 
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the Arctic Council. These instances form the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 3 
examines the output of the Council and its discussions of formal policy. It looks specifically for 
those instances in which there was controversy over the creation of policy. These instances form 
the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 4 examines the negotiations to form the 
Council’s secretariat. The stages in negotiation form the dependent variables. Chapter 5 
examines the negotiations to add observers to the Council and their activity once they were in the 
Council. These two sets of activities form the dependent variables, separate and yet interrelated. 
Chapter 6 examines the total output and activity of permanent participants in the Arctic Council. 
This activity is the dependent variable, expressed as a measure of their influence in the Council. 
The independent variables in Chapters 2 through 6 are the expectations about institutional 
growth drawn from international relations theory. Table 1.2 provides more details about these 
variables and how they relate to each chapter in this analysis.  
Table 1.2: Variables 
Dependent Variable (Chapters 2-5) Independent Variable (Chapters 2-5)  Related Theory  
Changes in Council mandate State interest Functionalism 
Changes in policy-making Automatic expansion Functionalism 
Establishment of secretariat Issue spillover Functionalism 
Interest in new observers Competency  Functionalism 
 Institutional capacity Functionalism 
 Interest group pressure Functionalism 
 Absolute gain Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Economic potential Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Form of negotiation Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Path dependence Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Norms Neoliberal institutionalism 
 Relative gains Neorealism  
 Great power interest Neorealism 
 Balance of power Neorealism 
Dependent variable (Chapter 6)  Independent variable (Chapter 6)  Related Theory  
Influence of permanent participants Provision of quality of information  Functionalism 
 No influence/incorrect appearance of 
influence 
Neorealism 
 Form of negotiation/agency of actors  Neoliberal institutionalism 
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This thesis includes data collected from five sources. First, the history of the Council’s 
activities and decisions is traced from 5,100 pages of the minutes of Council meetings and other 
Council documents. These minutes provided an outline of the activities of the Council, as well as 
its discussions and decisions. Second, to understand why decisions were made, 33 interviews 
were conducted with policy-makers from all of the Arctic states and representatives of the 
permanent participant organizations. These were elite interviews, designed to “reconstruct an 
event or set of events.”164 In elite interviews, “the aim is not to draw a representative sample of a 
larger population . . . but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players who 
have participated in the political events being studied.”165 Interviewees were selected on the basis 
of reputation and the number of Council meetings attended. The interviews were semi-structured. 
They probed events, discussions and decisions, thus building on the knowledge derived from the 
meeting minutes. The questions specifically asked for insights about internal discussion around 
decisions. Twenty-one of the interviews took place in person, in Ottawa, Ontario, and 
Washington, D.C., at a site of the interviewee’s choosing during spring and winter 2013. The rest 
occurred via Skype or email in the summer of 2013. Follow-up interviews and correspondence 
occurred in fall 2014. Seventeen interviewees wished to remain anonymous, largely because of 
conditions imposed by their employer, such as the government of Canada, or fear of negative 
consequences for revealing sometimes politically sensitive information about Council 
proceedings.  In such cases, quotes are attributed so as not to reveal the person’s identity (for 
example, “a senior Canadian foreign affairs official and a former Council delegation member”). 
Fourteen interviewees asked to see and potentially edit quotes before attribution and their wishes 
were respected. Two interviewees allowed attribution without a review. The questions posed 
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varied with the interviewee, depending on which meetings they attended. Examples are in 
appendix one. Third, attending the October 2013 Council meeting in Whitehorse, Yukon, 
facilitated gaining first-hand experience of the operation of the Council and the policy-making 
process of meetings. Conversations were held with Council policy-makers and state delegation 
members who provided insights into the history of the Council. Fourth, the WikiLeaks database 
provided more than one dozen diplomatic cables relating to Council decisions that explained the 
reasons behind state action. Fifth, policy-makers made more than a dozen pages of classified 
documents related to the Council available to the researcher.  
In conclusion, this thesis assesses of the evolution of the Arctic Council. It answers the 
following question: what explains the Council’s evolution? It formed as a weak environmental 
research forum but has grown into a broad policy-making institution of global governance.   
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING THE EXPANDING MANDATE OF THE COUNCIL 
The mandate of the Arctic Council is undergoing great change and evolution. Although 
the Council emerged to facilitate as well as promote co-operation on environmental protection 
and sustainable development in the Arctic region, the mandate does not specifically limit its 
work to these two areas. The only issue off-limits to the Council is military security. In the past, 
the Council carried out mostly environmental work as it developed into a research institution that 
produced scientific reports and technical projects about the Arctic. In recent years, the mandate 
has functionally expanded in that it addresses more issues, namely economics and public safety, 
such as business representation, search and rescue and oil spill response. The mandate could 
expand further as states seek to exploit economic opportunity in the region.  
This chapter answers the following question: why is the mandate of the Council 
evolving? “Mandate” refers to the types of issues states instruct the Council to address. The 
Council’s formal mandate has not changed. Rather, its informal mandate, or the types of issues it 
addresses, has expanded. This chapter explains changes in the Council’s mandate using 
neoliberal institutionalist theory, neorealist theory and functionalist theory. Functionalism would 
predict that an institution’s mandate would expand automatically due to state interest, issue 
spillover, institutional pressure or outsider lobbying. Neoliberal institutional theory would 
predict the institution’s mandate would expand when states stand to gain something through co-
operation, particularly when the gain is economic, and also that the form of negotiation impacts 
outcomes.  Neorealist theory would predict that the Council’s mandate would expand when 
doing so enhances relative gains and regional balance. The chapter concludes that neoliberal 
institutionalism, complimented with arguments from functionalism, provide the best explanation 
for the Council’s evolution and that the economic potential of the Arctic explains the mandate’s 
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growth. If the economic potential of the Arctic were not perceived to be increasing, the Council’s 
mandate would not expand. The central argument of this chapter is that the Arctic Council’s 
mandate is undergoing expansion and addressing more issues than ever before because the 
increasing economic potential of the Arctic region provides an incentive for states to co-operate 
and increase its work. In addition, the fact that the Council has demonstrated that it is competent 
to take on a greater range of issues and that interest groups effectively lobbied for mandate 
expansion contributed to growth. The first section details the theory employed in this chapter. 
The second section traces the evolution of the Council’s mandate from 1996 until 2013 to 
establish that the mandate has indeed undergone expansion. The third section explains the 
mandate’s evolution by reconciling trends in the Council’s history with the hypotheses of 
neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism. 
This chapter contributes to the academic literature in three important ways. First, no 
existing work systematically examines and seeks to understand the current evolution of the 
Arctic Council’s mandate. In the study of the Council, a first group of authors focus on why it 
emerged, as seen in work by political scientist Oran Young,
166
 political scientist Olav Schram 
Stokke,
167
 American diplomat Evan Bloom,
168
 consultant Terry Fenge,169 political scientist Rob 
Huebert,
170
 historian John English
171
 and political scientist Timo Koivurova.
172
 These authors 
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mostly view the institution as a research body that facilitates information sharing on 
environmental issues, occasionally inspiring action.
173
 A second group of authors, led by Timo 
Koivurova, disagree and view the Council as a norm-creation body that creates soft-law on 
environmental issues.
174
 This chapter argues that a new conceptualization of the Council as an 
economic facilitator is necessary.  
Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body 
of work, especially the work of the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, argues the Council’s 
mandate should expand further,
175
 while some authors, especially work by Oran Young, argue it 
should maintain its current structure.
176
 This work largely ignores the political context of the 
Council. For example, political scientist Michael Byers advocates that the Council should create 
an oil spill prevention treaty, but does not examine why the Council rejected such a treaty when 
creating an oil spill response treaty.
177
 Other authors who advocate a greater role for the Council 
are cited in Chapter 1. This paper argues that subsequent mandate expansion is unlikely into 
policy areas without a strong economic imperative.  
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Third, this chapter contributes to literature that tests the explanatory reliability and 
validity of neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism. Case studies, such as this 
chapter, are necessary to prove the reliability and validity of theory. This chapter suggests the 
continued validity of neoliberal institutionalism, with some modification drawn from neorealism 
and functionalism.  
2.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council 
A series of predictions are necessary to provide a context to explain the evolution of the 
Council. Functionalism argues that institutions change without prompting and would make six 
predictions about Council evolution. The first four hypotheses explain state preferences, or why 
states want to evolve the Council. The fifth and sixth hypotheses predict outcomes of evolution.  
H1: The Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding because all member states stand to make 
absolute material gains through automatic expansion. 
 
Functionalists hold that the mandate of an institution will expand naturally when all states stand 
to gain something in a technical sense, such as a piece of information or capability that they 
would not otherwise have.178 According to functionalists, institutions will evolve without state 
prompting in a “self-sustaining” process.179 Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism predict 
that states would have to change institutions deliberately and would co-operate for different 
reasons. According to functionalism, “Driving the alleged self-sustaining integration process was 
. . . a mechanism called ‘spillover,’ . . . whereby the creation of a common policy in one sector 
generates the ‘need’ to transfer policy-making in related sectors to the supranational level as 
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well.”180 For example, states may desire to make gains by increasing trade with several countries 
and so an international institution will create a new free trade agreement. Creating a new free 
trade agreement means new trade routes might be necessary. Thus, the international institution 
would develop new trade routes, even though such work might be outside its original mandate. 
The development of these trade routes would be in the absolute interest of all member states. 
States will only act together when structural changes create unified preferences.  
H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic 
goal around a less political issue area. 
 
Functionalists argue that the Council’s mandate will expand because states seek to fulfill 
a mutual technocratic goal in a less political issue area, such as search and rescue or 
environmental monitoring.
181
 A less political issue area is a non-ideological issue, where actors 
generally agree on the overall goal. These are policy areas outside of vital state interest. The 
other theories studied would agree with this hypothesis, though functionalists emphasize this 
point. Other theories predict that states will be hesitant to co-operate in areas crucial to their 
interest, such as military security, since non-compliance could threaten state survival. Non-
compliance with a search and rescue agreement, for example, would present problems but would 
not threaten state security. Evolution in response to less political issue areas is automatic.
182
 For 
example, one functionalist interpretation of the formation of the European Union is that, 
“rational-bureaucratic technocracy” was “a benevolent social driving force” behind the 
organization.
183
 Co-operation on less political issues can build trust that leads to co-operation on 
more political issues.  
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H3: The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without 
disruption. 
 
Functionalists would predict that mandate expansion would occur when the organization 
has a reasonable degree of autonomy from states.
184
 In the words of political scientists Bastiaan 
van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, “There is also a political spillover, whereby 
supranational institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making autonomy, resulting in a 
situation in which the supranational executive sets the political agenda and independently carries 
the integration process forward.”185 As stated by functionalist David Mitrany, “Every functional 
link helps to build up a common legal order.”186 The other two theories examined argue that 
international institutions cannot become fully independent actors. The process toward gaining 
independence proceeds in five stages. First, states create international institutions to accomplish 
technocratic tasks. Second, international institutions automatically address new issues as 
challenges arise. Third, states grant these institutions a certain degree of independence to ensure 
they can complete their tasks efficiently.
187
 Independent institutions also help ensure co-
operation because states will be more likely to work together when no one state can dominate.
188
 
Fourth, states give up their own ability to dominate in order to ensure co-operation. Independent 
institutions are more efficient because they can help mediate among states when new problems 
emerge and generate new ideas.
189
 Fifth, independence allows international organizations to set 
agendas and even demand co-operation or action. Institutions also can encourage co-operation in 
subtle ways, such as by gathering information and facilitating the emergence of new issues.
190
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H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should 
expand. 
 
Functionalists would predict that interest groups and epistemic communities of 
individuals could help lobby states to increase the powers and responsibilities of the 
organization, as individuals can influence state policy.
191
 Individuals, epistemic communities and 
interest groups can bring information forward that impacts how states define their interests. 
Epistemic communities are groups of experts who share a common perspective on an issue. 
Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and expectations.”192 A difference between 
functionalism and the other theories is that functionalists hold that individuals or groups can 
influence states at the international level. For example, groups of individuals negatively impacted 
by climate change would demand institutional action to address the issue in the Arctic Council. 
Similarly, companies and individuals that can benefit from the economic opportunities of climate 
change would advocate the Arctic Council expand its mandate into the economic realm.  
H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent. 
Functionalists assert “organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional 
powers”; hence, the fact the Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding indicates that it has proven it 
can execute its current mandate.
193
 Governments want to entrust tasks to entities that can 
successfully complete those tasks. This idea contrasts with neoliberal institutionalists and 
neorealists, who privilege state interest for institutional expansion. For functionalists, mandate 
expansion is an evolutionary process as long as the institution is an effective one.
194
  
 
                                                 
191
 Mark Imber, “Functionalism,” in Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, eds. 
David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity, 2002): 301; Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of 
European Integration,” 21.  
192
 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21.  
193
 Imber, “Functionalism,” 293.  
194
 Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European Integration,” 21. 
  
 
50 
H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently. 
 
Functionalists would predict the Council is evolving automatically. As noted, on the 
international scene, new issues emerge that demand state response, which can create separate 
issues.
195
 For example, climate change presents a challenge to states that the Council will 
automatically address, given its mandate to work on the Arctic environment. The issue also 
presents economic opportunities in the region as melting sea ice opens potential trade routes and 
unlocks resources. The Council will automatically address economic issues because of its other 
work on climate change, which leads to institutional mandate expansion into economic areas. 
Functionalists would predict this process should proceed without interruption, in contrast to the 
other theories studied that predict institutional expansion is a highly political process.  
 Neoliberal institutionalists would hold four hypotheses about the evolution of the Arctic 
Council’s mandate, based on their emphasis on the material interests of states. The first three 
hypotheses explain state preferences to evolve the Council, while the fourth explains outcomes.  
H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain 
something through expansion. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states expand the Arctic Council’s mandate “when 
states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”196 States define their interests rationally, focusing 
on material gains. As long as all states gain something through mandate expansion, or make an 
absolute gain, they will be likely to co-operate.
197
 Functionalists expect states would co-operate 
to make absolute gains while neorealists expect co-operation to result in relative gains, defined 
later. For neoliberal institutionalists, the great powers of the Arctic (the United States and 
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Russia) must gain something through co-operation. In addition, the likelihood of co-operation 
will be high because all of the countries involved face the “shadow of the future.”198 In other 
words, all of the states in the Arctic Council interact on a number of issues and are thus likely to 
need to co-operate in the future. These states will strive to maintain good relations in the present. 
In the case of the Arctic Council, the likelihood of co-operation will be high. 
H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.  
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that economic gains are a particularly potent motivation 
for international co-operation and Council evolution.
199
 All theories would agree with this point, 
though neoliberal institutionalists emphasize this type of co-operation to the greatest extent.  
H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal, 
tempered by path dependence and norms. 
  
The Council’s mandate should expand to fulfill shared state goals and provide a technical 
service. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states use international institutions to “provide 
information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points 
for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.”200 Functionalists and 
neorealists mostly agree with this hypothesis. However, neoliberal institutionalists would expect 
that norms and path dependency impact institutional evolution.
201
 Norms refer to informal 
expectations and patterns of behaviour that states follow. Path dependency means that once a 
state invests resources in a project, it is unlikely to change course, even if it is clear the initial 
course of action was an unwise one. States will expand the Council’s mandate when it provides 
gains to states and no norms or path dependence holds evolution in check.  
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H4: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has 
an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.  
 
 Neoliberal institutionalists argue that agency, or the form of negotiation (e.g. the type of 
interaction between states) has an impact on the outcomes of negotiations.
202
 Thus, the Council’s 
mandate is evolving in part due to the form of negotiation. States, non-governmental 
organizations, interest groups and epistemic communities bring forward information that states 
may find persuasive. Outcomes may not reflect the interests of great powers, as neorealist 
scholars would predict. Functionalists would expect automatic evolution. Even small states can 
exert and impact on negotiations based on the persuasiveness of the information they brings 
forward, their ability to ally with like-minded states to form coalitions and the effective 
employment of persuasive negotiation tactics. 
 Neorealists make three predictions that explain when an institution’s mandate would 
expand, based on their emphasis on the importance of state security.  The first two hypotheses 
predict preferences while the third predicts outcomes.  
H1: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate. 
Neorealists would predict that relative gains, rather than absolute gains, would influence the 
evolution of the Council’s mandate. Relative gains refer to the notion that in interactions in 
which vital interests are a stake, states must gain more than rival states.
203
 Neoliberal 
institutionalists hold that in any interaction, a state will co-operate if it gains something, termed 
an absolute gain. Functionalists would emphasize absolute gains, as well. For neorealists, great 
powers would not agree to any change in the Council’s mandate if it had an impact on state 
security or its power relative to that of a rival. To quote neorealist scholar Robert Gilpin, 
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“Realism assumes that national security is and always will be the principle concern of states.”204 
Participation in the Council needs to enhance states’ ability to survive and self-help in the 
international system.
205 
Thus, the mandate could not negatively impact state survival or security 
in any way. Economic gains enhance state security, as a good economy is necessary to maintain 
independence and self-help in the international system.
206
 The same is true of environmental 
considerations, as a healthy environment is likely necessary to maintain independence. Other 
sorts of considerations can be important to states, though security concerns will underpin any 
state interaction or instance of institutional evolution. Neorealists would predict that the Council 
would not exist at all if it negatively influenced state security, even with its work on 
environmental protection. 
H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region. 
Neorealists would argue that states are evolving the mandate of the Council so the 
institution can maintain regional balance. A “balance” refers to a situation in which various 
coalitions of states have equal capabilities and thus will find conflict contrary to their interest. 
The Council could be an attempt to create balance against some external threat to the Arctic 
region or a coalition of powers in a different region, such as China. Alternatively, small powers 
could attempt to exert control over a great power within the Arctic.
207
 Neorealists argue that 
three tenets define the international system: statism, survival and self-help.
208
 They assert that 
states are the only important actors in the international system and fundamentally seek protection 
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from external threats. Neorealists expect that states will expand or evolve the mandate of the 
Arctic Council to create a balance against an external or internal challenge, potentially 
environmental or economic, which neoliberal institutionalists and functionalists do not.  
H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers. 
Neorealists argue that great powers would not enter into the Arctic Council or allow its 
mandate to change unless it met the interests of these actors.
209
 Neoliberal institutionalists and 
functionalists do not make this prediction. The great powers will always be the most important 
actors in the international system. For instance, in the European Union, “the role of major 
political players, namely Germany, France and the United Kingdom, is central.”210 Great powers 
have greater economic and military power than smaller powers. These powers have less need to 
co-operate than do other powers and can demand that any co-operation reflect its interests.
211
 
 We can review each theory by summarizing the question each theoretical lens attempts to 
answer. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s mandate evolving automatically in response 
to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The theory’s predictions would 
be falsified if evolution were not automatic or consistent. In regards to neoliberal 
institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s mandate to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, 
tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution 
was in response to relative gains and the form of negotiation was not important. In regards to 
neorealism, are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and 
accommodate great power interest? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if absolute gains 
motivated states, or if great power preference did not prevail in outcomes. Table 2.1 summarizes 
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the key variables examined in the analysis. Variables highlighted are key unique variables that 
prove or disprove the explanatory power of a theory.  
Table 2.1: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s mandate into economic 
and other areas 
Necessary (n)  
/ sufficient (s) 
Common ind. variables Less political issue area  S 
 Economic gains S 
Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something) N 
 Issue spillover  N&S 
 Independent institution N&S 
 Interest group or epistemic community lobbying N 
 Institution has proven competence N 
 Automatic response  N&S 
Neoliberal ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something) N&S 
 Shadow of the future N 
 Lack of path dependence N 
 Lack of contrary norms N 
 Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions) N&S 
Neorealist ind. variables Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals) N&S 
 No security ramifications N 
 “Balance” motivations N&S 
 Great power preference reigns supreme N&S 
Necessary and sufficient conditions are highlighted because they are the key variables that will 
prove or disprove the predictions of the various theories.  
2.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council 
 This section shows that the Council’s mandate expanded between 1996 and 2013. The 
Arctic Council’s mandate has proceeded to grow in four periods. During the first period, from 
1991 until 1996, states co-operated on environmental issues in the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS). States and governments debated the merits of transforming the 
AEPS into a stronger institution that would address human security issues and perhaps military 
security. In the second period, from 1996 until 2004, the Council emerged as an institution to 
promote environmental protection and sustainable development. States and governments debated 
the definition of “sustainable development” and the place of military security within this 
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mandate. In the third period, from 2004 until 2007, Russia committed action to shift emphasis in 
the Council’s work to emergency preparedness from environmental protection and sustainable 
development. Environmental research was still a major part of the Council’s work as research 
revealed the problem of climate change in the Arctic region. In the fourth period, from 2008 until 
the present, the Council promoted economic growth, in addition to addressing environmental 
issues and sustainable development issues. The Arctic Council has evolved from an institution 
that promotes environmental conservation and sustainable development to an institution that also 
promotes regional economic growth, in response to opportunities created by climate change.  
2.2.1 – 1991-1996 
 From 1991 until 1996, states debated the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) and Council mandate. To establish that evolution in the Council’s mandate has taken 
place, it is necessary to understand the institution’s intended mandate at its founding. This 
subsection seeks to answer two questions. First, what was the intended mandate of the Council at 
its founding for each actor? Second, what were the major debates about the Council’s mandate?  
In terms of the first question, all of the Arctic states intended and agreed that the Council 
mandate should have a strong environmental component because it was a successor to the AEPS, 
an environmental body in which states researched the extent of Arctic pollution. The AEPS 
emerged partly to encourage co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union 
following the Cold War, which led to the creation of the Council. As noted in Chapter 1, the 
United States and its western allies competed for global dominance with the Soviet Union and its 
eastern comrades from 1945 until 1991. The Arctic, lying between the two adversaries, would 
have been a theatre of combat in any military conflict. The United States counted four other 
Arctic countries as allies in its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective defence 
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regime, namely Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. Another Arctic country, Sweden, was 
formally neutral but more closely allied with the West than the East. The government of the 
other Arctic state, Finland, faced difficulty, as relations with its Russian neighbour were 
historically problematic. Finland was a colony of Russia for 108 years leading up to the First 
World War. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, which resulted in Finland losing a tenth 
of its territory after the war. Finland’s governments sought to maintain good relations with its 
neighbour throughout the Cold War by opting not to join NATO, while working to avoid being 
drawn behind the Iron Curtain. In the 1980s, the administration of hawkish United States 
President Ronald Reagan increased military spending and the Soviet economy under Premier 
Mikhail Gorbachev weakened. The United States increased its annual military spending to 
$456.5 billion in 1987 from $325.1 billion in 1980.
212
 The Soviet Union struggled to keep pace, 
leading to economic problems and contributing to its fall. Nuclear war seemed more likely than 
at any point since the 1960s as 1970s attempts to create détente faded.  
Toward the later 1980s, the AEPS was created as hope increased that an Arctic 
governance institution could emerge with a collaborative, peace-building mandate. The United 
States Department of State issued an Arctic policy document in April 1983, the United States 
Arctic Policy, which indicated it was interested in expanding Arctic co-operation, though it did 
nothing to follow up on this statement.
213
 Relations between the Soviet Union and the United 
States subsequently worsened after the Soviet Union shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 on 
September 1, 1983. In 1985, political scientist Oran Young authored an article in Foreign Policy 
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magazine that called on states to proclaim the Arctic a “zone of peace.”214 On October 1, 1987, 
in the wake of the negotiation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a 
general improvement in Soviet-United States relations, a conciliatory Gorbachev gave a speech 
in Murmansk, Soviet Union, which echoed Young’s words by advocating making the Arctic a 
“zone of peace.”215 The government of Finland was inspired by these words and contacted 
foreign affairs departments in the Arctic states to convene a conference on this subject.
216
 There 
seemed to be a possibility in the late 1980s that an Arctic institution with a peace-building 
mandate could emerge, which incidentally led to the creation of the AEPS and Council.  
These discussions lead to the AEPS and Council because there was also hope that an 
Arctic institution with an environmental mandate could emerge. Finnish policy-makers were 
particularly hopeful that collaboration on environmental protection could ease Cold War 
tensions. States first became aware of Arctic contamination problems due to observations by 
pilots flying over the Arctic in the 1970s.
217
 In the 1980s, Arctic states and indigenous groups 
were concerned after it became clear “that sloppy Russian workmanship has led to an increase in 
nuclear pollution in the environmentally sensitive Arctic Ocean.”218 The Soviet Union unsafely 
stored nuclear waste in the Kola Peninsula that borders Finland. The Soviet Union did not have 
regulations to govern the storage of the cancer causing industrial coolant polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCB) safely.
219
  In bilateral meetings, the government of Finland had difficultly 
convincing the Soviet Union to take action on this issue.
220
 On both issues, states knew the 
problem existed, but did not understand the extent of the problem. The environment emerged as 
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an issue around which states could collaborate to ease Cold War tensions, which would set the 
stage for the emphasis on environmental protection in the Arctic Council.  
The Council’s intended mandate emphasizes environmental protection because the AEPS 
emerged as an environmental organization. Relations between Cold War adversaries continued to 
improve as the Soviet Union began to dissolve after 1989. Finland successfully convened a 
conference on Arctic governance in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989 after two years of 
requests and letters sent to Arctic governments. It took so long to convene a conference because 
many Western policy-makers did not believe the sincerity of Gorbachev’s proposal, since he had 
not proposed to close the Soviet Union’s military installations in the Arctic, as noted in Chapter 
1. International co-operation between East and West of this type was new and so state officials 
had low expectations for this meeting. Before the meeting, policy-makers mutually decided to 
work to take “co-operative measures to protect the Arctic environment.”221 After three further 
meetings, (April 1990 in Yellowknife, Canada, January 1991 in Kiruna, Sweden and June 1991 
in Rovaniemi, Finland) states created the AEPS. The AEPS was not an international institution, 
per se, but rather a research strategy. The meetings were not contentious, amid a spirit of co-
operation. In addition, the AEPS was a scientific strategy that did not have the sorts of impacts 
on vital state interest that create contentious negotiations. States created four working groups, 
staffed by government scientists and experts from each Arctic country, to meet and compile 
research on Arctic environmental issues. The AEPS would hold bi-annual meetings of 
environment department officials to share findings. The four working groups were the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which compiled reports on the extent of 
Arctic pollution; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), which studied the health of 
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plants and animals; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR), which prepared 
for potential emergency situations, such as an oil spill, and; the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME), which monitored the extent of Arctic marine pollution. The AEPS came 
into being because it was not overly ambitious, but it compiled useful scientific information.  
The AEPS led to the creation of the Council because within three years, state researchers 
had done a great deal of work to establish the extent of Arctic pollution, which provided the 
impetus to continue this work in the Arctic Council. The AEPS found more than 180,000 tonnes 
of PCB fluids had been produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, without safe 
storage or disposal facilities.
222
 The process to create the Council began as state policy-makers 
informally debated how to continue and formalize this work. The prospect of an Arctic 
international institution was on the agenda, prompted by Gorbachev’s earlier proposal for an 
Arctic zone of peace. Canada came to champion a weakened version of a 1991 proposal from the 
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) that called for the creation of a formal Arctic international 
organization to promote the region as a zone of peace.
223
 The ICC’s President, Mary Simon, had 
some influence in the 1990s Canadian Liberal government, as she had represented the Inuit 
during the 1982 repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the negotiation of the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement. As detailed by John English, she pressed Canada to establish the 
Council during her various interactions with the government during the early 1990s and helped 
organize a conference on the proposal in 1992.
224
 The process leading to the creation of the 
Council began in 1995, during a meeting in Ottawa between United States President Bill Clinton 
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and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien.
225
 Chretien proposed the creation of the Arctic 
Council. Clinton agreed to discuss the issue and so Canadian officials sent communications to 
the other Arctic state foreign affairs departments, which also agreed to discuss creating a council. 
Policy-makers in the Nordic countries in particular were enthusiastic about the prospect of an 
Arctic council.
226
 Russian policy-makers were more reluctant, but agreed to discuss the idea.
227
 
State delegations attempted to negotiate the creation of a formal Arctic international organization 
outside of AEPS meetings and through teleconferencing during 1995, as well as a round of 
negotiations in Ottawa during June, with the goal of seeing the AEPS transition from a strategy 
to an international institution by the end of that year. As is evident in subsequent chapters, 
contentious issues emerged in these early negotiations, which continue in the Council to this day. 
This chapter limits its focus to contentions over the mandate.    
The Nordic governments strongly intended that the Council’s mandate have a strong 
environmental component. The major reason these states supported a Council is that their policy-
makers sought to force Russia to address environmental issues. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic 
states had a desire to address pollution in the Russian Arctic, having received troubling 
information about the unsafe storage of nuclear and other waste materials after the end of the 
Cold War.
 228
 However, contaminants and persistent organic pollutants (POP) from Russia 
affected the Nordic countries more than North America,
229
 particularly Finland and Norway, 
given these countries’ proximity.230 One policy-maker summarized, “I felt the leading countries 
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[in negotiations] were in Scandinavia.”231 The force of the scientific evidence about 
environmental problems in Russia gave the Nordic countries, as well as Canada and the United 
States, a powerful bargaining chip to push for an Arctic council.  
Canada, the United States and the Nordic countries also intended that the Council have an 
environmental mandate because many policy-makers had a concern that Russia did not want to 
address environmental issues. Arctic environmental policy-makers believed that Russians had 
the weakest environmental awareness of any Arctic country. Russian officials were “extremely 
nonchalant,” with the misguided belief that “Russia is a gigantic country” too large to suffer 
serious environmental damage.
232
 The Russian economy went through a depression following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as gross domestic product fell by more than fifty per cent during the 
1990s.
233
 The Russian government closed half its Arctic environmental monitoring stations, amid 
budget shortfalls.
234
 The top priority for Russian policy-makers became the country’s economic 
recovery.  
Policy-makers outside Russia intended a Council with an environmental mandate for fear 
that many Russian officials opposed environmental action, as environmentalists were at the 
forefront of the country’s democracy movement. International Russian experts believed, “A lot 
of the constituency for democratic reform came from the environmental community” because 
after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster it was clear “that the Russian regime was ignoring Russia’s 
many environmental problems.”235 In 1996, as the Council was coming into being, the Russian 
government “downgraded” its environmental department from a ministry to a less-powerful 
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“state committee.”236 In 2008, the Russian government combined the committee with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources to become the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment.
237
 A United States expert on Russia and Arctic policy-maker summarized, 
There was a growing pressure to tame this environmental beast that had politically been very 
important when the Soviet Union disappeared. As time went on, they made too many enemies 
within the power structures and largely industrial corporations . . . Since then, we’ve been 
watching very closely how Russia tries to manage its environmental policy functions.
238
 
 
Experts within the Arctic governments believed that “major oligarchs and industrial concerns” in 
Russia did not favour “any kind of strong environmental regulatory body coming out of 
Moscow.”239 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to capitalism led to privatization 
of natural resources and former state business that created a class of wealthy business people in 
the country unprecedented in Russian history.
240
 Policy-makers outside Russia saw this class as 
hostile to environmental regulation.
241
 Economic concern and the importance of Russia as a 
regional player could have given it a strong bargaining chip to resist Arctic governance.   
Canada intended to create a Council with an environmental mandate, but it also intended 
that the Council find a way to formally consider the views of Northerners on Arctic governance 
and include a “human dimension” in the work of the AEPS.242 Indigenous peoples’ organizations 
also intended that an Arctic council include human security issues. Canada and the indigenous 
peoples’ organizations, particularly the ICC, became allies in the 1995 Council negotiations.243 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations first put human security issues on the AEPS agenda, which 
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led to a question as to the role of such issues in a new Arctic council. The three major indigenous 
peoples’ organizations that existed in 1991 participated in the AEPS as observers, namely the 
ICC, Saami Council and Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON). 
These groups and their members believed that it was unacceptable that they shared the same 
status as non-Arctic states in the AEPS even though they represented northern indigenous 
peoples. The three indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully organized a private meeting 
with the Arctic states to argue that they should have a special status in the AEPS. This meeting 
occurred during the September 1993 AEPS ministerial overview meeting in Nuuk, Greenland. 
The Arctic states agreed that these groups would have the right to attend every AEPS meeting. 
Observers could only attend the meetings to which states invited them.
244
 At the September 1993 
meeting, the permanent participants used the authority granted by the new status to pressure 
states to address human security in the AEPS. In response, at the same AEPS meeting, states 
created the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization to address human security 
under the rubric of sustainable development.
245
 This work by indigenous peoples’ organizations 
put human issues onto the agenda for a new Arctic Council. As one Arctic policy-maker 
summarized, “Once you started to set up a structure to address sustainable development . . . it 
starts to take on a life of its own.”246 Canada championed this cause for two reasons. The first 
factor was the domestic importance of the ICC. In 1994, as Canada began to consider the notion 
of an Arctic Council anew, it appointed Mary Simon as its first circumpolar ambassador and 
subsequently as its chief negotiator to create the new council. Second, much of the Nordic 
interest in Arctic governance stemmed from European environmental problems. Adding 
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sustainable development to the Council could help orient it toward projects of more interest to 
North America. Canada held a bargaining chip in negotiations: the support of northern residents 
in the three indigenous peoples’ organizations.  
In terms of the second major question about the Council’s mandate, two debates emerged 
as negotiations to create the Council began in 1995. The first debate concerned the role of human 
security in the new institution. Two alignments developed, amid differing state intentions for the 
creation of a new Council. In the first alignment, Russia and the United States did not support the 
concept. The United States’ policy-makers were leery of the political consequences of an 
emphasis on sustainable development. The AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and 
Utilization undertook controversial work soon after its founding. In 1995, the ICC brought a 
project to the task force called Collapse of the Seal Skin Market, which discussed the 1972 
United States Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products, as well 
as various economic hardships in Inuit communities.
247
 Earlier, in a 1985 report, the ICC had 
slammed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the major United States land claims act, as an 
act of assimilation by the United States government against the Inuit.
248
 Further, Canada had 
appointed the president of the ICC as its lead negotiator to create a Council. Policy-makers in the 
United States government came to fear a potential Arctic council as a venue to air grievances 
against the United States’ Arctic activities and challenge its national sovereignty.249 Russia did 
not strongly support adding sustainable development to the Council’s mandate due to a lack of 
understanding of the concept.
250
 During the September 1993 discussions of whether to create a 
sustainable development task force in the AEPS, Russian policy-makers were unfamiliar with the 
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meaning of the term and even had trouble translating it into Russian.
251
 In the second alignment, 
as noted, Canada and the indigenous peoples’ organizations supported adding it to the Council 
mandate, as did the Nordic states. As previously stated, Canada supported the concept in 
deference to indigenous peoples’ preference and to ensure the work of the Council was not too 
focused on European issues. The Nordic countries joined Canada’s alignment and supported 
adding human security and sustainable development to the Council in 1995. The concept of 
sustainable development in part arose due to the United Nations Commission on the 
Environment and Development headed by a former Prime Minister of Norway, which resulted in 
the October 1987 Brundtland Report.
252
 Subsequently, all of the Nordic delegations supported 
work on sustainable development at the 1993 Rio Earth Summit.253 Sustainable development was 
part of the mandate of another Arctic governance institution made up of the Nordic countries, the 
Nordic Council of Ministers.254 Some policy-makers have explained the Nordic promotion of 
sustainable development as “ideological imperialism.”255 Despite uniformly being “very 
progressive on climate issues,”256 the Nordic countries have different interests, with different 
histories, economic systems, resources, access to waterways, international obligations,257 and 
interest in Arctic resource development.258 No doubt important was the fact that, as the ICC and 
its leader Mary Simon was important in Canada, so too was the Saami Council important in the 
Nordic states (save Iceland). 
The second debate emerged over the role of security in the new mandate of the 
organization. There were no major military security issues among the Arctic states in the 1990s, 
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save for some relatively minor disagreements over the legal status of some maritime areas, 
certainly not issues to spark an arms race or armed conflict.
259
 Nonetheless, security had been a 
factor in the creation of the AEPS, stemming from calls to make the Arctic a “zone of peace” and 
so a question naturally emerged as to whether it was appropriate to add security to the new 
mandate. In 1995, Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding military security to the 
mandate of the new organization, while Russia and the United States did not. Canada and the 
Nordic countries supported a strong and flexible Council that could respond to a wide variety of 
Arctic issues as they emerged. The United States and Russia feared the sovereignty ramifications 
of including military security in the Council mandate and any placing of limits on its 
sovereignty.
260
 
Throughout the 1995 negotiations, which occurred mostly around AEPS meetings held in 
Canada that year, these mandate debates hampered progress. Officials in Canada and the Nordic 
countries wanted a Council and so were willing to compromise, despite environmental concern 
and the force of indigenous activism. The United States’ refusal to compromise became the 
biggest obstacle to creating a Council. To other state delegations, this opposition was surprising, 
given that the new Council would adopt the “architecture of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy,” which the United States supported.261  In addition, the United States government 
supported international action on Russian environmental problems. However, United States 
policy-makers were leery of a Council for three reasons, beyond questions of including 
sustainable development in the mandate. First, during preparatory meetings for the 1995 
negotiations, some policy-makers in the United States questioned whether a regional 
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organization would be effective when other international environmental organizations, such as 
the United Nations Environment Programme, already existed.262 Second, some United States 
officials questioned whether a regional council was necessary because the solutions to 
environmental issues required a transboundary approach, working in concert with the entire 
world community.
263
 Third, the Arctic was not a priority area for the United States government 
during the 1990s.
264
 In the absence of a formal policy on the region, the United States 
government was “legalistic” in its approach to the Council, concerned with the legal obligations 
and ramifications of an Arctic international institution.
265
 The United States’ size as a regional 
actor and its staunch concerns over sovereignty gave it a powerful bargaining chip. Canada and 
the Nordic countries wanted a Council. The United States was willing to walk away from 
negotiations.   
The Council’s mandate resulted from a compromise over a separate issue in the process 
of negotiations. Canada had hoped to wrap up negotiations quickly and informally, but this goal 
proved unrealistic. Canada and the United States organized three major rounds of negotiations in 
Ottawa throughout 1996 (in April, June and August). As further detailed in Chapter 7, Canada 
and the Nordic countries wanted the permanent participants to be full members of the Council, 
which the United States and Russia opposed. This discussion dominated the April meetings. The 
negotiation process that led to the creation of the Council’s mandate unfolded in three stages. In 
June, Canada and the United States held one-on-one meetings at the larger negotiations. First, the 
Canadian delegation proposed a compromise on the issue of indigenous representation that 
influenced the Council’s mandate, namely to drop military security from the mandate in 
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exchange for the United States agreeing to add indigenous peoples’ organizations as second-tier 
“permanent participant” Council members equal to states in all areas except voting rights.266 In 
addition, sustainable development would be part of the mandate. The United States delegation 
agreed to this compromise, content that Canada acceded to its security concerns. Second, Canada 
brought the proposal to a closed-door meeting with the three indigenous peoples’ organizations. 
In past international negotiations, some indigenous officials feared that an emphasis on 
“sustainable development” could create projects that would challenge traditional economies,267 
though in this meeting delegations decided to take that risk to ensure the Council included a 
“human” emphasis. Third, after indigenous approval, the Nordic officials agreed to the proposal, 
seeing that without this compromise, the Arctic Council would not come into being. Russian 
officials agreed to this compromise, as well, somewhat leery at the inclusion of indigenous 
peoples’ organizations in the Council but enthusiastic over the prohibition on security issues. The 
inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Council as members assured that human 
issues would be part of the new organization, as these groups would not allow the exclusion of 
such issues. The compromise over their inclusion led to an agreement over the Council’s 
mandate and temporarily settled discussions over the place of sustainable development and 
military security.  
The United States accepted Canada’s compromise for three reasons. First, delegates 
agreed that the willingness of Canada and the Nordic countries to compromise on the 
organization’s new mandate created a Council that suited the United States’ interest. It would not 
address military security issues that could impact United States sovereignty. Second, the United 
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States’ delegates saw that the Council could facilitate useful information sharing between the 
Arctic countries. Inter-departmental meetings in the lead-up to the 1996 negotiations saw policy-
makers realize a benefit to international co-operation.
268
 In 1996, it was necessary to share 
information such as health statistics through international institutions or costly research, a fact 
that may be difficult to appreciate in the Internet age.
269
 Such comparative information is useful 
in construction of policy. Today, that information is widely available online, but in 1996, it was 
not.
270
 Third, the research conducted by AEPS had raised the profile of the Arctic region. There 
was a concern among some policy-makers that in the absence of a response to Arctic pollution, 
other United Nations bodies, such as its environmental program, could increase their attention on 
the Arctic region.
271
 The creation of the Arctic Council was partly to prevent other institutions 
from gaining a foothold in Arctic governance. Canada proposed a compromise that suited the 
interest of the United States. 
Why did Russia support the Council’s environmental and sustainable development 
mandate, given that the environment was not a priority area for the Russian government in the 
1990s? There were two major reasons. First, Russia faced international pressure to address 
environmental pollution (as seen in Finland’s lobbying for the AEPS) and the Council was a way 
to respond to that pressure. As the Council was a relatively weak organization, it would not 
hamper Russian sovereignty. Second, throughout negotiations, policy-makers realized action on 
the environment attracted needed international funding and investment in Russia,272 which it 
partially re-directed to non-environmental projects. For example, at the September 1996 
inaugural Arctic Council meeting, Russia announced a “regional program of action” on 
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biodiversity, a project under the CAFF working group. The specifics of the project were vague. 
The project got underway in November 1999, after securing funds from Norway ($45,000) and 
the United Nations’ Global Environmental Facility funding agency, which would eventually total 
millions of dollars. Russia updated the Council 11 times in the next 12 years about the project, a 
particularly long time for an Arctic Council project, yet did not deliver specific, strong results.
273
 
The United States, in particular, privately had evidence that elements in the Russian government 
were re-directing some of the funds into other, non-environmental projects.274 Fears over 
corruption and wasted resources in Russia prompted the United States to help form the ACAP 
working group in 2006 to deal with contaminants.
275
 Russia held a similar bargaining chip to the 
United States as a large regional player, willing to walk away from negotiations. The Council 
mandate agreed upon suited Russian interests.  
States created the Council with a mandate to facilitate co-operation on environmental 
protection and sustainable development. With the issue of permanent participants settled, states 
straightforwardly negotiated the structure of the Council in August and September 1996 (its 
founding meeting).
276
  The Council was different from the AEPS because the former 1) was to be 
a permanent institution; 2) was run by the foreign affairs ministries of the Arctic states while the 
ministries of the environment had run the AEPS, and; 3) was to promote sustainable 
development as well as environmental protection, through the creation of the new Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG).
277
 Some state officials and permanent participant 
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delegates thought the Council was simply “the AEPS with a new name.”278 Other policy-makers 
were optimistic and believed that sustainable development would be a “pillar” of the institution, 
equal to the environment.279 One could argue that “sustainable development” suffered a setback 
due to the creation of the Council, because the Task Force on Sustainable Development and 
Utilization folded in favour of the new SDWG.
280
 The SDWG would start again at a beginning, 
constructing a new mandate and developing new projects.
281
 The work of creating the Council 
was not fully complete before its official launch in September 1996. At that meeting, the Council 
set three goals for its first years of existence: 1) to draft rules of procedure, 2) to shut down the 
AEPS and assume all of its work, and 3) to develop the terms of reference and mandate of the 
Council’s sustainable development program, under the newly created SDWG.282  
 In review, this subsection sought to answer two major questions: 1) what was the 
intended mandate of the Arctic Council, and; 2) what were the major issues and alignments 
pertaining to the Council’s mandate? The Arctic Council’s mandate is to facilitate co-operation 
on environmental issues and sustainable development. There were two major debates during 
negotiations to create the Council. First, states debated the extent of human security and 
sustainable development in the Council’s mandate. Second, states debated whether the Council’s 
mandate should include military security issues. Canada and the Nordic countries wanted the 
Council to address security issues and take strong action on sustainable development. The United 
States and Russia were willing to walk away from the Council if need be, as both opposed these 
notions. Why did the preferences of some prevail over those of others?  Who exerted most 
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influence? The United States and Russia emerged as the major winners, as these countries were 
able to ensure that the Council was not an overly strong body, with a limited mandate focused on 
the environment and the vague notion of sustainable development. The Council would not 
address security issues, as per their request. The United States exerted the most influence, 
because it was unwilling to compromise and, as a large regional player, was a leader in 
negotiations. The Nordic countries also could claim victory. The major goal of these countries 
was to create a Council focused on the environment, which was the outcome of negotiations. 
However, the Council was weaker than these countries would have liked, as it did not address 
military security issues. The Nordic countries exerted less influence than did the United States. 
Canada exerted less influence because it gave priority to creating the Council and hence it was 
willing to compromise, in contrast to the hard-line positions taken by the United States and 
Russia. The Council did not have an overly strong human element and would not take up 
security issues, as Canada envisioned. The Council ultimately emerged as a reasonably weak 
environmental body.  
 Returning to the literature, authors who write about the Arctic Council correctly identify 
the institution as an environmental research body after its founding, based on states’ decision to 
carry on the work of the AEPS in the Council.
283
 Its mandate does not invest the institution with 
specific powers beyond this role and it did not obviously emerge as a soft-law body. These 
authors do not discuss efforts by Canada and the Nordic states to have the Council become more 
than a research body and the political struggle surrounding the founding and the mandate of the 
institution. Historian John English’s Ice and Water notes political division but questionably gives 
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much credit for the founding of the Council to advocacy groups and the leadership of the 
government of Canada, underestimating reasons for the creation of the Council favoured by 
European countries and the United States, as this section demonstrates.
284
 English’s work posits 
that Canada created an Arctic council due to lobbying by interest groups, but does not explain 
why Canada found their ideas compelling and why other countries went along with Canada’s 
ideas.
285
 English particularly credits the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Canadian Arctic 
Resources Committee and the Gordon Foundation with promoting the idea of a council.
286
 This 
section demonstrates that the Council came into being for a number of reasons, including a desire 
to foster post-Cold War peace, a desire to address problems in the Russian environment and a 
need to share information about the Arctic region. It also demonstrates that policy-makers 
wanted to formalize the governance that was occurring in the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy. Furthermore, Canada was not the only country that showed leadership in the creation of 
the Council. The Nordic states were supportive and influential. The Council emerged as an 
environmental body through a political process of contentious negotiations relating to the interest 
of all Arctic states.  
2.2.2 – 1996-2004 
The Council’s mandate appeared settled in 1996, but debates continued from 1996 to 
2004. This section seeks to answer two questions. First, what evolution took place in the 
Council’s mandate between 1996 and 2004? Second, how did the debate evolve and what 
explains this evolution?  
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In terms of the first question, little evolution took place after 1996 because states agreed 
on the Council’s basic mandate following the negotiations to create the institution. In 1998, the 
Arctic Council articulated its formal mandate in the Iqaluit Declaration. Delegations wrote this 
mandate at Council meetings in Canada in May and August 1998. The policy-making process 
was straightforward and did not see disagreements over the mandate, as states and permanent 
participants had agreed in principle to the content in 1996. The declaration states that the Arctic 
Council’s goal is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction 
among the Arctic States” and emphasizes that this should be “with the involvement of the Arctic 
indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular 
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”287 The mandate 
does not preclude discussion of any issue except for the vacuous concept of “military security,” 
indicating that it could discuss other types of security.
288
 In places, the declaration emphasizes 
the advocacy and informational role of the Arctic Council. It says that a goal is to “disseminate 
information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.”289 From this 
wording, it is clear that states did not intend that the Council be a policy-making instrument. The 
mandate is broad because it does not define the contentious concept of  “sustainable 
development,” but says the Council will focus on “areas of Arctic children and youth, health, 
telemedicine, resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology 
transfer to improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development 
strategies.”290 Its formal mandate is broad, though, as the next paragraph shows, the informal 
mandate of the Council has become more focused and has changed considerably. 
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 Most of the Council’s concrete work in 1999 and 2000 was on environmental issues. 
Action on sustainable development was not as strong as it is today because the Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) was constructing its mandate. To give a few examples, 
on the environmental front, in 1999 Norway promoted the development of a strategy and related 
projects to clean up pollution in the Arctic.
291
 In 2000, work began on the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA), which is a major scientific report on climate change. At the May 2000 
meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group 
announced several new projects,
292
 while the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR) working group
293
 and the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working 
groups
294
 were busy executing a pre-set research agenda. The SDWG did not complete any 
concrete projects as it dealt with institutional organizing. Not every project proceeded smoothly. 
States worked on an emergency preparedness project to study the threat of oil spills in the Arctic, 
but the commitment was weak. At the May 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the 
minutes state, “Norway noted that they are the lead country for the project on a circumpolar map 
of resources at risk from oil spills in the Arctic, stating that the deadline for countries to 
contribute information was March 1 and that only Norway had responded to date.”295 This 
project was unambitious, an example of information sharing. States did not respond quickly to 
even this low-level Council project, a sign the commitment to such issues was weak.  
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 In regards to the second question pertaining to debates about the evolution of the 
Council’s mandate, two issues emerged. The first concerned the exact meaning of “sustainable 
development.”296 At two Council meetings in May and August 1998, Council states negotiated 
the sustainable development mandate. In this era of the Council, Russian officials singled out the 
necessity of economic development, while Europeans favoured environmental protection, with 
North Americans falling somewhere in between.
297
 These preferences reflected the interests of 
Arctic states during the negotiations to create the Council. Russia faced economic problems, 
while Nordic governments feared environmental pollution from Russia. North America did not 
face the same consequences of these issues. In the May and August negotiations, the Nordic 
countries wanted a set of “shared priorities” for sustainable development, while the United States 
and Russia favoured the creation of a set of technical projects.
298
 Russia was largely silent in this 
debate, allowing the United States delegation to lead the push for a project-based approach.
299
 
The Canadian delegation advocated for an emphasis on “capacity building,” or the notion that 
the SDWG should give northerners the ability to be “authors of their own development.”300 Why 
did states hold these positions? The United States and Russian preferred to create a weaker 
working group, which reflects concerns about challenges posed by a sustainable development 
program. Canada sought to strengthen the influence of the permanent participants in the Council. 
Delegations did not wish to be acrimonious so early in the history of the Council and so, in these 
negotiations, worked to accommodate each other’s concerns. The terms of reference states 
created do not define “sustainable development,” but say the goal of the SDWG is to “foster 
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sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, 
improved health conditions and cultural well-being.”301 It reflects the United States and Russia’s 
desire for a project-oriented SDWG, calling on the group “to propose and adopt steps to be taken 
by the Arctic States to advance sustainable development in the Arctic.”302 In October 2000, at the 
Council Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council states articulated a set of priority 
projects, in fulfilment of the wishes of the Nordic governments. These areas are capacity 
building, health, education, children and youth, natural living resources and infrastructure 
development.
303
 The inclusion of capacity building reflected Canada’s preferences.  
 The Canadian government wanted “capacity building” to be a theme for all sustainable 
development work and undertook two projects to promote it. First, at the October 2000 
Ministerial Meeting, Canadian policy-makers authored and presented a report outlining what 
“capacity building” entails.304 Examples of projects to enhance sustainable development were to 
create a summer camp, art projects, information materials, internships and other tangible 
initiatives for northern residents.
305
 Second, Canada and Finland hosted a workshop on capacity 
building in Helsinki, Finland, in November 2001.
306
 In June 2001, at a Council meeting in 
Rovaniemi, Iceland’s delegation said it would make sustainable development a priority during its 
term as chair.
307
 At the end of 2002, states urged “all subsidiary bodies of the Arctic Council to 
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take capacity building into account in all their activities,” though this statement did not constitute 
a formal requirement.”308 Some policy-makers felt that the SDWG became a venue for state 
projects that did not fit elsewhere in the Council, in response to different state interests.
309
 Yet, 
Canada initiated some projects that reflected its desire for a “capacity building” approach.  
In total, the Council launched 57 projects from 1998 until 2004, or about 11 projects per 
working group. About eighty percent of this work was environmental in nature. The Council held 
19 meetings between 1996 and 2004. At meetings, states reviewed project proposals by working 
groups and gave feedback. Working groups and government scientists completed projects 
between meetings, such as reports, assessments and technical initiatives, such as workshops. The 
Council completed three major projects from 1998 until 2004, namely: 1) Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, completed in 2004 by the CAFF and the PAME; 2) the Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program, completed by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which was 
a technical project that sought to clean up the results of the 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in 
the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, and; 3) the Arctic Human Development Report, 
completed by the SDWG, which compiled social statistics comparing the Arctic regions. By 
2002, even Russia promoted sustainable development and argued, “The work carried out in the 
SDWG was of utmost importance to the whole Council because of the human aspect.”310  
As a brief aside, the resulting mandate for the SDWG is quite broad, especially compared 
to the other working groups that have a clear set of activities. The notion of “sustainable 
development” is open to multiple interpretations, while other working groups have a clearer set 
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of priorities.
311
 The AMAPs activities focus on monitoring Arctic pollution. The AMAP is 
arguably the most active working group. It has completed major projects on PCBs, radioactivity, 
climate change, acidification, Arctic haze, mercury and others, many of which have policy 
recommendations.
312
 The CAFF focuses on monitoring biodiversity in the Arctic, as seen in such 
projects as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment.
313
 In the past, it has completed work on an Arctic 
species trend index, various assessments on Arctic seabirds and flora, among other projects.
314
 It 
contributed to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment along with the AMAP and the SDWG.
315
 
The EPPR focuses on Arctic emergencies. It has produced numerous reports about risks and 
trends in shipping, the potential for oil spills and search and rescue capabilities.
316
 It has 
organized various “tabletop” exercises to plan for Arctic emergencies.317 The PAME focuses on 
trends in Arctic shipping and marine pollution. It is responsible for the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment, a major initiative that the Council adopted in 2004.
318
 This project has spawned 
numerous follow-up reports and subsequent work to assess the present and future of Arctic 
shipping.
319
 The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have had a contained set of activities. 
Meanwhile, even today, the SDWG’s activities fall into four broad categories. First, some 
of its projects focus on social issues faced by Arctic residents, such as information on suicide 
prevention and the status of women.
320
 Second, some of its projects concern traditional 
northerner and aboriginal lifestyles, such as projects on compiling information about the threat to 
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traditional knowledge from climate change and the preservation of traditional languages.
321
 
Third, some focus on indigenous health, such as projects on the state of circumpolar health, 
circumpolar nutrition, a survey of living conditions in the Arctic, a project on controlling 
infectious disease and attempts to implement telemedicine programs.
322
 Fourth, some of its 
projects are about general Arctic economic issues, such as a summit on Arctic energy, reports on 
the state of the northern economy and reports on issues in traditional economies such as reindeer 
herding.
323
 Each of these broad sets of activities could warrant a working group in itself. There is 
more focus in the group today, as much of its activity focuses on understanding the threats and 
opportunities from climate change on Northerners, though certainly there are projects outside of 
this theme.
324
 According to policy-makers within the group, the general approach of the SDWG 
has been to take on a variety of projects that could be of value to northern residents.
325
 The group 
has tried to avoid discussions of the definition of sustainable development, as well as the group’s 
mandate, and focused on achieving outcomes.
326
 The SDWG has had a broad set of activities that 
reflect the fact that states have had a difficult time defining and understanding what constitutes 
sustainable development.  
 The second debate over the Council’s mandate occurred at the November 1999 Arctic 
Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska. It concerned the flexibility of the Council’s mandate. At this 
meeting, the United States delegation included a representative from the United States military to 
give a presentation on a joint project with Russia called the Arctic Military Environmental Co-
operation Group.
327
 The presentation was strictly for information and it would not result in 
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Council action. When the agenda item came up, the Canadian delegation immediately vetoed 
discussion of the matter, before other countries could comment, because the program concerned 
military security.
328
 Why would Canada block the discussion of security issues when it, along 
with the Nordic countries, had pressed the United States and Russia to discuss military issues in 
the new Arctic Council? United States policy-makers did not intend to add military security to 
the Council’s mandate, but the presentation could have set a precedent to do so in the future. 
This precedent could have one day suited Canada’s interests. The Canadian delegation decided to 
block the United States’ presentation in retribution for what it perceived as a disruptive use of the 
rules of procedure by United States delegations. Canadian policy-makers perceived that United 
States officials were strictly interpreting the mandate.
329
 For example, the United States had 
insisted that the Council fully develop its rules of procedure before the institution undertook any 
substantive work, against Canada’s preference to move forward with substantive work. As noted, 
the United States was “legalistic” early in the Council.330 The delegation from Canada wanted to 
signal that it too could strictly interpret the Council mandate and subvert the will of the United 
States’ policy-makers. Canadian policy-makers determined that sending this message was more 
important than a precedent to add security to the agenda. Canadian policy-makers believed the 
Council had a significant mandate without considering traditional security.
331
 Security was not a 
priority for countries in the Council as there were no pressing issues and it was a small, 
inexperienced international body.
332
 Even though the presentation was strictly for information 
purposes, Canadian policy-makers believed the Council should avoid discussions of security.  
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 In sum, this section explained the evolution of debates around the Council’s mandate 
during the period from 2004 until 2007. The Council successfully completed its environmental 
mandate, completing more than 40 research and technical projects dealing with the environment. 
Two debates emerged over the Council’s mandate. First, states debated the content of the 
Council’s sustainable development program, with the United States and Russia favouring a series 
of technical projects, the Nordic countries favouring a set of shared priorities and Canada 
pushing for a capacity-building approach. The result was a mandate that attempted to incorporate 
every country’s viewpoint. The second was over the role of military security in the Council, with 
Canada vetoing a discussion of military security to ensure the institution maintained a workable 
mandate. These findings support the conclusions of authors, such as Oran Young, who classify 
the Council as a research institution from 1996 until 2004.   
2.2.3 – 2004-2007 
From 2004 until 2007, the Council’s mandate shifted significantly as the Council began 
to address emergency preparedness issues. This section seeks to answer two questions: 1) at what 
point did changes in the mandate of the Council take place, and; 2) what explains these key 
changes? The Council’s mandate shifted in 2004 after the release of the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, which made states aware of the new economic opportunities resulting from climate 
change in the Arctic region. All of the Arctic states and even the permanent participants 
supported this shift in the Council’s mandate, though Russia strongly proposed the new emphasis 
on economic issues through its promotion of co-operation on emergency preparedness. 
Nonetheless, the Council’s shift was not as profound as it may appear, as the majority of the 
Council’s work continued to focus on environmental issues.  
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In 2004, the Council released the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which 
changed the Council and its mandate. The report argued that climate change would present 
profound challenges for the Arctic. The United States proposed the project at the 2000 Arctic 
Council Ministerial Meeting, which won the enthusiastic backing of all of the Council 
countries.
333
 The United States delegation proposed the project due to a general desire to know 
more about climate change, especially given the interest in Alaska, as well as in fulfillment of its 
perceived obligations to the international community and Council to be a leader on issues of 
global consequence.
334
 Scientists and academics from all Council members wrote the text of the 
report over the next four years, with annual updates to the Council on progress.
335
 The United 
States provided core funding for the project and an American researcher, Robert Corell, 
organized the research. Funding continued even as Republican George W. Bush succeeded the 
Democrat Bill Clinton as president, although the former was not reputed to be a supporter of 
work on climate change. The United States under the Bush Administration still wanted to obtain 
information on climate change and to appear to fulfill international obligations to address it.
336
 
Another reason the report moved forward is that there was also pressure to continue its funding 
among Alaskan policy-makers, a state with a strong Republican character.
337 
It was a landmark 
report that changed the Council.
338
 
The ACIA made states and permanent participants aware of a variety of environmental 
issues in the Arctic. It found that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost 
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twice the rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with “Arctic warming of about 
4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.”339 It also found that, “Permafrost has warmed by up to 2 
degrees C in recent decades.”340 The report concluded, “Arctic precipitation has increased by 
about eight per cent on average over the past century.” In addition, “The average extent of sea-
ice cover in summer has declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.”341 Due to climate 
change in the Arctic, “global and Arctic sea level has risen 10-20 centimetres in the past 100 
years” while “about an additional half metre of sea-level rise (with a range of 10 to 90 
centimetres) is projected to occur during this century.”342 It concluded that, “For Inuit, warming 
is likely to disrupt or even destroy their hunting and food-sharing culture as reduced sea ice 
causes the animals on which they rely to decline, become less accessible, and possibly become 
extinct.”343 This report also made states aware of economic opportunities relating to climate 
change. Ice melt would make Arctic shipping lanes more accessible to vessels. The Arctic region 
contains more than 90 billion barrels of oil that will be more accessible due to climate change.
344
 
Further, as Russia holds 80 per cent of Arctic resources, it stands to gain the most from climate 
change in the Arctic.
345
 The ACIA made states aware of the region’s economic potential.  
In response to the first question, regarding when the Council’s mandate shifted, it shifted 
toward economic issues and emergency preparedness after the release of the ACIA report at the 
November 2004 Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, held in Reykjavik, Iceland, “Russia 
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introduced the Arctic Rescue initiative, a mechanism for the coordination of international 
activities on prevention and response as regards the consequences of emergencies in the 
Arctic.”346 This initiative was a statement of support by Russia for the Council to shift to a 
greater emphasis on emergency preparedness. The policy process unfolded in two stages. First, 
Russian officials pushed the Council to take more action on emergency preparedness by stating 
its importance at nine Council meetings between 2004 and 2009 (November 2004, April 2005, 
October 2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and 
November 2009). Russian officials sought to develop guidelines on the clean up of hazardous 
materials as well as a search and rescue plan.
347
 Next, two projects came from this work. First, in 
April 2005, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group began to 
author a report on Arctic shipping at its biannual meetings, which later resulted in the 2009 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, sponsored by the United States. Second, the government of 
Russia organized an October 2008 “accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, with the 
participation of the other Arctic states.
348
 Russia placed a greater emphasis on emergency 
preparedness work after the ACIA made it clear that climate change created economic 
opportunities in the Arctic. In response to the second question, as to reasons for the shift, none of 
the Arctic delegations opposed this work in any other Council meeting, nor did any of the 
permanent participants. As each state holds a veto on Council activities, each could have blocked 
any project that did not meet with its approval. Delegations supported this work because 
emergency infrastructures encourage economic development in the Arctic region. Information on 
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shipping and preparation for search and rescue emergencies increases the potential for 
investment in the region because companies have the knowledge that states are prepared when 
emergencies arise. These measures reduce corporate liability and make them more confident to 
invest in the Arctic region.  
This new emphasis does not indicate that the Council turned away from environmental 
work. The Council completed an average of 159 projects between 2004 and 2007, or 26.5 
projects per working group. Each state sponsored an average of 15.25 projects, while permanent 
participants sponsored an average of two projects each.
349
 Only two of these projects concerned 
emergency preparedness as a primary focus, namely the aforementioned projects by Russia. The 
Council undertook twelve major projects, all of which had a strong environmental character: 
-  The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)  
-  Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (AMAP) working group pollution assessments 
(2005-2013) (the AMAP) 
-  Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the Sustainable Development Working Group)  
-  Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
(initiated 2009) (Task Force)  
-  Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the PAME) 
-  Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)  
-  Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 
(completed 2013) (Task Force)  
-  Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)  
-  Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)  
 
Thus the Council still completed environmental work between 2004 and 2008.  
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In summary, this section identified the point at which changes in the mandate of the 
Council took place and the positions of various actors. Change took place after the publication of 
the ACIA report. Russia sought to encourage work on emergency preparedness to encourage 
economic development in the Arctic region, which all of the Arctic states supported. Academic 
literature characterizing the Council as a research institution is no longer completely valid; the 
Council is no longer merely an environmental organization.  It is also an economic facilitator.   
2.2.4 – 2007-2014 
More recent Council work has focused on emergency preparedness and economic issues, 
showing an evolution in the Council’s mandate. This section shows that the Council’s mandate is 
now economic in nature as well as environmental, which all of the Arctic members support. 
Between 2009 and 2011, the creation of an Arctic Search and Rescue agreement occupied much 
of the Council’s time. From 2011 until 2013, the major project of the Council was a formal 
agreement on oil spill response. The United States delegation surprised many observers when it 
proposed the search and rescue treaty in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino, 
Norway, which Russia asked to co-sponsor to support its earlier emphasis on emergency 
preparedness.350 The treaty aims to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue co-
operation and coordination in the Arctic.”351 State representatives easily negotiated the treaty at 
only five meetings (Washington, December 2009, Moscow, February 2010, Oslo, June 2010, 
Helsinki, October 2010 and Reykjavik, December 2010).
352 
 At the May 2011 meeting in Kiruna, 
Sweden, the delegations of the United States, Russia and Norway took many by surprise and 
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sponsored a similar agreement on oil spill response.353 States again easily negotiated the treaty at 
five meetings (Oslo, October 2011, St. Petersburg, December 2011, Girdwood, Alaska, March 
2012, Helsinki, June 2012 and Reykjavik, October 2012).
354
 Chapter 3 elaborates on the 
negotiation process that led to these treaties. The other states and the permanent participants 
supported this work and contributed to the task forces that created the agreements. 
There are three pertinent questions about these treaties. First, do they have substantial 
economic elements? They provide safety and emergency response infrastructure in the Arctic. 
This work has an economic element because it provides infrastructure that states and companies 
need to operate in the Arctic region. These treaties will potentially result in increased investment 
in the Arctic region. Second, why did the United States suggest these treaties and why did other 
states support them? According to policy-makers familiar with the process, both treaties resulted 
primarily from requests from the insurance and resource sectors for measures to increase 
emergency response.
355
 Officials from the business community asked policy-makers for 
measures to increase safety when operating in the Arctic region.
356
 Third, does the creation of 
these treaties represent a sea change in the way that the Council operates? The Council still 
completed environmental work from 2007 until the present, as these projects constituted only 
two out of the Council’s average 159 ongoing projects. Yet, these treaties are very significant as 
they represent the first clear work beyond the initial mandate of the Council. The institution 
addresses more economic issues than in the past.  
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After the development of these treaties, the government of Canada, in preparations to 
become Council chair, emphasized the economic work of the Council, indicating a change in its 
mandate. The government stated that it planned to use the Council to achieve economic 
aspirations, which constituted the first time that a Council state had been so direct in stating this 
intent. A Government of Canada report obtained by media sources said, “Canada will use its two 
years as leader of the circumpolar world to promote development and defend its policies.”357 
Media outlets reported, “A discussion paper circulated at meetings held across the North to 
gather input suggests that Canada's top priority will be development.”358 The paper indicated an 
interest that economic development should benefit the North and said, “The development of 
natural resources in a sustainable manner, in which northerners participate and benefit, is central 
to the economic future of the circumpolar region.” It also said, “Arctic Council initiatives could 
be built around and support Canada's priorities to increase investment and development in the 
northern resource sector.”359 Leona Aglukkaq, Canadian Minister Responsible for the Arctic 
Council, held “meetings with private sector representatives across the North to help to plug a gap 
in the Arctic Council’s work”360 The discussion of development provided by the government of 
Canada does not stress the need for environmental protection. Policy-makers see economics as 
increasingly important in the Council’s work.361 As one policy-maker summarized, “It seems 
now the Council’s focus is on development” whereas “before, the focus was on environmental 
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protection.
362
 In 2013, the government of Canada released a report that says its priorities in its 
turn as chair are to establish “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic shipping” 
and “sustainable communities.”363  
The Council issued a document called A Vision for the Arctic, which included what could 
be an updated Council mandate. It said, “We have many accomplishments to celebrate since the 
signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, and it is timely for us to set out a vision for the future 
of our region.”364 Its pillars are “a peaceful Arctic,” “the Arctic home,” “a prosperous Arctic,” “a 
safe Arctic,” “a healthy Arctic environment,” “Arctic knowledge” and “a strong Arctic 
Council.”365 Most of that is within the existing mandate of the Council. However, it also pointed 
to a potential growth in the Council as a body to address conflict resolution and political issues. 
It said, “The further development of the Arctic region as a zone of peace and stability is at the 
heart of our efforts” and “We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot solve together 
through our co-operative relationships on the basis of existing international law and good 
will.”366 There is also a greater acknowledgement of the economic potential of the region. The 
report says, “The economic potential of the Arctic is enormous and its sustainable development 
is key to the region’s resilience and prosperity.”367 Again, the Council still undertakes 
environmental work and most of its activities are environmental in nature. The Council still has 
an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given time, roughly 80 per cent of which are 
environmental in nature.    
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The new emphasis on economics is due to requests from insurance and other companies 
to Arctic governments for more Arctic infrastructure.  Many fear that the difficulty of operating 
in the Arctic will neutralize profits and discourage growth. In 2012, major insurance firm Lloyds 
of London released a report that argued, “The Arctic is likely to attract substantial investment 
over the coming decade, potentially reaching $100 [billion] or more,” however “given the high 
risk/potentially high reward nature of Arctic investment, this figure could be significantly higher 
or lower.”368 Emergency preparedness reduces the economic risk of operating in the Arctic.  
An outcome of Canada’s emphasis on economic development369 is the establishment of a 
new semi-autonomous institution, the Arctic Economic Council. States negotiated the structure 
of the organization at Council meetings held in Canada during 2013 and 2014. Swedish officials 
conceived of the body during its term as chair as a business council focused on corporate social 
responsibility and the environment, but Canada shifted the emphasis based on its stated 
priorities, a move all states supported.
370
 The 42-member Arctic Economic Council consists of 
three business representatives appointed by each Council state and the permanent participants.
371
 
The organization holds meetings separate from the Council but is part of the organization. The 
Arctic Council reports that, “The overall aim of the AEC is to foster sustainable development, 
including economic growth, environmental protection and social development in the Arctic 
region.”372 The creation of the body is significant because it is the first outcome of the Arctic 
Council that did not have some strong environmental component. The Arctic Council says that 
the body will do environmental work, but it is first and foremost an “economic” body. 
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In conclusion, the Council’s mandate is undergoing change. It has a broad mandate, but 
in practice states intended that it take action on the environment and sustainable development. 
The working groups have undertaken many environmental projects. States had difficulty defining 
sustainable development and as a result, its projects are broad and often ad-hoc. The Council has 
increased the number of projects that promote emergency preparedness as time has gone on. The 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment changed the direction and intensity of Council work, making 
states aware of the economic opportunities in the region. The United States supported that report, 
even though action on climate change appears contrary to its interest. Russia in particular wanted 
the Council to take action to improve emergency preparedness in the region. Canada, the current 
chair of the Council, has emphasized that it will use the Council to pursue and promote economic 
opportunities in the Northern region. Earlier work by authors such as Oran Young, Olav Schram 
Stokke and Evan Bloom viewed the Council as an environmental institution whose goal was to 
research the Arctic so that states could subsequently take action to reduce and prevent pollution 
in the region.
373
 John English agrees that the Council was intended as an environmental 
institution but emphasizes that some states had broader goals for the institution to build the 
region as a zone of peace; economic development and the similar goals were not among the 
broad goals states had for the Council.
374
 The Council’s mandate is now environmental and 
economic. Its initial mandate was to facilitate environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the Arctic region. Its informal mandate at the current time is to facilitate co-
operation on environmental research, to initiate projects to encourage human development in the 
region and to improve the prospects for investment in Arctic resources.  
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2.3 – Analysis of the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Mandate 
Functionalism provides a somewhat compelling account of Council expansion.  
 
H1: The mandate of the Arctic Council is expanding because all members stand to gain 
something through automatic expansion. 
 
Overall, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. All states gain something through 
participation in the Council and its expansion into economic areas, though the gains are not 
equally distributed. As noted, Russia benefits the most from economic gains in the Arctic region 
as it controls 80 per cent of Arctic resources.
375
 However, all states gain information through 
participation in the Council and its reports. States sought to gain information about Arctic 
pollution, but moved to acquire information about climate change as the issue emerged, 
constituting automatic expansion from issue spillover.  
This hypothesis has limited explanatory value because expansion occurred selectively, 
rather than automatically. The turn to economic work occurred after the 2004 Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (ACIA) report. This work revealed economic opportunity stemming from 
climate change, in the form of opportunities for increased Arctic resource exploitation and 
shipping. Functionalism assumes states will respond rationally to problems. The hypothesis 
would have support if Council states automatically took strong action to combat exogenous 
climate change in the Arctic because the information about it in the ACIA is alarming. Yet, 
Council action has focused on adaptation, rather than mitigation. All states moved to maximize 
the benefits of climate change. Nordic countries have taken good action to combat climate 
change, but the response of Canada, Russia and the United States has been inadequate.
376
 The 
Council’s mandate is evolving due to political reasons and not solely due to issue spillover.   
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H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic 
goal around a less political issue area. 
 
There is support for the hypothesis because it appears to provide some explanation of 
Council behaviour. The mandate expansion is around less political policy areas, namely search 
and rescue co-operation. Oil spill response is more political, but it is less political than it could 
have been because it is a response agreement and not a prevention agreement. Search and rescue 
could become political, but the agreement that resulted is quite limited in scope, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. The hypothesis is very similar to the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism, which 
this paper discusses later.   
H3: The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without 
disruption. 
 
This hypothesis does not appear valid because the Council does not have great power to 
direct states. This hypothesis would have support if the Council had the bureaucratic ability to 
make requests of Council states. However, this situation is not the case. The Council is only now 
in the process of setting up a permanent secretariat and previously states firmly controlled the 
working group secretariats. It is possible that the new permanent secretariat could make demands 
of states and affect the operation of the Council. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there is 
every indication it will be a purely administrative secretariat. Many policy-makers argue that the 
precise reason that it took so long to create a secretariat (and the reason why the secretariat is to 
perform purely administrative work) is to stop it from making demands of states.
377
 The working 
groups are as strong as they have ever been and their ability to shape the Council’s agenda is not 
strong. The reports they create might put pressure on states, but they do not create action in 
themselves and states often ignore their findings. Some policy-makers expressed the belief that 
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some groups operate better than in the past,
378
 but otherwise the structure of the Council has 
stayed the same. The Council’s mandate has expanded in tandem with the increased economic 
interest in the Arctic region. It is difficult to argue that current mandate expansion is because of 
the Council itself. 
H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should 
expand. 
 
This hypothesis is not accurate. Epistemic communities, such as the Munk-Gordon Arctic 
Security Program in Toronto, Canada, or the Rideau Institute in Ottawa, Canada, try to influence 
the Council. This hypothesis does not have support because the Arctic Council only changed 
once economic issues emerged. There is evidence that epistemic communities have had an effect 
on the Council in the past. As noted, states partially added a “human dimension” to the Council 
because of the demands of permanent participants, particularly in Canada. This lobbying partly 
resulted in the Council’s sustainable development program. Yet, it is the Council’s weakest 
working group, meaning that epistemic community demands did not result in strong action. In 
addition, epistemic communities impacted the ACIA. Arctic Council policy-makers partly credit 
the work of ACIA lead author Bob Corell for ensuring the project came to fruition.
379
 Alaska 
Senator Ted Stevens worked in the United States Senate to ensure the project had crucial 
funding.
380
 Yet, there are reasons that the Council states created the report aside from the 
lobbying of individuals, such as the need for information about climate change. The hypothesis 
does not have support because the Council has ignored lobbying by some groups that 
demonstrate pressing problems in need of action, instead focusing on the lobbying efforts of 
economic actors and the region’s economic potential.  
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H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent. 
 
This hypothesis has support. Through various environmental impact assessments, the 
Arctic Council has proven itself a competent international organization. The ACIA, for example, 
is a very good report that has helped prove that climate change is occurring in the Arctic and 
worldwide. Nonetheless, this hypothesis does not fully explain Council evolution. The Council 
has been producing high quality reports for many years, yet evolution has only occurred once 
economic objectives became clear. Neoliberal institutionalism and functionalism together can 
provide a likely explanation for why states have expanded the workload of the Council rather 
than create a new institution. It explains why states entrust reports to the Council rather than 
creating the reports in other ways, or independent of the Council. In contrast, as demonstrated 
later, neoliberal institutionalism would predict that path dependence would stunt Council 
evolution. The fact that the Council is a competent body explains why path dependence did not 
stall Council expansion. In accordance with functionalism, states partially expand the Council’s 
mandate because it has proven that it can do what states want it to do. The Council had elements 
in place that made expanding the Council more efficient than developing a new organization.  
H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently. 
This hypothesis does not have support because, as noted, the expansion of the Council’s 
mandate occurred in response to selective state interests, rather than as an automatic process. 
This hypothesis would have support if the Council’s mandate expanded when new issues 
emerged without prompt. If the Council worked aggressively to combat climate change as 
information became available, the hypothesis would have support. However, mandate expansion 
did not begin until economic considerations became important. It is not clear how smoothly the 
expansion of the Council’s mandate will progress. Thus far, it appears to be progressing 
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consistently. Canada has said that it will continue to promote economic development in the 
Council. The institution seeks to increase the role of business within the Council. Nonetheless, it 
is too soon to tell if this trend will continue. The Council does not have any projects on its 
agenda at the current time that will tangibly continue to increase the mandate of the Council. The 
Council is not negotiating a treaty at present, for example. Yet, the Council could take up such 
work in the future.  
 In conclusion, functionalism’s explanation for Council mandate expansion is not 
compelling. It predicts that expansion should have occurred earlier than it did, but states did not 
respond to pressing environmental issues presented in the ACIA report. Expansion did not occur 
until economic considerations became important. Functionalism is correct in predicting that 
expansion is occurring around a less-political issue area. However, functionalism is wrong in 
predicting that the Council can compete for power with states. It is difficult to argue that the 
Council is powerful beyond the control of states. It is not clear if the change that is occurring will 
be consistent over time. It is somewhat correct in predicting that individuals can influence the 
Council because individuals have had some influence over the Council’s agenda, though there 
are many other considerations that explain state behaviour. However, individuals are not 
responsible for the growth of the Council’s mandate. Most importantly, the growth of the 
Council has not occurred automatically. States have been selective in expanding the mandate of 
the Council, ignoring information about the need for climate change mitigation, instead focusing 
on economic gains and the potential that climate change can benefit states in certain sectors. 
They correctly predict evolution occurred once the Council proved itself competent, which 
explains why states opted to use it to address economic issues rather than create a new 
institution.  
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Neoliberal institutionalism explains the growth of the mandate of the Arctic Council and 
its hypotheses mostly have support. 
H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain 
something through expansion. 
 
This hypothesis has validity because all states stand to gain through co-operation in the Council 
and expansion did not occur automatically. The Council emerged to address Arctic pollution and 
promote co-operation between Russia and the West. According to neoliberal institutionalism, 
this is a low-level goal because it does not concern military security or economics. All states 
stood to gain, so states decided to form the Council. Under this scenario, the Council should not 
have been very strong, and it was not. There are few states involved (eight) and they face the 
“shadow of the future” (i.e. they will likely need to work together again), so there was an 
incentive for co-operation. States excluded security because they did not stand to gain much by 
adding it. It is clear that states were not able to accomplish much in terms of sustainable 
development. However, states stood to gain something by adding sustainable development to the 
mandate. The fact that states could not agree on a definition, and the working group’s agenda is 
very broad, reflects the fact that Arctic states have different development needs. Historical 
process tracing shows that most of the Council’s work has been on environmental monitoring, 
which demands relatively low-level commitment. Environmental monitoring can create problems 
for states if it highlights costly issues that demand resolution. The Council has provided funding 
for research on climate change, calling for a change in the way states operate, for example. Yet, 
environmental reports do not necessarily result in policy action. The ACIA has not inspired 
strong state action on climate change. Rather, it has ignited interest in the economic potential of 
the Arctic region. Emergency preparedness has become a focus on the Council at a time when it 
can help states. States stand to gain through the Arctic Council and so continue to aid evolution.  
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H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue. 
 
This hypothesis has support in that the mandate of the Council has expanded because it 
increasingly emphasizes emergency preparedness and the North’s economic potential. States 
have aspirations of economic growth in the Arctic. There is no shortage of reports extolling the 
economic potential of the Arctic in the wake of climate change.
381
 The Arctic contains extensive 
oil and gas deposits and Arctic shipping lanes promise to reduce travel distances substantially. 
Canada has directly stated that it will use the Council to fulfill an economic agenda. Part of this 
growth will benefit Northern Canada, but it also will benefit Canada as a whole. Whom the 
development benefits most is not yet clear. Almost every Arctic Council policy-maker 
interviewed believed that economics were an important explanatory variable in the Council’s 
expansion. States have economic aspirations for the Arctic.  
H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal, 
tempered by norms and path dependence. 
 
This hypothesis mostly has credence because states are using the Arctic Council to fulfill 
a technocratic goal. All states stand to gain through the expansion of the Council. Search and 
rescue, as well as oil spill prevention, are less political areas for co-operation. States are 
collaborating on technical matters without risking state sovereignty. Neoliberal institutionalism 
predicts that there are three reasons the Arctic Council would have been unable to evolve. First, 
path dependency should have made new action harder to undertake in the Arctic Council. The 
Council’s environmental orientation should have pushed states away from pursuing non-
environmental issues in the Council. Counter to this, some institutional elements to deal with 
search and rescue were in place through the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
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(EPPR) working group, which may have provided a framework to break such path dependence. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the Council has not evolved more is likely due to path dependence. 
However, these factors may explain away a fundamental fact that neoliberal institutionalists do 
not believe that international institutions will evolve in many circumstances. Second, 
institutional norms should have made it harder to take new action. Once the Council begins to do 
work to protect the environment, it could develop norms to continue such work. Still, there was 
always some interest in carrying out action on emergency preparedness and development through 
the EPPR and the Sustainable Development Working Group. Norms were not strong enough to 
prevent work in these areas. Third, the Arctic Council countries have taken action in the face of 
Arctic issues outside of the Arctic Council. Nonetheless, the countries all stood to gain 
something from co-operation in the Council. Through environmental reports and monitoring, the 
Council provides information and reduces costs for countries carrying out research. Through the 
facilitation of international action and agreements, the Council makes commitments more 
credible and predictable. States have a technocratic goal they want to achieve in the Council.  
H4: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has 
an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate. 
 
 The form of negotiation impacts the evolution of the Council’s mandate and thus this 
hypothesis has predictive power. We can see that the Council emerged from negotiation. States 
debated the Council’s mandate, with Canada and the Nordic countries failing to win United 
States and Russian support for its initiatives. Coalitions were not as important in an institution in 
which any country has a veto on any action. Yet, the major change in the mandate occurred due 
to research conducted by the Council. Russia first proposed increasing the profile of emergency 
preparedness issues in response to information about climate change, which won the support of 
all of the Council countries. Information was important in the evolution of the Council.  
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Neoliberal institutionalism mostly provides a good explanation of Council behaviour. 
The Council’s mandate is expanding because it is in the interest of member states. All member 
states gain something through participation in the Council, even if it is a low-level goal. It is 
expanding to take on economic issues, which neoliberal institutionalists say are a particularly 
potent motivator for state behaviour. The Council is evolving to perform technical functions, 
helping states collaborate on emergency preparedness. The theory does not predict that 
individuals can be important in the Council. However, it is clear that they might be important in 
some way. Neoliberal institutionalism correctly predicts that the Council would not have the 
power to compete with states. Still, the theory emphasizes that international institutions are 
subject to path dependence. Information was important in the evolution of the Council, as was 
the form of negotiation, as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. This dynamic does not account 
for the fact that the Council’s mandate has shifted to include environmental issues, sustainable 
development and economic issues.  
Neorealism provides a poor explanation for Arctic Council mandate expansion.  
H1: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate. 
 
This hypothesis does not have support because it is clear that neither relative gains nor security 
was important in state decision making about the Council. This hypothesis would have support if 
states attempted to gain more than rivals through their work in the Council or if the Council’s 
work improved state security. However, states co-operated in the Council to expand its mandate 
even though gains were uneven. Russia stands to gain the most from the economic growth of the 
Arctic region, yet its main regional rival the United States continues to collaborate to strengthen 
the Council’s mandate. Further, security was not a pressing consideration of states at the onset of 
the Arctic Council. There is little reason to believe that states now have security aspirations for 
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the Council. The potential for conflict in the Arctic is virtually nonexistent.
382
 Survival is not at 
issue. Further, several Council policy-makers argue that there is little chance that states have 
security-minded motivation for participation in the Council. Council policy-makers do not 
believe security was important in the founding of the Council.
383
 There were other organizations 
that states could use to address Arctic traditional security as states formed the Council in 1996,
384
 
such as NATO or the United Nations. One could argue that a strong economy supports state 
security and self-help, in line with neorealist predictions. Neoliberal institutionalism better 
explains the Council’s economic expansion, with its predictions about the importance of 
absolute, economic gains. Relative gains were not important for states in the founding of the 
Council.  
H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region. 
 
This hypothesis does not have support because the states are not responding to a military 
threat or regional re-balancing. They are collaborating on technical economic issues. In a way, 
states wanted to form the Council to ensure regional balance against Russia, but such 
considerations are no longer important. Despite some alarmist headlines and academic articles in 
Canada, there are currently no military threats to any of the Arctic countries’ legal status in the 
Arctic. In the unlikely event of a threat, NATO would protect member Arctic regions, because 
Canada, the United States, Denmark, Iceland and Norway are part the alliance and it has 
relations with the other Council countries. Even if one removes security considerations from 
state motivations, the hypothesis has limited support. Aside from security, smaller states could be 
                                                 
382
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using the Council to balance economic power in the region and prevent U.S. dominance. States 
want to make gains through Council mandate expansion, rather than ensuring regional balance.  
H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers. 
 
The hypothesis does not have support because all of the states support the direction of 
evolution in the Council, representing a neoliberal institutionalist absolute gain. In addition, 
sustainable development is part of the Council even though the United States resisted the 
concept.
385
 The form of negotiation led them to accept the Council. One could point out that 
Russia stands to gain the most from the expansion of the Council’s mandate into economic areas. 
However, it seems likely that the Council’s mandate would have expanded even if this situation 
were not the case. Overall, it is difficult to test the validity of the influence of the influence of 
great powers based on this case. States all agreed to expand the mandate of the Council and the 
preferences of great powers and other powers aligned.  
 In conclusion, neorealism does not provide a good explanation for Council behaviour. 
States do not have major security concerns in the Arctic. These actors have economic concerns, 
but neoliberal institutionalism better explains this interest. Neorealism would predict that the 
United States would have to gain more than Russian does in Council mandate expansion for 
expansion to move forward. It is difficult to argue this is the case because Russia has greater 
Arctic territory, resources and shipping routes than does the United States. It is difficult to argue 
that “balance” considerations motivate states in the Arctic. The states are not focused on 
defending themselves against an internal or external threat. Smaller states might be trying to 
balance economic power against the larger states. These states would include Russia and the 
United States. Neoliberal institutionalism does a better job explaining this situation with its 
emphasis on economic motivations for state behaviour.  
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Table 2.2: Analysis 
 
Hypothesis Number Hypothesis Accepted/Rejected 
Functionalism 
Functionalist 1 The mandate of the Council is expanding 
because they all stand to gain something 
through automatic expansion. 
Not supported – expansion 
into environmental areas is 
not automatic 
Functionalist 2 States are allowing the Arctic Council 
mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual 
technocratic goal around a less political 
issue area. 
Supported – expansion is in 
less-political areas, such as 
search and rescue  
Functionalist 3 The mandate is expanding because 
institutional capacity allows it to evolve 
without disruption. 
Not supported – no 
evidence of strong 
institutional capacity 
Functionalist 4 The mandate is expanding because an 
epistemic community is convincing states it 
should expand. 
Not supported – no 
evidence of epistemic 
community impact on 
mandate 
Functionalist 5 The mandate is expanding because the 
Arctic Council has proven itself competent, 
tempered by norms and path dependence. 
Supported – ACIA 
established competence 
Functionalist 6 The process of mandate expansion should 
occur automatically and proceed 
consistently. 
Not supported – expansion 
into environmental areas is 
not automatic 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neoliberal 1 States are expanding the mandate of the 
Arctic Council because they all stand to 
gain something through expansion. 
Supported – all gain by 
expansion into economics 
Neoliberal 2 The expansion of the Arctic Council is 
occurring because of an economic issue. 
Supported – expansion 
clearly economic 
Neoliberal 3 States are allowing the Arctic Council to 
expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic 
goal. 
Supported – expansion 
clearly economic, technical 
Neoliberal 4 The form of negotiation (such as 
coalitions, information and the power of 
persuasion) has an impact on the evolution 
of the Council’s mandate. 
Supported – Council’s 
mandate evolved 
throughout negotiations 
Neorealism 
Neorealist 1 Relative gains will mediate the evolution of 
the Council’s mandate. 
Not supported – absolute 
gains key 
Neorealist 2 States are expanding the mandate of the 
Arctic Council to balance power in the 
region. 
Not supported – absolute 
gains sought, not balance 
Neorealist 3 The evolution of the Council’s mandate 
should reflect the preferences of great 
powers. 
Not supported – all states 
gain absolute gains 
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Table 2.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of the Council’s Mandate 
Phenomena Functionalism Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
Neorealism Why? 
1991-1996/founding of the Council  
 
Environmental 
rationale for Council 
formation 
X X X All theories 
emphasize 
interests 
Military concerns in 
Council formation 
 
X X X All theories 
emphasize 
interests 
Scandinavian 
interest in 
environmental 
Council 
X X X All theories 
emphasize 
interest 
ICC influence over 
Canada vis-a-vis 
human security 
 
X X  Allow role for 
epistemic 
community 
influence 
United States 
resistance to security 
in Council  
 X X United States 
opposition 
based on gains 
Russia resistance to 
environmental work 
 
X X  Allow role for 
epistemic 
community 
influence 
United States 
resistance to Council 
(duplication/utility) 
 
  X Predicts great 
power 
reluctance to 
co-operate 
United States and 
Russian resistance to 
security versus 
Canadian and 
Nordic interest 
  X Predicts great 
power 
reluctance to 
co-operate 
United States and 
Russian resistance to 
human security 
versus Canadian and 
Nordic interest 
 X X Great power 
concern; 
questions over 
gains and 
avenue for 
criticism 
Desire for 
information sharing 
X X X All states 
stand to make 
gains, relative, 
mutual and 
absolute 
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 Functionalism 
Continued 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
Continued 
Neorealism 
Continued 
 
Russia interest in 
Council 
 X  Influence of 
coalitions and 
negotiations 
1996-2004 
 
Environmental focus X X X All theories 
emphasize 
interests 
Disagreement over 
sustainable 
development 
 X X Concerns 
about 
sovereignty 
Disagreement over 
security 
 X  Influence of 
coalitions and 
negotiations 
2004-2007 
 
ACIA X X X All theories 
emphasize 
interests 
Shift toward 
emergency 
preparedness 
 X  Absolute gains 
Continued 
environmental work 
X X  Absolute and 
mutual gains 
2008-2013 
 
Emergency 
preparedness work 
 
 X  Absolute gains 
Continued 
environmental work 
 
X X  Absolute and 
mutual gains 
Shift toward 
economic work 
 
 X  Emphasis on 
power of 
economics 
     
Totals 10 18 11  
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It is necessary to review the major questions posed at the onset of this chapter. The 
predictions of functionalism are not realized because the Council’s evolution is not automatic 
and consistent. The predictions of neoliberalism are valid because absolute gains motivate states 
to expand the Council’s mandate and the form of negotiation is important. The predictions of 
neorealism are unsubstantiated because relative gains are not important in determining state 
preferences and great power preference does not always prevail in Council decision-making. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the analysis.  
Table 2.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis 
Dependent variable: expansion 
of the Arctic Council’s 
mandate into economic and 
other areas 
 
Necessary 
(n) / 
sufficient 
(s)  
Fulfilled 
(Y/N) 
Why fulfilled 
Common ind. 
variables 
Likely less 
political issue 
area 
S Y No security in Council mandate (a 
political issue); expansion into less 
political emergency prep, economics  
 
 Economic 
gains 
S Y Emergency prep economic issue; 
Arctic Economic Council 
 
Functionalism 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (i.e. 
mostly equal) 
 
N N Russia gains the most from economic 
growth 
 Issue spillover  N&S N Response to ACIA specific, not 
automatic (i.e. economics, not climate 
change); response took several years 
 
 Independent 
institution 
N&S N Council is a weak body; no evidence of 
lobbying 
 
 Interest group 
or epistemic 
community 
lobbying 
 
N N Individuals partly responsible for 
ACIA and SDWG, but less influence in 
case of mandate 
 Institution has 
proven 
N Y Council has produced good reports; 
states take new action in Council rather 
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competence than create a new institution 
 Automatic 
response 
N&S N Response to ACIA specific, not 
automatic (i.e. economics, not climate 
change); response took several years 
 
Neoliberal 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (e.g. 
states gain 
something) 
 
N&S Y All states gain through economic 
expansion, though not all states gain 
equally 
 Shadow of the 
future 
N Y All states are allies; though relations 
with Russia are strained, future work 
likely 
 
 Lack of path 
dependence 
N Y Council evolved despite history of 
environmental work 
 
 Lack of 
contrary 
norms 
 
N Y Council had roots in areas of expansion 
(i.e. EPRR and SDWG) 
 Form of 
negotiation 
(e.g. 
information, 
coalitions) 
 
N&S Y Compromise in negotiations led to 
initial mandate of Council; information 
responsible for expansion into 
economic areas 
Neorealist 
ind. variables 
Relative gains 
(e.g. states 
gain more 
than rivals) 
 
N&S N No evidence of concern for relative 
gains; no importance of security issues 
 No security 
ramifications 
 
N Y Security not an important issue for 
states 
 “Balance” 
motivations 
 
 
N&S N States attempting to make absolute, 
economic gains 
 Great power 
preference 
reigns 
supreme 
N&S N All states supported Council; 
sustainable development part of 
Council despite United States and 
Russian resistance; all states gain in 
current expansion 
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Conclusion 
This chapter explained the evolution of the Arctic Council’s mandate to take on 
economic and related public safety issues. Initially, states and permanent participants intended 
that the Arctic Council promote environmental protection and sustainable development in the 
Arctic region. Although it has done a lot of work on environmental protection, its work on 
sustainable development has faced problems of focus. Only the Council’s informal mandate has 
changed. Functionalists would explain this evolution with reference to a combination of 
institutional capacity, technocratic interest, automatic spillover and institutional competence. 
Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that economic issues, negotiation tactics and absolute 
gains are responsible for mandate expansion. Neorealism would expect that regional balance 
concerns are responsible for the expansion. Neoliberal institutionalists are the most correct in 
that states are expanding the Council’s mandate to exploit the economic potential of the Arctic.  
Functionalism also can contribute to our understanding the Council. Neoliberal 
institutionalism would predict that the Council would not evolve due to norms. The Council 
broke path dependence in that there were some elements and working groups whose broad 
activities allowed it to move beyond environmental monitoring, namely the Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response group. This fact is in line with the predictions of 
neoliberal institutionalism. Nonetheless, the institution showed that it is competent through 
excellent reports, which also contributed to its growth. This fact is in line with the predictions of 
functionalism, which sees individuals within the council being able to shape the agenda of the 
Council indirectly by pushing for action on climate change. Neoliberal institutionalism would 
not make this prediction. The Council’s mandate has expanded mainly due to the economic 
importance of the Arctic, but also due to its good work and the individuals within the Council. 
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This chapter contributes to academic literature in that it is the first study to explain the 
current expansion of the Arctic Council. Those who argue that the Council should expand for 
normative or more altruistic reasons must pay heed to the power of economics. Many scholars 
prescribe what the Council should do to address issues of profound importance in the Arctic 
region. Scholars need to pay more attention to what the Council can do. That is, scholars need to 
take into account the factors that motivate Council action when they provide their prescriptions 
for Council action. As economic arguments are responsible for mandate expansion, scholars who 
seek to influence the Council would be wise to make their arguments in these terms. Scientists 
within the Council in the past have shaped the mandate of the Council, as seen in the case of 
securing the funding of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report. In the Arctic Council, 
environmental and social problems in the Arctic motivate research but not necessarily action. 
More elaboration about what changes are possible in the Arctic Council in this context is a 
direction for more research.  
Authors such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke may be 
correct that the Arctic Council emerged due to an interest in scientific knowledge about the 
Arctic, but that explanation does not explain the Council’s evolution. There is some evidence 
that geopolitical concerns and concerns about human security also motivated states to form the 
Arctic Council, but there is no doubt that concern about Arctic pollution from Russia mainly 
inspired states to create the institution. These scholars did not anticipate the changes that are 
taking place in the Council and that economics would inspire change in the Council. The 
motivations and interests of states within the Arctic Council have shifted considerably since 
scholars first examined the Council’s formation. As the Council is now dealing with important 
economic issue areas, it may continue to expand.   
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLAINING THE POLICY-MAKING ROLE OF THE COUNCIL 
The policy-making role of the Arctic Council is expanding.
386
 In 1996, shortly after the 
founding of the Council, commentators anticipated it would be an institution that governments 
used to create formal policy.
387
 It quickly became clear that it would instead be a weak policy-
recommendation body. The institution emerged as a forum to research environmental issues and 
complete small-scale sustainable development projects. States and permanent participants 
created scientific reports in the institution, often with policy recommendations, but they did not 
create formal policies or treaties. The role of the Council changed in 2009, when it announced it 
would create a formal agreement on Arctic search and rescue. This chapter explains the reasons 
for the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. The term “policy-making role” refers to 
actions by the Council to facilitate the creation of formal international agreements. The Council’s 
“policy-recommendation role” refers to research creating policy options, which states can decide 
to adopt or ignore.  
 This chapter analyzes the policy-making role of the Council using functionalist theory, 
neorealist theory and neoliberal institutionalist theory, proceeding in three sections. The first 
section describes each theory’s expected reasons for the expanding policy-making role of the 
Council. Functionalism would hypothesize that the Council’s policy-making role would expand 
automatically in response to clear issues that states and the Council itself need to address. 
Neorealism would expect the policy-making role should expand when doing so helps states 
achieve relative gains and fulfills the preferences of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalism 
                                                 
386
 Expansion in this case refers to increased frequency of the creation of formal policy, such as treaties.  
387
 For example, see Gordon Barthos, “New Envoy Tackles Challenge of Canada’s Last Frontier,” Toronto Star, 
November 25, 1994; Canadian Press, “Eight Nations Form Council to Protect, Develop Arctic,” Globe and Mail, 
September 20, 1996; David Crary, “Eight Arctic Nations Band Together to Combat Pollution,” Associated Press, 
September 19, 1996; Randall Palmer, “Arctic States Join to Try to Protect Environment,” Reuters, September 19, 
1996. 
  
 
113 
would hypothesize that the policy-making role would expand because it is in the absolute interest 
of all member states, tempered by the form of negotiation. The second section undertakes 
historical process tracing to demonstrate how the Council’s policy-making role has expanded 
over time. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, 
with its emphasis on absolute gains, explains state preferences in the Council’s policy-making 
role; however, neorealism, with its emphasis on great power influence, provides the best 
explanation for outcomes in the Council. Economics provide the catalyst for the evolution of the 
Council’s policy role, which all of the theories examined would expect. We would not see the 
same expansion of the policy-making power of the Council if the Arctic’s economic potential 
were not as strong as it is today. The central argument of this chapter is that the Council’s policy-
making role is expanding primarily because the increasing potential to exploit the North’s 
economic resources means that expansion is in the absolute interest of member states, most 
importantly the United States and Russia.  The North’s economic potential provides an incentive 
for states to create policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region. 
This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, existing literature does 
not agree on the policy-making role of the Council. Several authors, such as diplomat Evan T. 
Bloom,
388
 consultant Terry Fenge389 and political scientist Oran Young
390
 argue that the Council 
developed as a research institution rather than a policy institution. These authors emphasize that 
the Council creates good quality research that states use to create policy in other forums. For 
these authors, the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role is an unexpected event. A 
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second group of authors argue that the Council is a norm creating, “soft law” international 
institution. This group includes such political scientists as Timo Koivurova,
391
 Peter Stenlund
392
 
and Alison Ronson.
393
 A shortcoming of this literature is that the authors do not provide strong 
examples to establish that the Council indeed creates soft-law. This paper evaluates both sides of 
this debate and concludes that neither is currently accurate because the Council now creates 
“hard-law,” or formal international policy. It contributes to literature that seeks to explain why 
the Council operates as it does, as well as literature that seeks to understand the dynamics of 
international institutional decision-making.  
Second, this chapter contributes to literature that debates whether the Council’s policy-
making role should expand further. Some authors, such as political scientist Oded Cedar,
394
 call 
on the Council to increase its policy-making role to address pressing challenges in the Arctic 
region. This group includes research institutes and think tanks.
395
 Their work ignores the political 
context of current Council decision-making, as well as whether the type of policy role they 
envision for the Council is possible in the near future. Existing work, for example, does not 
examine whether the current instances of policy-making in the Council are temporary, successful 
or wanted by all member states. This thesis shows that further policy-making expansion is 
unlikely outside of economic issue areas.  
Third, this thesis contributes a case study that demonstrates the explanatory validity and 
reliability of neoliberal institutionalism when modified with predictions of neorealism.  
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3.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role 
 Theory provides a frame for analysis to explain the reasons for the evolution of an 
international institution. Functionalists would expect an institution would evolve automatically 
and would thus propose six hypotheses to explain expansion of the Council’s policy-making 
ability. The first hypothesis relates to state preferences and outcomes. The second through fifth 
hypotheses relate to state preferences while the sixth relates to outcomes.  
H1: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response 
to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.  
 
Functionalists would expect that changes in the policy-making role of the Arctic Council 
are occurring automatically due to clear, external issues demanding a co-operative policy 
response. Other theories argue institutional evolution is more political. Functionalists argue that 
states respond to external challenges “automatically.”396 Political scientists Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner summarize that in functionalism, international 
co-operation “propels itself forward.”397 Functionalist David Mitrany writes that there is 
“promise in working arrangements as a way of building up an international community.”398  
Formal agreements emerge to help states achieve their goals and do something that would not 
otherwise be possible.
399
 For example, functionalists would expect climate change to elicit 
automatic co-operation. It is a challenge external to any state and no one state is responsible. It 
poses clear challenges that governments must address together and thus states will not hesitate to 
respond. Thus, climate change co-operation will emerge automatically in the Council.  
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H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the 
same preferences that create evolution 
 
According to functionalists, instances of international co-operation in the Council must 
serve a clear function and be in the absolute interest of all states.400 Neorealists do not believe 
gains must be absolute. International institutions, as summarized by political scientists Kenneth 
W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared 
goals: producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner’s dilemma settings, solving 
coordination problems, and the like.”401 States should have the same goal in any instance of 
international co-operation and thus the evolution of the policy-making role of the Council is a 
response to common goals.  
H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual 
technocratic goals around a less-political issue area. 
 
For functionalists, co-operation in the Council is likely to emerge around less-political 
issues. These are issues usually associated with “low politics,” or issues that do not involve vital 
state interest and impact state survival.  Other theories would agree, but functionalists emphasize 
this point. For example, military security would be a highly political issue area, but ecosystem 
management would be a less political issue area. If all states face an environmental threat, the 
solution to the problem should not be contentious. In the words of political scientist Mark Imber, 
functionalists “advocated using the ‘low politics’ of functional, technical and economic co-
operation as more suitable for promoting [international] integration.”402 Thus, the Council will 
create formal policies and treaties to serve a technical purpose, such as the creation of a new 
trade route or a mechanism to reduce pollution with transboundary consequences. 
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H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring automatically because of 
“spillovers” that create opportunities for further co-operation.  
 
Functionalists would predict that “spillover” would increase Council policy-making. 
States may grant international institutions a degree of autonomy, after which institutions may end 
up “leading the individual member states.”403 The other theories argue international institutions 
will never “lead” states. States grant international institutions authority to complete tasks 
efficiently.
404
 In some cases, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ 
to transfer policy-making in related sectors.”405 Functionalists call this process “spillover.”406 For 
example, if states created an institution to negotiate an economic agreement, it might next 
discuss the infrastructure necessary in response to new economic activity, which would expand 
their policy-making role. Functionalists argue this process should proceed consistently. 
According to functionalists, evolution in the Arctic Council would occur in response to issue 
“spillover.”  
H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in 
the Council. 
 
Functionalists would predict that an epistemic community and/or an interest group is 
likely convincing states that Council policy-making evolution is necessary and providing 
information that makes evolution more likely. Functionalists argue that interest groups or 
epistemic communities can convince states to undertake action by providing information or 
making compelling arguments.
407
 In contrast, other theories, such as neorealism, do not believe 
such groups can influence state foreign policy. Epistemic communities are groups of experts who 
share a common perspective on an issue. Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and 
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expectations.”408 For example, business groups may push for new roles and responsibilities for 
the Arctic Council as climate change creates new opportunities for business in the Arctic. These 
groups may provide information about the business activity that would result if the Council 
undertook certain action, such as creating an agreement on search and rescue. They may bring 
forward beliefs and values about the necessity of economic development ahead of all else. In 
contrast, the epistemic community of climate scientists may convince states that action on 
climate change is necessary by providing information about the harmful consequences of 
inaction. They also may bring forward beliefs and values about the importance of protecting the 
environment ahead of economic activity. However, states will not allow an international 
institution to take on an issue that is outside of its interest or that is not within its desired range of 
preferences, despite the lobbying of epistemic communities or interest groups.  
H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven 
competent. 
 
For functionalists, the Arctic Council will only evolve when it is clearly competent.
409
 In 
the words of Imber, “Organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional powers, 
those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy task expansion.”410 In contrast, the other two theories 
maintain that institutional expansion relates to state interests rather than institutional 
performance. If a new issue emerges, states only will co-operate in existing international 
institutions if it can execute state goals. If an institution does not have a record of success, states 
may opt to create a new international institution. Thus, states will allow the evolution of the 
Arctic Council when it shows that it is an international institution capable of doing more than it 
currently does.  
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Neorealists argue that concerns over relative position drive state ambitions and would 
make three predictions to explain the growing policy-making role of the Arctic Council. The first 
two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third explains outcomes.  
H1: States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current 
evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.  
 
Neorealists argue that the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role should serve 
state relative gains. As noted, functionalists assume that states will co-operate to achieve any 
gain. Neoliberal institutionalists assume that states are “atomistic” in that in any transaction, their 
motivation is to gain something, regardless of the gains of other states (i.e. absolute gains).
411
 
Neorealists, in contrast, assume that states are “positional,” in that in transactions these actors 
seek to maintain or improve their position relative to rival powers (i.e. relative gains).
412
 Rival 
powers are states that can challenge the position of a given state and so states seek relative gains.  
H2: Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital 
interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger 
policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region. 
 
Neorealists argue great powers would need to gain more than rival powers to ensure 
relative gains in Council evolution.
413
 Namely, the United States and Russia must gain more than 
rival powers, such as China, in international co-operation.  Russian and United States gains also 
must be equal. Neorealists argue that self-help and survival are the most important goals in 
international relations.
414
 Great powers would be unlikely to co-operate in areas of vital interest, 
but may support co-operation in less important issue areas, such as environmental protection.  
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Neorealists would argue that smaller states co-operate to “balance” against rival powers 
in the Council.
415
 Through the Arctic Council, states might be attempting to strike a balance 
against a rival outside the region. Small states in the Council might use the institution to balance 
against the great powers in the region.
416
 For example, the Arctic states could use the Council to 
respond to increased Arctic interest from a rival power such as China. Alternatively, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden might be attempting to balance the power of 
Russia and the United States. A country such as Finland, for example, has few advantages in 
bilateral relations with Russia, yet it is better able to achieve its objectives when it works in 
concert with the other Scandinavian countries in the Council; hence, regional balance is an 
important consideration. Neither functionalism nor neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes great 
power relative gains or “balance” concerns as determining state co-operation, as do neorealists. 
H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great 
powers. 
 
 According to neorealist scholars, great powers would not enter into arrangements that are 
contrary to their preferences and so the structure of the Council should reflect their interests. This 
scenario is possible in functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism. Great powers have greater 
economic and military power than smaller powers. Thus, these powers have less need to co-
operate and can dictate the terms of collaboration.
417
 Smaller powers in the Arctic Council have 
fewer alternatives to accomplish their policy goals. These states are less able to exploit their 
economic power or coerce other states. In many cases, these actors require co-operation more so 
than great powers. Thus, middle powers and small powers may co-operate through the Arctic 
Council even when the form of co-operation does not match their foremost preferences.  
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Neoliberal institutionalism would make five predictions about the reasons that an 
international institution’s policy-making role would expand. The first three hypotheses predict 
state preferences in Council evolution while the fourth and fifth predict outcomes.  
H1: States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through 
treaty making. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states must gain something by evolving the Arctic 
Council’s policy-making role. They assert that a state creates a treaty when it is in its interest to 
do so and it stands to gain something material.
418
 States will co-operate if they make any gain, in 
contrast to neorealists who argue states will likely respond to relative gains. 
H2: States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic 
issue. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists view economics as a potent motivator for state action and thus 
the Council’s policy-making evolution. Other theories agree that economics motivate state 
behaviour, but it is particularly important to neoliberal institutionalists.
419
 In the words of 
political scientist David Baldwin, in neoliberal institutionalist theory, “states are assumed to be 
trying to maximize their economic welfare in a world where military force is a possibility.”420  
H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the 
future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept 
compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states are likely to co-operate if all of the countries 
are likely to have to co-operate in the future, which should be true in the Council. Scholars refer 
to the fact that states will need to co-operate in the future as “the shadow of the future.”421  
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Neoliberal institutionalists also argue that international norms can restrict state behaviour 
(in contrast to functionalists and neorealists), which should have an impact on the Council. 
Political scientists Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.”422 In other words, a norm in international 
relations is an informal rule or expected behaviour to which states adhere. In international 
institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms about the institution’s operations may dictate state 
action and can even overcome state interest, thus leading to compromise by great powers.  
H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus 
Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the interaction between states and the content of 
negotiations can explain outcomes of co-operation in the Council, in contrast to functionalists
423
 
They also argue that non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities and small states 
can bring forward information that impacts international co-operation. This fact explains why 
outcomes may differ from the desired outcomes of great powers, in contrast to neorealists.  
H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence. 
Neoliberal institutionalists would expect the Council to evolve in order to make the 
region more predictable, though tempered by path dependence. They argue that treaties formalize 
the sharing of information and codify how states interact.
424
 Treaties help ensure commitments 
are legitimate. This situation can create path dependence. Functionalists and neorealists do not 
believe this phenomenon will be a problem. Path dependence refers to the notion that norms and 
established practices within international organizations can mean they are difficult to evolve.
425
 
                                                 
422
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norms Dynamics and Political Change,” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 891.  
423
 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Co-operation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” 238-239. 
424
 Ibid., 229. 
425
 Ibid., 238-239.  
  
 
123 
Table 3.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy-making role 
evolution according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making 
role evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy 
response? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution was not consistent or 
automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-
making role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s 
predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute gains or the form of 
negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-
making role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The 
theory’s predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains motivated states, or if the 
preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.  
Table 3.1: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role Necessary (n)  
/ sufficient (s) 
Common ind. variables Likely less political issue area S 
 Economic gains S 
Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. gains mostly equal) N 
 Issue spillover  N&S 
 Independent institution N&S 
 Interest group or epistemic community lobbying N 
 Institution has proven competence N 
 Automatic response  N&S 
Neoliberal ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something) N&S 
 Shadow of the future N 
 Lack of path dependence N 
 Lack of contrary norms N 
 Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions) N&S 
Neorealist ind. variables Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals) N&S 
 No security ramifications N 
 “Balance” motivations N&S 
 Great power preference reigns supreme N&S 
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3.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council’s Policy-Making Role 
This section provides an overview of four periods of Council policy-making. In the first 
period, from 1991 until 1996, states debated the policy-making role of the Council, with the 
United States and Russia strongly opposing defining the Council as a policy-making body, and 
Canada and the Nordic states strongly supporting such a role. In the second period, from 1996 to 
2003, the United States, Russia and even Canada blocked attempts to create formal policy in the 
Council. In this period, policy-making in the Council did not occur because state interests did not 
align in areas requiring a policy response. The third period, from 2004 until 2007, was a 
transitional period. Russia increasingly supported using the Council to create policy because it 
was in its economic interest to do so. In the fourth period, from 2007 until present, the Council 
created formal policies on issues of circumpolar concern, namely emergency response.  
3.2.1 – 1991-1996 
To show that evolution has taken place, it is necessary to understand the intention of 
states regarding the Council’s policy-making role. From 1991 until 1996, states debated the 
policy-making role of the Arctic Council. There are four key questions. First, how did the 
question of the Council’s policy-making role emerge? Second, what were key debates regarding 
the Council’s policy-making role? Third, what were the positions of the various actors prior to 
the creation of the Council regarding its policy-making role? Fourth, why did the preferences of 
some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence? In regards to the first 
question, the eight Arctic states envisioned that the Council would be an organization to research 
important Arctic environmental issues. The key question that naturally emerged was whether the 
Council would be the venue in which states would address these key issues. The Council 
emerged as a successor to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). 
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In regards to the first question, a question about the Council’s policy-making role 
emerged because the AEPS had identified several issues demanding a policy response. The 
strategy stemmed from a desire by policy-makers in Arctic states to co-operate in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and to address severe environmental issues in the Russian 
Arctic that demanded a response. Governments generally knew that there were large amounts of 
the poisonous industrial coolant polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) unsafely stored in the Russian 
Arctic. These states, including Russia, did not know the extent of the problem.
426
 It was 
important to understand the issue because exposure to PCBs causes cancer. In addition, the 
government of the former Soviet Union openly acknowledged that it had dumped radionuclides 
in the Arctic, namely in the Kara and White Seas.
427
 The AEPS came together in 1991 in 
Rovaniemi, Finland, after negotiations beginning in September 1989 at the government of 
Finland’s suggestion. The program was to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans” as 
well as to “review regularly the state of the Arctic environment.”428 The strategy established that 
there were 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War.
429
 A 
2000 report summarized, “Within the Russian Federation, there is no collection of PCB waste, 
and no disposal facilities; PCB contaminated wastes are usually stored on site.”430 It also found, 
“Storage may be in the open air or in storage rooms or warehouses,”431 in many cases near 
populations of indigenous peoples. States began to consider the role of policy in the Arctic 
Council because the AEPS identified Arctic environmental problems as potentially demanding a 
policy response.  
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After 1991, the question of an Arctic council’s policy-making role continued because 
policy-makers became aware of the poor living conditions in some parts of the Arctic requiring a 
policy response. Indicators showed the living standard of Russia’s Arctic residents was declining 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. During the 1990s, the life expectancy of Russia’s northern 
indigenous peoples decreased by almost five years.
432
 The AEPS took on human development 
projects, such as the creation in 1994 of the Task Force on Sustainable Development and 
Utilization. It conducted studies of domestic policy and its impact on indigenous peoples.
433
 
AEPS research about the declining human security situation in the Russian Arctic begged 
questions about the policy role of an Arctic Council.  
In terms of the second question, as to the key debates around the Council’s policy-
making role, the main issue concerned whether the Council would be an institution in which 
states created formal policy, which news commentary expected. In 1994, Toronto Star columnist 
Gordon Barthos wrote, “An Arctic Council should be used to tackle a broader range of 
international issues such as demilitarizing the North and creating a free-trade zone,” as well as 
such issues as “boosting scientific exploration, mining, tourism, pollution control, and wildlife 
protection.”434 Historian John English, in his history of the formation of the Arctic Council, 
confirms that many commentators expected that the Council would be a policy-making body.
435
 
The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, for example, had called for policy creating a “zone 
of peace” in the Arctic since 1984.436 Many commentators debated the Council’s policy role.   
                                                 
432
 Arctic Council, Arctic Human Development Report (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2004), 158. 
According to the report, life expectancy among Russian indigenous peoples declined 4.8 years from 1990 until 1995. 
This decline occurred because of high alcohol consumption, poor economic performance and high levels of stress.  
433
 Permanent participant representative and delegation member, winter 2013. The report was entitled Collapse of 
the Seal Skin Market and published under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Task Force 
on Sustainable Development and Utilization 
434Gordon Barthos, “New Envoy Tackles Challenge of Canada’s Last Frontier.” 
435
 John English, Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council (Toronto Ontario: Allen Lane, 2013).  
436
 Ibid., 108.  
  
 
127 
In terms of the third question, regarding the positions of the various actors on the 
Council’s policy-making role, two alignments emerged: Canada and the Nordic countries, with 
delegations supporting a robust, policy-making Council; and the United States and Russia, whose 
delegations stood opposed. Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in 1995 as it 
sought a more robust international institution to succeed the AEPS and faced demands from 
indigenous peoples. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien proposed to United States President 
Bill Clinton that states create a new Arctic institution during a meeting in Ottawa in February 
1995, which the rest of the Arctic states accepted when contacted by Canadian officials.
437
 The 
Canadian government intended the Council to be a policy-making body, which was not accepted 
by United States and Russian officials. The process to create the Council proceeded in two major 
stages. Discussions of the Council’s policy-making role were a relatively minor issue. First, 
informal negotiations between states occurred throughout 1995 as well as in one formal 
negotiation session during June.
438
 The goal of states was to transition the AEPS into an 
institution informally and quickly by the end of 1995. However, state representatives could not 
agree on the role of indigenous peoples’ organizations, discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.439 
Second, Canadian officials saw that informal negotiations would not be adequate and so 
organized three rounds of negotiations between state department officials in 1996. These took 
place in Ottawa in April, June and August.
440
 The issue of whether indigenous peoples’ 
organizations would be full Council members dominated the April and June meetings, with the 
resolution that these groups become second-tier members, or “permanent participants,” without 
voting power. June and August 1996 saw state delegations prepare the declaration founding the 
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Council, signed in a September 1996 meeting in Ottawa. Delegations discussed the policy-
making role of the Council during the June meeting.  
In these negotiations, delegations from the first United States and Russia made two 
arguments opposing a policy-making role. The United States led this alignment and so the 
arguments reflected its preferences. First, the United States generally opposes international 
organizations with a strong policy-making role for fears that it could compromise its 
international autonomy.
441
 One Environmental Protection Agency official illustrated the fear that 
the Council could affect sovereignty in an anecdote about the negotiations to create the Council:  
We [the Environmental Protection Agency] had some inter-agency meetings that were bloody 
because we had some Neanderthals from the then Bureau of Mines and various other elements. 
They were almost shouting, ‘No way in hell are we going to let anybody else come in and tell us 
whether or not we can go and mine in Alaska.’ There were parallel kinds of message coming 
from certain other camps. At the end of the day, the State Department and the White House said, 
‘There’s some good that can come out of this, so we are going to do it [and join the Council].’442 
 
Second, the United States opposed the creation of policy in the Arctic Council to avoid 
duplicating the efforts and roles of other international forums that create formal agreements, such 
as the International Maritime Organization or United Nations.443 There were two other reasons 
the United States and Russia opposed a strong policy-making role for the Council. The nature of 
the United States’ policy-making system makes it difficult for the country to accept and 
implement formal policy, which resulted in a reluctance to involve itself in institutions that could 
create legal obligations.
444
 Furthermore, environmental issues were a fairly low priority for the 
Russian government in the 1990s.
445
 Russian delegations have stated in Council meetings that 
Russia feels unfairly singled out as a problematic polluter, when the other Arctic states have 
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environmental issues as well.
446
 Russia and the United States opposed a policy-making role for 
the Council out of concern for the obligations it would create, which the other Council states had 
to accept.  
The second alignment (the Nordic countries and Canada) sought a strong policy-making 
role for the Council. In the June negotiations, these delegations argued that a policy-making 
Council could be an effective means to address environmental and other Arctic issues. The 
Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, supported using the 
Council to create formal policies as a way to force Russia to address its Arctic contaminant 
problem.
447
 As noted, there was a significant contaminant problem in the Arctic impacting 
human health. It is easier to create common policy positions in Nordic countries due to the 
structure of their governments.448 In Finland, for example, Arctic stakeholders meet ahead of 
Council meetings to develop common Finnish policy positions. (Such meetings do not always 
happen in North American countries.) These stakeholders include government ministries, 
experts, interest groups, the administration, regional governments, non-governmental 
organizations and industry, as well as Saami representatives.449 Nordic countries in general 
develop top-down strategies, followed by an action plan, implementation, follow-up and 
monitoring.450 The United States, in contrast, does not always develop common multi-
stakeholder policy positions, which makes accepting formal policy more difficult.
451
 Canada 
supported policy-making as a means to develop the Council as a strong, robust international 
body. Canada, in the early days of the Council, supported bottom-up decision-making and policy 
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in the Council.
452
 Permanent participants also were part of this alignment, though these groups 
were not a strong part of discussions and were preoccupied securing their participation in the 
Council, discussed in Chapter 6. Government officials from the Nordic states and Canada 
believed that good outcomes could come from the Arctic Council. What emerged from the June 
1996 discussions was not a formal prohibition on policy, but an understanding that the Council 
was an international forum, rather than an international institution with law-making capability.
453
 
 In regards to the fourth question, as to which states’ preferences prevailed, the first 
alignment’s preferences prevailed as Russia and the United States created the expectation that 
the Council would not be a venue to create formal policy. These two countries yielded more 
powerful bargaining positions than the Nordic countries and Canada, namely their relative 
importance and the fact that they were much less willing to compromise in the key June 1996 
negotiations as to the Council’s policy-making role. The United States delegation, in particular, 
demanded a Council that met its state interests and would not threaten the country’s international 
autonomy. It became clear that the Arctic Council would not be a treaty-making body shortly 
after the creation of the organization, but rather an institution that states would use to research 
important policy options. As a 1996 news report noted,  
The group will not, for example, be able to tell the United States whether to develop its most 
northern Alaskan oil reserves, or counsel Russia about how aggressively to mine for minerals in 
Siberia. But it may recommend methods for minimizing the effect of such projects and spreading 
the work and benefits among native communities.
454
 
 
The great regional powers emerged mostly victorious in negotiations.  
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Still, the second alignment could also claim some success, as the United States and 
Russian officials did not demand a general prohibition on the creation of policy. The second 
alignment did not suggest any policies that the Council might create at the onset of the 
institution. The United States and Russian official’s concerns were more about the future than 
the present, which negated the need for a stronger prohibition. States understood after the June 
1996 Council negotiations in Ottawa that the Council would not rush to create policy, but did not 
include language in the Council’s founding documents precluding work on policy.455 The press 
release announcing the Council, for example, says that the Council provided “a mechanism for 
addressing the common concerns and challenges faced by their governments and the people of 
the Arctic.”456 In the media, there was some confusion as to the ultimate policy-making role of 
the Council. For example, a September 1996 Associated Press article created the impression that 
the Council would create policy, identifying the Council as a body “to protect the fragile polar 
environment while encouraging long-term development.”457 The language in the Council’s 
founding documents leaves open the possibility that the Council could be a policy-making body 
in the future. The Nordic countries and Canada accepted the policy-making powers of the 
Council as prescribed by the United States and Russia, confident that the Council could be a 
policy-making institution if circumstances dictated. Overall, the first alignment emerged 
victorious, as there was an understanding that the Council, as an international forum, would not 
create any policy in the short-term. The second alignment could claim some victory, as policy-
making was available to the Council as a tool of governance. States relatively settled the question 
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regarding the policy-making role of the Council as the Council began operations in 1996, even 
though the question did not remain settled for long.  
Returning to the literature, several authors explain that the Council was a research 
institution upon its creation. This chapter confirms that analysis. The AEPS was an institution 
that created good quality research about little understood environmental issues. In 1996, it 
appeared that the Council would continue with this work, as predicted and described by Evan 
Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young. At the founding of the institution, the Council did not 
appear poised to develop norms, or “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors.”458 This 
analysis suggests that authors such as Timo Koivurova, Peter Stenlund and Alison Ronson over-
emphasize the Council role as a soft law institution, based on the legal powers given at its onset. 
The creation of research and reports does not necessarily result in soft-law. Soft law must see 
research lead to a consistent change in state behaviour. In addition, those authors advocating that 
the Council expand could deepen their research agenda by acknowledge that the Council was 
designed deliberately as a limited research institution.  
3.2.2 – 1996-2004 
There are two key questions pertinent to the period of Council policy-making from 1996 
until 2004. First, how did the debate over the policy-making role of the Council evolve from 
1996 until 2004? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over the preferences of 
others?  
In regards to the first question, the debate around the policy-making role settled to an 
extent as it became clear that the United States and Russia would not allow the Council to be a 
strong policy-making body. In creating the Arctic Council rules of procedure, the United States 
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and Russia sought to ensure the Council had a weak policy-making role and that it could ensure 
that such a role could not emerge without consent. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration set out three 
goals for the Council to complete from 1996 until 1998: 1) to develop rules of procedure for the 
Council; 2) to create terms of reference for the Sustainable Development Working Group 
(SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the AEPS to the Arctic Council. There were five 
Council meetings from 1997 until 1998, four of which Canada hosted in the spring and fall of 
each year.
459
 The creation of the rules of procedure dominated the first four of these meetings, 
from the spring of 1997 until August 1998.
460
  In these meetings, the United States sought to 
ensure that the rules of procedure authorize the Council only to undertake projects having the 
consent of all Council members, in essence giving each state a veto on all Council matters.
461
 
The rest of the Council members sought to create a “short and simple” set of “procedural rules” 
that would make the Council a flexible body and ensure the task of creating rules of procedure 
did not take up too much time.
462
 The United States, which was again unwilling to compromise, 
was successful, as the rules of procedure establish that each Council state has a veto on any 
Council matter and that the institution operates according to consensus. This veto allows the 
United States to ensure that no policy can occur in the Council without the consent of all states, a 
high burden of agreement that could stifle policy. The Council’s policy-making role appeared 
settled as the Council began undertaking substantive work in 1998.  
Nonetheless, nothing in the rules of procedure precludes policy work in the Council, 
reflecting the general understanding of the Council’s policy-making role achieved in 1996 
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negotiations. States and permanent participants set the Council agenda,
463
 decide on delegation 
sizes,
464
 schedule meetings and participate in meetings.
465
 All states and permanent participants 
“may make proposals for co-operative activities.”466 States make all of these decisions by 
consensus. Thus, every state has a veto on any Council matter. They decide what observers can 
attend each meeting and what they can do in those meetings.
467
 States typically hold between two 
and four annual meetings in which they receive updates on projects in progress, present 
proposals for new projects and approve of projects presented by other countries. One state acts as 
the chair country to facilitate communication for two-year rotating terms.
468
  
Between 1996 and 2004, the Arctic Council emerged as a policy-recommendation body 
because of the United States, Russia and to a lesser extent Canada. The Council held 18 
institutional meetings from 1998 until 2004. Research defined the Council’s work during this 
period. In a typical meeting, Arctic Council working groups of government scientists would 
bring forward research proposals, which states would sponsor, approve and provide comment. 
Permanent participants and occasionally observers also would sponsor projects and provide 
comment. Most projects moved forward with little interference from state delegations. From 
1998 until 2004, the Council initiated 57 projects, including three major projects (the Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Human Development Report and the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program).
469
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Research, rather than disagreements over policy, defines the Council’s first era of 
existence. The Council undertook research projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil-spill 
preparedness and human security, among others.
470
 Specific examples of research projects 
include the Arctic Sea Birds project,
471
 sponsored by Norway and Canada (2000), the Russian 
Regional Program of Action on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, sponsored by 
Russia (2000) and the Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Technique Manual Project
472
 sponsored 
by Canada (2004). Technical projects include a 2000 project by Canada in the SDWG entitled 
“Children and Youth in the Arctic” that sought to facilitate “data collection and analysis of 
health indicators” for children living in the circumpolar Arctic.473 It also sought to support 
internships, “a summer camp for young people, a learning materials exchange, and an art 
competition for young people.”474 A 2002 project by Norway in the Emergency Prevention 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group sought to produce “a series of GIS-based 
circumpolar maps showing the areas of highest risk of an oil spill and those areas with sensitive 
natural resources or subsistence communities,”475 a useful tool for Arctic shippers.476 At the 
onset of the Council, the Arctic Council was a collegial “science club,” in which it was possible 
to create non-binding research around environmental issues of concern to all Council states.
477
 
This research, while valuable, does not represent significantly ambitious work for an 
international institution, as universities or research institutions could have completed this work.  
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The debate over the Council’s policy-making role re-ignited in 1999 when a Council 
member proposed the creation of a formal policy in the Council. At the November 1999 Arctic 
Council meeting in Washington, D.C., states discussed research on Arctic contaminants, among 
15 agenda items, including reports from the working groups and briefs on relevant environmental 
work occurring outside of the Council. The Swedish and Norwegian delegations, armed with 
scientific evidence about the severity of the problem of PCB contamination, proposed the 
creation of formal, coordinated state reduction targets for Arctic contaminants in the Arctic 
Contaminant Action Plan (ACAP).
478
 The meeting minutes say, “Norway reported that delegates 
should be prepared to negotiate final text for the strategy component of the [Arctic Contaminants 
Action] plan at the next meeting.”479 The Norwegian delegation intended that all states commit 
to the action plan and that Arctic states put forward a common policy on contaminants in other 
“international fora.”480 After this suggestion, delegations from Sweden, Finland, Iceland and 
Denmark expressed support for the plan.
481
 Sweden, for example, announced it would contribute 
two specific projects to clean up PCBs in the Russian Arctic.
482
 However, the Canadian 
delegation then stated it was vetoing the proposal to use the Council to create international 
obligations, citing sovereignty concerns, before Norway or Sweden could discuss what either 
envisioned.
483
 The meeting minutes report, “As far as using the ACAP as a coordinated approach 
in international fora, Canada stated that the Council must continue to rely on individual states to 
take action” and “Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.”484  
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In this case, Canada exercised a veto to block the first-ever suggestion of formal policy 
creation in the Arctic Council. The United States and Russian delegations did not state outright 
rejection of a coordinated Arctic Contaminants Action Program in 1999, but did not express 
support either.
485
 Permanent participants supported creating a policy, but did not convince 
Canada to reverse its veto. Following the Canadian veto, the Inuit Circumpolar Council said that 
a policy response to contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of 
indigenous people in the Arctic.”486 The Nordic countries supported policy on contaminants 
because contaminants from Russia posed environmental and health risks for these countries, as 
previously noted. A formal agreement would keep Russia accountable in the face of resistance to 
environmental action. The United States and Russia did not state support or opposition to the 
proposal, but given either’s earlier resistance to policy-making in the Council, support seems 
unlikely. Russia had little interest in such environmental issues.
487
 Canada did not support formal 
policy due to disagreements over the necessity of such measures.
488
 The debate over the policy-
making role of the Council shifted as the Nordic countries attempted to convince the Council to 
create formal policy, which Canada rejected, citing concerns over sovereignty.   
In the aftermath of this shift, the debate over the Council’s policy-making role further 
ignited as the United States took action to ensure that formal policy would not be forthcoming in 
the Council. In 1993, at the AEPS meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, the Council’s future EPPR 
working group, at the request of Canada, began to review the “adequacy and effectiveness” of 
emergency preparedness “arrangements” in the Arctic.489 At the October 2000 Arctic Council 
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Ministerial Meeting, the project announced it had “concluded that agreements in force are 
currently adequate.”490 Formal treaties or policies could have resulted had the EPPR concluded 
that existing agreements were not adequate. A decade later, the Council created an agreement on 
oil spill prevention. Does this indicate that the agreements in place in 2000 were not adequate 
and the EPPR report was incorrect, or that the environmental and economic conditions in the 
Arctic changed over the course of 10 years? According to policy-makers involved, Russia and 
the United States, then chair of the EPPR working group, pressured the EPPR to ensure the 
report concluded current policies were adequate for fear its report could affect existing nuclear 
pollution regulations.
491
 Other Council actors were not active in this debate but would have 
likely allowed formal policy, though United States and Russian interests reigned supreme.  
 Further work demonstrates that in this period, the Council sometimes acted like an 
advocacy group. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, the Arctic states and 
permanent participants discussed strategies for its members to ratify the 1998 Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution Protocols on Persistent Organic Pollutants and Heavy Metals, an 
international convention to limit the use of contaminants. Canada was the only Arctic Council 
member to ratify the protocols and so states discussed the prospects of other Council countries 
ratifying.
492
 The Inuit Circumpolar Council urged states to ratify the protocols, and Sweden, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland expressed intent to ratify.
493
 The delegation from Canada 
suggested releasing a statement urging “early ratification,” which the United States and Russia 
allowed.
494
 The Council acted like an advocacy group rather than a policy-making organization.  
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In response to the second question, as to why the preferences of some actors prevailed 
over the preferences of others, the Nordic countries could not initiate policy because there was 
no consensus on Council action. At the 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, during a 
discussion of contaminants, Denmark renewed calls for a formal policy on contaminants, 
following up on the 1999 discussion, as its delegation asked, “Why is it so difficult for some 
countries to make a commitment?
”495
 Denmark asserted, “Contaminants can only be reduced 
through international co-operation.”496 In 2002, Finland circulated a draft of the upcoming Inari 
Declaration to Arctic states and permanent participants that had the Council declare itself the 
“mouthpiece” of the Arctic region.497 However, the delegations from Canada and Iceland said 
that they “are not in favour of using the word ‘mouthpiece’ in the declaration,” vetoing the 
idea.
498
 It is not clear where the other Council states stood on this issue. It is not clear what affect 
the declaration that the Council is “mouthpiece” of the Arctic region would have, but certainly, it 
would invest the organization with greater importance. The Council did not create policy because 
the United States and Russia, and to a lesser extent Canada, did not support the creation of 
formal policy in the Council on the issues favoured by the Nordics and permanent participants.  
Decision-making by consensus gave these countries a tool to prevent the adoption of policy.  
As Oran Young and others have asserted, the Council was a research institution from 
1996 until 2004. In addition, the Council did not necessarily create soft-law and fulfill the 
potential role identified by such scholars as Timo Koivurova, although its research often 
contained policy recommendations.   
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3.2.3 – 2004-2007 
From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Arctic Council as a policy-
making body as Russia began emphasizing the importance of taking action on Arctic search and 
rescue. This section seeks to answer the following question: at what point did changes in the 
policy-making role of the Council take place and what explains this evolution? Changes began to 
take place in 2004 as Russia stated its support for formal policy on search and rescue, which all 
Council members generally supported. However, the United States stood alone blocking formal 
policy on climate change, to the disappointment of all Council states and permanent participants.  
The policy-making role of the Council changed in 2004, when Russia shifted its position 
toward that of the Nordic/Canadian alignment and away from the United States’ opposition to 
policy-making. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) had made clear that climate 
change would increase the Northern Sea Route shipping season, a lane 40 per cent shorter than 
the Suez Canal when travelling from China to Europe.
499
 The Russian delegation stated, at the 
November 2004 Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, at which states released the ACIA 
report, that emergency response and Arctic search and rescue would be a priority for the Russian 
government and proposed to “establish a network of international base points, stationing 
equipment and resources for monitoring and rescuing through an agreement among the Arctic 
states.”500 Russia supported taking action on search and rescue in the Arctic because a formal 
agreement would strengthen its economic position in the Arctic. Many reports indicate that the 
economic future of the Arctic is strong because it is a region with billions of barrels of oil and an 
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abundance of natural gas.
501
 As noted earlier, Russia controls roughly 80 per cent of the Arctic’s 
resources.
502
 Insurance companies have cautioned against Arctic investment due to lack of safety 
infrastructure.
503
 Strong work on search and rescue reassures potential investors that resources 
are available in case of emergency, which is part of the reason that Russia proposed policy to 
increase economic potential.  
 Despite the Russian invitation to begin developing policy on emergency preparedness, 
work did not begin immediately. Russia did not come forward with a clear treaty on emergency 
preparedness. From 2004 until 2013, the Council had on average 159 projects ongoing at a given 
time. The Council completed four major projects from 2004 until 2007, namely: 1) the 
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program;
504
 2) Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme pollution assessments;
505
 3) the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks project,
506
 
and; 4) the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment.
507
 Russia emphasized its commitment to search and 
rescue at nine Council meetings over the next five years (November 2004, April 2005, October 
2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and November 
2009). The major focus during the Russian chair was on the clean up of hazardous materials in 
the Arctic as well as the development of an Arctic search and rescue plan.
508
 As noted, there 
were two significant outcomes of Russia’s emphasis on emergency preparedness and its search 
and rescue plan. First, the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group 
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began to create a scientific assessment on the extent of Arctic shipping. Work began on the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (sponsored by the United States) in April 2005, with updates 
on progress at every Council meeting until 2011. Second, the government of Russia organized an 
“accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, Russia, during October 2008, in which circumpolar 
states came together to share strategies to avoid accidents in the Arctic.
509
 The Arctic Oil and 
Gas Assessment also helped support Russia’s emergency preparedness initiative, though it was 
more economic in scope. The Russia search and rescue initiative inspired the subsequent 
agreement on search and rescue, discussed later.  
Nonetheless, Russian openness to an international agreement did not signal great change 
in the Council. There was a second event in which the debate over the Council’s policy-making 
role came to the forefront as the United States signalled that it did not support the creation of 
formal policy through controversy over the ACIA. States decided to create the ACIA at the 2000 
Ministerial Meeting as an assessment of climate change in the Arctic in the wake of information 
about a potential threat from global warming to the environment and livelihoods around the 
world. Government scientists, led by the researchers from the United States, completed the 
assessment over four years. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, Iceland 
proposed the creation of a policy document to accompany the ACIA, which all states approved at 
this meeting.
510
 Scientists updated the Council about its progress creating a policy document in 
April 2003, at the Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. The scientists reported, “The policy 
document will be at least 30 pages, containing three major chapters.”511 The plan was to deliver 
the first draft on June 15, 2003, followed by a second on October 31, 2003 and a third on 
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February 9, 2004.
512
 At every point, states would provide comments, technical in nature. The 
final draft would be finished on April 4, 2004.
513
 There would be a special Council meeting from 
August 5-7, 2003 in Svalbard, hosted by Norway.
514
 The purpose would be to “create a link 
between the scientific work of ACIA and the policy document.”515 It appeared that the Council 
would create a robust policy document on climate change, which could have inspired some 
policy action.  
However, the ACIA policy document was not strong. The United States proposed a 
policy document of only one page at the August 2003 meeting.
516
 After states did not accept this 
proposal, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of an ACIA policy 
document.
517
 The United States changed its earlier support for fear of the document’s impact on 
the 2004 presidential election as the Republican Party under President George W. Bush sought to 
avoid commitments to action on climate change.518 The Inuit Circumpolar Council was 
instrumental in seeing that a policy document survived. As discussed further in Chapter 6, Sheila 
Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council went before United States Senate Commerce 
Committee on March 3, 2004 to testify that the United States was blocking policy on climate 
change.
519
 This testimony embarrassed the United States, and it allowed the report to move 
forward in November 2004 at the next Council meeting.
520
 It considered vetoing the report at this 
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meeting, but decided the optics of doing so would be too controversial.
521
 The United States did 
allow a policy document, but only after external pressure.  
The United States’ resistance to Council policy is reflected in the policy report that 
emerged from the ACIA, which is modest and the result of compromise. While the ACIA is 140 
pages, the policy document is only eight pages.
522
 The report came out on November 24, 2004, 
after the United States election took place on November 2. The actual policy recommendations 
are weak and contain no specific strategies.
523
 Nonetheless, the ACIA changed the way the 
Council operates and increased awareness about the dangers of climate change in the Arctic 
region.
524
 It showed that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost twice the 
rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with likely “additional Arctic warming of 
about 4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.”525 The United States could not block the creation 
of an ACIA policy document, but blocked it from being a strong document.  
We can conclude that from 2004 until 2007, the policy-making role of the Council began 
to shift as Russia joined the Nordic/Canadian alignment, generally becoming open to policy-
making in the Council, specifically to action on Arctic search and rescue. Oran Young’s 
characterization of the Arctic Council as a research institution accurately describes its role from 
2004 until 2007, although a policy-making role was evolving. The Council undertook some work 
beyond research, such as the ACIA policy document or the Russian search and rescue 
collaboration exercise. However, we cannot point to any norms created by these projects, in 
contrast to the predictions made by Timo Koivurova and others. 
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3.2.4 – 2008-2013 
 The Council became a policy-making body, as well as a research institution, from 2008 
until 2013, evolving its approach to governance. The key question is thus: what change in the 
Council’s policy-making role took place and what explains this evolution? The major change 
that took place was that the Council became a body that states use to negotiate formal policy, 
through the creation of the Arctic search and rescue agreement, as well as the agreement on oil 
spill response. All states supported the move to create formal policy in the Council, although the 
support of the United States and Russia was the major factor leading to the creation of formal 
policy.    
 The major change in the Council’s policy-making role took place in 2008. At the 
November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, the United States delegation 
proposed the creation of an Arctic Council agreement on search and rescue to coordinate the 
response to emergency situations,526 to the surprise of many observers and former Council 
policy-makers who did not think the Council would ever create policy. Russia said that it 
supported the proposal and none of the other Arctic Council members stated opposition.
527
 The 
United States and Russia served as co-chairs of the task force that created the agreement.528 
Overall, the Council continued to devote much of its activities to research. As of 2013, each state 
sponsors an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsor an average of two 
projects. Observers have sponsored seven projects.  Negotiating legally binding agreements 
comprised a small portion of the Council’s overall agenda, namely two projects.  
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The search and rescue agreement’s goal is to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime 
search and rescue co-operation and coordination in the Arctic.”529 States negotiated the 
agreement in five meetings in Washington (December 2009), Moscow (February 2010), Oslo 
(June 2010), Helsinki (October 2010) and Reykjavik (December 2010).
530
 The process to 
negotiate the agreement was quite straightforward, with few disagreements among states.
531
 The 
agreement does five things. First, it says that countries will abide by existing international law in 
the Arctic.
532
 Second, it divides the Arctic into zones of responsibility for search and rescue 
issues.
533
 Third, it provides a list of departments to contact in the event of a search and rescue 
emergency.
534
 Fourth, it says that a state can ask for assistance and carry out joint search and 
rescue missions if appropriate.
535
 Fifth, the agreement requires states to exchange information 
about search and rescue. The search and rescue agreement is not ambitious in terms of the 
obligations it imposes on states, but it sets the stage for good quality co-operation and the sharing 
of useful information. It is significant that states chose to create an international agreement at all. 
States could have accomplished everything in the agreement with an informal policy or action 
plan. Policy-makers believe that the agreement is very useful, if not particularly exciting or 
ambitious as an international legal instrument.
536
 The agreement sets up communication and 
coordination that could have happened in the absence of an agreement through existing Council 
meetings. However, it is possible that this coordination would not have occurred without the 
agreement. International agreements are a new tool that the Council uses to accomplish goals.  
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 States supported a search and rescue agreement for two reasons. First, an agreement 
emerged because it was in the interest of all state members. Co-operation was necessary due to 
increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic, which had been established through research by Russia 
in the Council.
537
 Three officials privy to details of negotiations reported that the agreement 
came together quickly and that there were few disagreements or roadblocks in its creation.
538
 
There was a disagreement about the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
search and rescue, but this disagreement was minor and easily overcome.
539
 Finnish officials 
wanted the agreement to acknowledge that the military is a key provider of search and rescue in 
the Arctic. Russia rejected this acknowledgement, as it believed it might justify a NATO 
presence in the Arctic, a position supported by Canada as well.
540
 As noted, Russia stands to gain 
financially from increased economic activity in the Arctic.
541
 The rest of the Arctic Council 
countries supported the agreement to “ensure that it was not going to have a negative impact” on 
their own initiatives and interests.
542
 In other words, states supported an agreement on search and 
rescue to ensure that whatever inevitable regime emerged met their interests. Second, states 
supported an agreement on search and rescue because of pressure from industry. An official who 
is familiar with emergency response in the Arctic said that the resource industry requested more 
safety infrastructure in the Arctic.
543
 Such infrastructure is very costly and fundamental to 
operations.
544
 The Search and Rescue agreement could be a way for states to respond to 
pressures to do something about emergency response without undertaking large expenditures. 
The search and rescue agreement won support because it enhanced the economic prospects of 
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several Council countries and did not run contrary to any other state interest, though it had little 
tangible impact on search and rescue capabilities.  
The process to ratify the agreement began in 2011 and was complete in 2013. The United 
States accepted the agreement through executive order, overcoming its historical opposition to 
international treaties dealing with the Arctic because it meant the agreement would not need to 
be ratified in the United States Senate, often a difficult prospect.
545
 A situation has not yet 
emerged in which provisions of the agreement were enacted, though preparations are ongoing 
within Arctic state authorities.
546
 On January 19, 2013, all the countries ratified the agreement 
and thus it legally came into force.
547
 The permanent participants or observers did not contribute 
significantly to the search and rescue agreement, though they generally supported it or at least 
did not strongly oppose it. Due to a lack of funds, permanent participants have to concentrate 
their scarce resources on areas vital to their interests, as discussed in Chapter 6. The agreement 
represented a move into policy-making by the Arctic Council.  
In 2011, at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, Council state 
delegations announced they would work to negotiate an agreement on oil spill response through 
the creation of a new task force. This agreement represents the Council’s second attempt to 
negotiate a formal agreement. Much like the search and rescue agreement, it came into being 
because state interests aligned to create it. Norway, Russia and the United States co-chaired the 
task force and led the negotiation of the agreement.548 States negotiated the agreement at five 
collegial and straightforward meetings, held in Oslo (October 2011), St. Petersburg (December 
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2011), Girdwood, Alaska (March 2012), Helsinki (June 2012) and Reykjavik (October 2012).
549
 
States signed the agreement during the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting
550
 and hailed it as a 
“huge agreement.”551 Several critics, such as international lawyer Michael Byers, criticized the 
agreement for failing to address oil spill prevention, focusing instead on only on the response to 
oil spills.
552
 Permanent participants were more critical of this agreement. The Arctic Athabaskan 
Council sent two letters to the government of Canada requesting that the agreement address 
prevention as well as response, which were ultimately ignored.
553
 It is possible that states will 
negotiate an Arctic treaty on oil-spill prevention in the future, though it remains uncertain.
554
  
The result of this process is not ambitious, though it shows that the Council has rethought 
its role in regional policy-making. The agreement excludes security by excluding military 
vehicles.
555
 It accomplishes five similar objectives to the search and rescue agreement. First, it 
establishes that states will follow existing international law when addressing oil spills in the 
Arctic.
556
 Second, it establishes zones of responsibility for oil spill clean up. States are 
responsible to clean up oil spills in their domestic waters.
557
 Third, the agreement on oil spill 
response establishes a list of departments responsible for oil spill clean up.
558
 Fourth, the 
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agreement establishes that states can carry out joint clean ups if appropriate.
559
 Fifth, it 
establishes that states have to share information about oil spills and techniques to combat oil 
spills.
560
 The oil spill agreement places legal obligations on state parties. Article 4 requires states 
to clean up oil spills
561
 and Article 6 obliges states to inform other countries if there is an oil 
spill.
562
 The agreement says that states cannot refuse a request for help cleaning up an oil spill.
563
 
States opted to create an agreement on oil spill response for two reasons. First, co-operation to 
address an oil spill is in state interest.
564
  Second, states initiated the agreement because the oil 
industry asked for more resources to deal with spills.
565
 States created the agreement for similar 
reasons to the search and rescue agreement.  
To reiterate, what change in the Council’s policy-making role took place and what were 
the positions of the various actors in the Council? All states are now open to the creation of 
formal policy in the Arctic Council. The United States was alone resisting changes in the policy-
making role in the Council, from 2004 until 2007. This shift is not a sea change. The Council 
created two formal agreements. However, the rest of its average 159 projects were research 
intensive, policy-recommendation work that did not involve formal policy.  
3.2.5 – 2013: The Future of Policy-Making in the Council 
Before concluding, it is necessary to review the policy-making role through three 
questions. First, what is the policy-making role of the Arctic Council today? Second, what is the 
likely trajectory of the policy-making role in the future? Third, why did the Arctic Council move 
from being a body that conducts studies to one that both conducts studies and engages in some 
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policy-making work? The answer to the first question is straightforward, whereas the second is 
less clear. The Council is a research body that can facilitate the creation of formal agreements if 
state officials so desire. In regards to the second question, the future of treaty making in the 
Council is unclear. The 2012 Kiruna Declaration Council work plan contained much that may 
lead to policy, such as an “arrangement on improved scientific research co-operation among the 
eight Arctic States” although there is no guarantee that any law-making documents will 
result.”566 The Council will take “action to prevent oil pollution,” though it is unclear if this 
action will result in policy.
567
 The Council is completing a project on short-lived climate 
forcers,
568
 and some policy-makers believe a treaty could be on the horizon.
569
 Nonetheless, 
some policy-makers still resist the notion that the Council is a policy-making body.
570
   It is not 
apparent whether the Council will continue to develop its policy role, or if it will slow the pace 
of change. Nonetheless, the change toward a policy-making Council has already occurred.   
In response to the third question, the policy-making role of the Council is growing 
because formal policy is increasingly in the interest of all Council states. From 1991 until 1996, 
states debated the role of the Arctic Council. Before the Council held its first meeting, 
commentators expected the Council to be a policy-making body. This expectation was not 
initially realized, as the Council emerged as a research and policy-recommendation forum. The 
Nordic countries wanted the Council to create policy to address pollution in Russia, while the 
United States and Russia wanted to maintain sovereignty. Canada supported policy-making, but 
preferred bottom-up approaches. From 1996 until 2004, the United States, Russia and to a lesser 
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extent Canada blocked the creation of formal policy. States supported creating policy that was 
within their interest and opposed policy that was not within their interest.  
From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Council as a policy-making 
forum. Russia introduced emergency response, as well as search and rescue, as priority issues 
and proposed the creation of a search and rescue agreement. Meanwhile, the United States 
blocked the creation of a strong policy document to accompany the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA). From 2008 until 2013, the nature of policy-making in the Council changed 
when the Council negotiated a formal search and rescue agreement, led by the United States and 
Russia. This issue was of particular interest to the United States, Canada and Russia, although all 
of the Council countries supported the agreement. This agreement also led to the negotiation of 
an agreement on oil spill response, similarly supported by all of the Council states but led by the 
United States, Russia and Norway. The agreements are not particularly ambitious, but they do 
indicate that the Council has moved from being purely a research institution to being a policy-
making body, as well. The treaties that exist support the economic development of the Arctic 
region by giving industry assurances that safety protocols exist. The future of policy-making in 
the Council is unclear.  
How do these findings contrast with the characterizations found in Arctic Council 
literature? A new understanding of the Council is necessary. Evan T. Bloom,
571
 Terry Fenge572 
and Oran Young
573
 argue that the Council is a research institution that provides good quality 
information to states. This characterization of the Council’s work is accurate. However, the 
Council’s role evolved in 2009, when states mutually decided to create formal policy in the 
Council through two international agreements. It is also clear that states had many disagreements 
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about the policy-making role of the Council, exhibited in 1999 in the dispute about whether to 
create a formal policy on pollutants in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, or in 2004 in 
the dispute over the ACIA policy document. States never permanently agreed on the policy-
making role of the Council. It is possible that the Council could create soft-law in the Council, as 
noted by Timo Koivurova,
574
 Peter Stenlund
575
 and Alison Ronson.
576
 Yet, it is difficult to 
identify the creation of any specific soft law, or international norms, in the Council from 1996 
until 2008. When the Council’s policy-making role evolved, it became the venue to create 
international Arctic agreements. The Council is beginning a new phase in its international 
governance. Contrary to the characterization by Oran Young and others, the Council has moved 
beyond its role as a research institution to become a policy-making body in addition. Contrary to 
the characterization by Timo Koivurova and others, the Council has become more than merely a 
soft-law organization by creating formal agreements and standards of practice. Furthermore, 
authors, such as Michael Byers, who argue that the Council should do more, could deepen their 
research agenda by expanding on the Council’s policy-making process.577 States create formal 
policy when it is in in their mutual interest and can gain economically, rather than in response to 
environmental and other issues that demand action. The Council has not become an all-
encompassing body to address all issues demanding governance. The contentious debate over the 
Council’s policy-making role is over. The Council can be a venue to create formal policy, though 
whether this role will expand is unclear.   
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3.3 - Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role 
Functionalism provides some limited insights that explain the evolution of policy-making 
in the Arctic Council.  
H1: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response 
external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.  
 
This hypothesis has limited support. It would have support if the evolution occurred 
automatically due to external structural changes. This situation was more or less the case for 
search and rescue as well as response to oil spills. These issues presented significant issues for 
Arctic states that states could best meet co-operatively. There were relatively few disagreements 
in the creation of these treaties. However, this hypothesis does not have support for two reasons. 
First, the response to these issues was not always automatic. States did not take action because 
action was necessary, but rather once they received demands from industry for regulation, 
promising economic benefit. One could interpret this as automatic expansion. However, the 
United States and Russia blocked earlier attempts to address these issues by limiting the Analysis 
of the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Existing Arrangements and Agreements report due to 
concerns over its effect on nuclear security. Second, the Council has rejected opportunities for 
policy work on other pressing co-operative issues. The United States, Russia and Canada earlier 
rejected strong policy work on Arctic contaminants, another external policy issue demanding co-
operation. The United States blocked a policy response to climate change, an exogenous issue 
that demands co-operation. United States policy-makers were well aware of the devastating 
consequences of climate change, as it had funded a major research report on climate change in 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). The evolution of the Council’s policy-making 
role has not consistently proceeded automatically in response to external structural changes.  
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H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the 
same preferences that create evolution.  
 
 This hypothesis does not have support, even though the policy-making role of the 
Council changed when state preferences aligned. The Scandinavian countries supported a strong 
policy-making role for the Council since at least 1999, as seen in its support for action on Arctic 
contaminants. Canada has wavered in its support for policy-making. It supported potential action 
on emergency preparedness in 2000, but earlier blocked action on contaminants. The United 
States blocked policy-making in the Council until action on search and rescue in 2009. Russia 
did not support policy-making until it introduced its initiative on emergency preparedness in 
2004. The Nordic countries supported the emergency preparedness initiative enough to allow it 
to proceed, though gained less than Russia and the United States. States do not have the same 
preferences and so the hypothesis does not have support.  
H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill shared technocratic 
goals around a less political issue area. 
 
 This hypothesis has some support because Council policy-making has been in areas that 
are technical in nature and less political, as discussed in Chapter 2. The Arctic Council states can 
create greater certainty in the region by pooling resources on search and rescue and oil spills. 
The treaties that states have created are largely technical in nature: they commit states to follow 
international law, conduct joint operations if necessary, create zones of responsibility, exchange 
information and coordinate contacts in case of emergency. One could argue that these are less 
political (i.e., less contentious) issues based on the ease with which the treaties came together. 
There were some minor disagreements in drafting the treaties, but for the most part the treaties 
came together quickly. They help states improve their emergency preparedness and support 
industry operating in the Arctic region. 
  
 
156 
 One could counter this argument and argue emergency preparedness is still a highly 
contentious issue. The United States and Russia had earlier blocked action on emergency 
preparedness because they feared it would have implications for their nuclear activities in the 
Arctic region, demonstrating a political dimension. However, this point does not indicate that 
emergency preparedness was a political issue in itself. The implications of action in this area 
made it a political issue. The United States and Russia likely supported action on emergency 
preparedness in 2009 in part because they were able to ensure that treaties did not impact state 
security. The United States and Russia were in a better place to ensure that action would not have 
unintended consequences. It is clear that overall, emergency preparedness is a less-political issue 
area than such issues as national economic health and military security. 
H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of “spillovers” that 
create opportunities for further co-operation.  
 
 The hypothesis has little support because emergency preparedness did not come to the 
Council’s agenda due to issue spillover. The United States and Russia brought the initiative to 
develop the treaties to the Council. It did not emerge due to earlier work that the Council 
accomplished, but rather from demands from outside actors. One could argue that the treaties 
spilled over from work completed by the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR) working group about emergency preparedness. However, emergency preparedness 
emerged separate from the EPPR, in unique task forces. The United States and Russia chose to 
create the agreements in task forces rather than entrusting the task to the EPPR, which may have 
seemed like a natural venue to create an international agreement on emergency response based 
on its mandate to take action in this area. They did not want to cloud the role of EPPR by 
entrusting it with policy-making. Policy-making did not evolve in the Council due to spillover. 
Rather, it came to the Council due to the will of the United States and Russia.   
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H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in 
the Council. 
 
This hypothesis has some support because industry had effectively pushed for new forms 
of co-operation in the Arctic Council. Industry is similar to an interest group and so fits under 
functionalist theory. Industry convinced states that agreements on emergency response were 
necessary. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, epistemic communities pushed the United States to 
support the ACIA. This same epistemic community was not able to convince Council countries 
to create a strong, supporting policy document. Nonetheless, the Council opted to create the 
emergency preparedness treaties due to the demands of industries, namely the tourism, shipping 
and resource industries in the Arctic, demonstrating the potential affect those interest groups and 
epistemic communities can have on international institutions.  
H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven 
competent. 
 
This hypothesis has some support, but is not fully valid. While the Council has 
demonstrated competence, it does not fully explain the evolution of the Council’s decision-
making role. The Council has proven itself competent in that it has produced quality reports. The 
Council created the 2004 ACIA, which demonstrated the abilities of the Council. Yet, states did 
not create policy in the Council for some time after the report. The United States stifled the 
attempts by the Council to create policy in the ACIA. Part of United States opposition was for 
political reasons, connected to the United States’ presidential election. The policy document 
ultimately did not make useful, substantive policy recommendations. The United States resisted a 
policy-making role for the Council even after the latter proved it is a competent body. It is 
significant that the Council’s policy-making role evolved after proving itself competent. It shows 
that competence is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for international institution evolution.  
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Neorealism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making in the Council. 
H1: States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current 
evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.  
 
This hypothesis has limited support because states in the Arctic Council seem more interested in 
absolute gains than relative gains. Concern for relative gains can make co-operation more 
difficult. It is possible that the United States and Russia rejected action on Arctic contaminants 
and emergency preparedness because they stood to gain less than other countries. It is also 
possible that relative gains motivate concerns about climate change action. Yet, the United States 
supported action on emergency preparedness despite the fact that Russia likely stood to gain 
more from increased Arctic economic activity than did the United States. Russia has the greatest 
potential to increase Arctic shipping of any Arctic Council country.
578
 Russia also has the most 
developed Arctic offshore oil industry.
579
 The United States supported these treaties because it 
stood to gain something in doing so, even if it was not as much as Russia. Absolute gains, rather 
than relative gains, motivate states in the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.  
H2: Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital 
interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger 
policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region. 
 
 This hypothesis has support because the great powers have opposed policy-making in 
areas that affect zero-sum power distribution, namely security. They rejected action on 
emergency preparedness when it was possible that such action would impact security interests. 
They supported treaties on emergency preparedness after ensuring that the treaties would not 
affect their security interests. It is clear that great powers oppose a greater policy-making role for 
the Council in areas of zero-sum power distribution.  
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 Smaller states support policy-making as a way to ‘balance’ against larger-countries. The 
Nordic countries supported strong action against contaminants due to their proximity to Russia. 
Contamination is greatest in Russia and the Nordic countries faced environmental affects 
because of that contamination.
580
 Canada and the United States had less interest in this issue. The 
Council was a means to leverage power against Russia and the United States, though ultimately 
this leverage did not prove successful. The United States is the second-largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide in the world and it is the most prominent country that is not a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, an international emissions reduction agreement.  The Nordic countries have been more 
aggressive and the ACIA policy document could have provided them with an advantage. Smaller 
countries use the Arctic Council as a means to “balance” against the United States.  
H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great 
powers. 
 
 This hypothesis has support because the form of evolution of the Council’s policy-
making role reflects the preferences of the United States and Russia. Nordic countries have 
pushed for a policy-making role for the Council. Finland advocated making the Council the 
“mouthpiece” of the Arctic region. Denmark in the past has expressed exasperation that the 
Council does not take stronger action. The Council has created treaties that are in the interest of 
the United States and Russia. Certainly, European states have supported the agreements that the 
Council has created. Norway in particular supported the oil-spill agreement and co-chaired the 
task force that created the agreement with Russia and the United States. Still, all of Europe and 
Canada’s attempts to create policy in the Council without the support of Russia and the United 
States have failed. The form of the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role has 
reflected the interests of the great powers, namely the United States and Russia.  
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Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making 
in the Council. 
H1: States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through 
treaty making. 
 
This hypothesis has support because the Council’s policy-making role grew due to issues in 
which all states stand to make an absolute gain. All states stood to gain from the creation of 
treaties on emergency preparedness. Some states stand to gain more than do other states. Russia 
stands to gain a great deal by expanding the economic base of the Arctic region, as it possesses 
the largest share of Arctic resources. The emergency preparedness increases safety in the Arctic 
for all countries. In contrast, the treaty on contaminants faltered because the issues that it dealt 
with were not as significant an issue for the United States and Canada as they were for European 
countries. Action on emergency preparedness in 2000 faltered because the United States and 
Russia saw that it might lose something, namely autonomy over its Arctic nuclear activities. 
Action on climate change failed because the United States, as a large international polluter, stood 
to lose economically in the short term. States supported policy-making in the Council when it 
was in their interest.  
H2: States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic 
issue. 
 
This hypothesis has significant support because the issues that inspired states to create 
formal policy in the Arctic are largely economic issues. Many reports indicate that there are 
economic opportunities to expand Arctic emergency and transportation resources. However, 
industry indicates that safety issues may prevent them from investing in the Arctic.
581
 Emergency 
preparedness is an economic issue because the creation of agreements increases the potential for 
economic activity.   
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 It is important that states agreed to create an agreement to address oil spill response, but 
not oil spill prevention. Work on oil spill prevention implies that regulations in the Arctic will 
increase. Oil spill prevention necessitates a well-regulated energy industry. Increasing 
regulations could discourage industry from investing heavily in the Arctic. Even the threat of 
new regulations could stifle economic activity in the short term. Oil spill response, on the other 
hand, reassures companies that government has a plan to make sure that the cost of oil spills, 
including public relations and liability, is relatively low. States sought to create an agreement 
after the high cost and public relations difficulty resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  
H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the 
future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept 
compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.  
 
 This hypothesis has limited support because great power influence has determined the 
course of Arctic policy-making, rather than the “shadow of the future.” It is true that the Arctic 
states likely will need to interact in the future and so it is in their interest to maintain good 
relations in the present. That may explain why the Nordic countries supported the search and 
rescue agreement even though it was not in their immediate interest. However, it does not 
explain why Canada rejected action on Arctic contaminants. Addressing Arctic contaminants 
from Russia was a major concern of the Nordic countries. It made it the major theme of its 
activity of the early years of the Council. The Council has done a lot to address Arctic 
contaminants. If Canada truly had a concern for the shadow of the future, it would have 
supported action that the Nordics wanted. The same also is true of the United States’ rejection of 
action on climate change. States have an interest in the “shadow of the future” in the Arctic 
region but it does not appear to influence the evolution of the Arctic Council.  
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H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus 
Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.  
 
 This hypothesis does not have support because we have not seen that coalitions can 
overcome the opposition of great powers in the Arctic Council. We have seen coalitions emerge 
in that the Nordic countries frequently work together. They acted together to push the creation of 
policy on Arctic contaminants. Canada has not acted in coalitions and it tried to push action on 
emergency preparedness in isolation, to no avail. The permanent participants tried to create a 
strong policy document in the ACIA, but did not succeed. Their victory was that a policy 
document exists at all. The treaties that exist came into being because they are in the interest of 
the great powers. The great powers led the Council in the creation of these emergency response 
treaties. Coalitions were not able to overcome the wishes of the great powers in the Council.  
H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence. 
 This hypothesis has little support because path dependence has not stifled the Council’s 
evolution. The Council has historically not been a policy-making body, conducting great 
amounts of research and making policy recommendations. Path dependence is not responsible 
for this situation, as demonstrated by great powers stifling attempts to create policy in the 
Council. Absolute gains for all Council members led to the evolution of the Council’s policy-
making role, which indicates a lack of path dependence. The Council is not creating formal 
policy at the current time; however it is possible that the Council will create new treaties in the 
future. The Council has several projects that could result in policy. The creation of formal policy 
has established that the Council can be an institution to create policy.  
However, path dependence is a useful concept because it explains why states opted to 
expand the Council rather than create a new institution to create policy. The Council has 
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emerged as the pre-eminent forum for Arctic governance. States opted to allow the evolution of 
the Council rather than create a new institution to develop international Arctic agreements. 
In summary, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism provide insights that explain 
the evolution of the policy-making role of the Arctic Council. Functionalism provides limited 
insight as it correctly predicts that evolution will occur when states’ policy-making preferences 
align. It is correct that the Council’s policy-making role will evolve around less-political, 
technical issues. Functionalists are correct in saying that policy-making evolution will occur 
when the Council establishes its competence; however, this element is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. They are partially correct that interest groups can influence the Council. 
They can influence in some cases, but their influence is not consistent. Functionalists are 
incorrect in arguing that policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in 
response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states. They 
also are incorrect that evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of 
“spillovers.” Neorealism provides some insights into the evolution of the Council’s policy-
making role. Proponents are incorrect that states’ primary concern is relative gains, but correct in 
the assertion great powers can dictate the form of Council evolution. Neoliberal institutionalism 
is correct in predicting that states’ primary concern is absolute gains and economics are a 
particularly potent motivator for state activity. These theorists are incorrect that the “shadow of 
the future” and negotiation tactics can overcome the opposition of great powers to evolution. The 
evolution of the Council’s decision-making occurred due to four factors: it was in the interest of 
all member states, it had the support of great powers, at that point the Arctic Council had proven 
to be competent, and economic gains were at stake.  
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The question is thus, what factor is most important? A competent international institution 
will only expand if there is a reason for it to do so. Thus, state interest is important. Institutions 
evolve when it is in state interest. However, why exactly is expansion in state interest? 
Economics emerge as the most important factor in the evolution of the Arctic Council. Economic 
gains made institutional expansion the interest of all member states, especially the great powers. 
Permanent participants have had a small role in the evolution of the Council’s policy-making 
role. Smaller powers cannot overcome the opposition of great powers, but great powers must 
have the support of small powers. No theory explains the affect of domestic politics on state 
decision making in the Arctic Council. Policy-makers believe that the structure of government 
decision-making between the United States and Europe was an important factor. If neorealism 
emphasized absolute gains rather than relative gains, it would be the most useful theory.  
Table 3.2: Analysis 
 
Hypothesis Number Hypothesis 
 
Accepted/Rejected 
 
Functionalism 
 
Functionalist 1 Co-operation and policy-making in the 
Arctic Council is evolving automatically in 
response to external structural changes 
and issues that demand co-operation 
between states. 
Not supported – co-
operation was not 
automatic, but rather the 
result of great power 
interest and preferences 
Functionalist 2 Co-operation and policy-making in the 
Arctic Council is evolving because states 
all have the same preferences that create 
evolution. 
Not supported – Russia 
gained more than Canada 
and the United States 
Functionalist 3 States are evolving the policy-making role 
of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual 
technocratic goals around a less political 
issue area. 
Supported – areas of co-
operation are less political 
but are not apolitical  
Functionalist 4 Evolution in the policy-making role of the 
Council is occurring because of 
“spillovers” that create opportunities for 
further co-operation. 
Not supported – United 
States and Russia supported 
policy-making role 
expansion, not spillover 
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Functionalist 5 The Arctic Council is evolving because 
interest groups are pushing for new co-
operation in the Council. 
Partially Supported – 
industry party responsible 
for evolution 
Functionalist 6 States are evolving the policy-making role 
of the Arctic Council because it has proven 
itself competent. 
Supported – Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment has 
proven competence 
 
Neorealism 
 
Neorealist 1 States have a greater concern for relative 
gains than absolute gains, present in the 
current evolution of the Arctic Council’s 
policy-making role.  
Not Supported – states seek 
to make absolute gains; 
Russia gains more than 
United States  
Neorealist 2 Great powers would oppose a greater 
policy-making role for the Council in areas 
of vital interest or zero-sum power 
distribution, such as security; small 
powers support a stronger policy-making 
role for the Arctic Council to balance 
power in the region. 
Supported – Russia and 
United States avoid policy 
affecting security; other 
states seek to use Council to 
compel Russia to take 
environmental action, 
among other areas 
Neorealist 3 The evolution of policy-making in the 
Council should reflect the preferences of 
the great powers. 
Supported – policy-making 
occurs when desired by 
Russia and United States  
 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
 
Neoliberal 1 States co-operate in the Arctic Council 
because they all stand to gain something 
through treaty making. 
Supported – states seek to 
make absolute gain, or gain 
something 
Neoliberal 2 States are evolving the policy-making role 
of the Council because of an economic 
issue. 
Supported – policy-making 
supports economic 
development 
Neoliberal 3 In international institutions such as the 
Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of 
the future” can create pressure for co-
operation and make great powers more 
likely to accept compromise on issues such 
as the expansion of the Council’s policy-
making role. 
Not Supported – states did 
not always support policy-
making or attempt to 
compromise despite the 
shadow of the future; norms 
did not appear to have 
impact on Council 
Neoliberal 4 The form of agency matters in 
international negotiation (such as 
coalitions, information and persuasion) 
and thus co-operation will not always 
reflect the interests of great powers 
Not Supported – coalitions 
did not shift preferences of 
United States and Russia; 
persuasion did not seem to 
be important 
Neoliberal 5 The form of the Council’s policy-making 
role can reflect path dependence. 
Not supported – great 
power preference key 
  
 
166 
Table 3.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of the Council’s Policy-Making Role 
Event Functionalism Neoliberal Neorealism Why?  
1991-1996 
United States 
and Russian 
resistance to 
policy-making  
  X Concern over 
sovereignty relates to 
relative gains and self-
help 
Nordic/Canadian 
interest in 
policy-making 
 X X Wanted to make 
absolute gain and 
balance 
1996-2004 
Nordic interest 
in contaminants 
issue 
X X X Could gain through 
treaty 
Canadian 
resistance to 
contaminates 
policy 
 X X Less likely to gain and 
so resisted work 
U.S. and 
Russian 
resistance to 
EPPR review 
  X Concern over 
sovereignty relates to 
relative gains and self-
help 
Advocacy work 
of Council 
   Advocacy work not 
anticipated 
2004-2007 
Russian embrace 
of search and 
rescue 
collaboration 
X X X Stood to make gain 
United States 
resistance to 
ACIA policy 
document 
 X X Concern over 
sovereignty relates to 
relative gains and self-
help 
2008-2013 
Negotiation of 
search and 
rescue treaty 
 X  All states make 
absolute gain 
Negotiation of 
oil spill treaty 
 X  All states make 
absolute gain 
Totals 2 7 7  
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Table 3.4 demonstrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for each theory. In regards 
to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making role evolving automatically in response to issue 
spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The Council’s policy-making role is not 
automatic and thus the theory’s predictions are falsified. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, 
are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered 
by the form of negotiation? The policy-making role evolution related to absolute gains but not 
the form of negotiation. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policy-
making role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The 
policy-making role evolution was not in response to relative gains but balance concerns and great 
power preference were important.  
Table 3.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis 
Dependent variable: expansion 
of the Arctic Council’s policy-
making role 
 
Necessary 
(n) / 
sufficient 
(s)  
Fulfilled 
(Y/N) 
Why fulfilled 
Common ind. 
variables 
Likely less 
political issue 
area 
S Y Area of policy-making are less 
political, though not apolitical, namely 
search and rescue 
 Economic 
gains 
S Y Area of policy-making support 
economic growth by providing 
infrastructure 
Functionalism 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (i.e. 
gains mostly 
equal) 
N Y Gains are absolute, although Russia 
gains more than other states in policy-
making areas due to economic 
potential 
 Issue spillover  N&S N United States and Russia brought 
forward policy-making, not spillover of 
issues 
 Independent 
institution 
N&S N Arctic Council is not an independence 
institution 
 Interest group 
or epistemic 
community 
lobbying 
N Y Industry lobbied states to increase 
emergency infrastructure in the Arctic, 
despite the fact that states ignored 
epistemic community demanding 
action on climate change 
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 Institution has 
proven 
competence 
N Y Arctic Council’s ACIA showed that it 
is a competent institution that can take 
action on important issues 
 Automatic 
response 
N&S N Policy-making has not been automatic; 
took several years after ACIA and 
emergency preparedness growth in 
Council 
Neoliberal 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (i.e. 
states gain 
something) 
N&S Y States all gain something through 
policy-making in the Council, though 
some gain more than others 
 Shadow of the 
future 
N N Canada ignored calls for contaminants 
treaty despite shadow of the future 
 Lack of path 
dependence 
N Y Little evidence of path dependence in 
the Council 
 Lack of 
contrary 
norms 
N Y Little evidence that norms stall 
development of Council’s policy-
making role 
 Form of 
negotiation 
(i.e. 
information, 
coalitions) 
N&S N Coalitions and lobbying by states could 
not overcome opposition by United 
States and Russia; policy needs to be in 
interest of United States and Russia 
Neorealist 
ind. variables 
Relative gains 
(i.e. states 
gain more 
than rivals) 
N&S N States all gain something through 
policy-making in the Council, though 
some gain more than others 
 No security 
ramifications 
N Y Policy specifically constructed to have 
no impact on security  
 “Balance” 
motivations 
N&S Y Small states wanted to control Russia 
through policy 
 Great power 
preference 
reigns 
supreme 
N&S Y Coalitions and lobbying by states could 
not overcome opposition by United 
States and Russia; policy needs to be in 
interest of United States and Russia 
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Conclusion 
This chapter explored why the policy-making role of the Arctic Council is undergoing 
expansion. Functionalist theory would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand due to 
state interest, technical need, institutional competence, interest group influence and issue 
spillover. Neoliberal institutionalism would credit state interest, the importance of economic 
goals and adequate bargaining strategies. Neorealism would expect evolution would occur due to 
the interest of great powers and the desire by small powers to balance power. Neoliberal 
institutionalism and neorealism provide insights into Council evolution. The Council’s policy-
making role evolved when states stood to make absolute gains (as per the predictions of 
neoliberal institutionalism) and in line with the interests of great powers (as per the predictions 
of neorealism). This chapter argues that the Council’s policy-making role is expanding because 
the increasing potential to exploit the North’s economic resources provides an incentive to create 
policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region. 
This chapter has two implications for research. First, it contributes a case study that tests 
the validity of dominant theories. It re-enforces the importance of absolute gains as well as great 
power rivalry in the current context. The explanatory validity of neorealism with an assumption 
of the importance of absolute gains (rather than relative gains) is a direction of further research. 
Second, this work emphasizes the importance of economics in state decision-making. The Arctic 
Council’s policy-making role evolved when state economic interests aligned.  
Scholars such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke do not 
explicitly examine the importance of economics as a driver of state behaviour. Groups and 
individuals who seek to influence state decision-making, particularly on the environment, would 
be wise to present their arguments in economic terms.  
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This chapter contributes to academic literature because it proposes a new understanding 
of the Council. The Council is now a research institution that states can use to create policy. It 
creates policy to support economic growth in areas that must benefit all states but specifically the 
United States and Russia. Overall, a new conception of the Council’s policy-making role must 
emphasize the highly political nature of decision-making in the Council.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING THE EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE 
ARCTIC COUNCIL 
The institutional capacity of the Arctic Council is expanding. Institutional capacity refers 
to “the ability [of institutions] to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve 
objectives.”582 In 1996, the institution had weak institutional capacity, since it lacked a 
permanent secretariat to perform functions or a stable budget to achieve objectives. Its ability to 
carry out functions or achieve objectives depended on state willingness to support the Council, 
and this support ebbed and flowed as government priorities shifted. An institution has strong 
institutional capacity if its bureaucracy is able to provide direction and carry out projects without 
state approval. It has weak institutional capacity if it cannot take any action without state 
approval, or if the institution were merely an extension of a group of states. The institutional 
capacity of the Council is changing. In 2011, the Council announced that it would establish a 
permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. In 2014, it established a “project support instrument,” 
similar in many ways to a stable budget.  
This chapter answers the following question: why is the institutional capacity of the 
Arctic Council expanding? It proceeds in three sections. The first section describes the 
theoretical expectations of three major international relations theories vis-à-vis institutional 
capacity. Functionalism would predict that institutional capacity is expanding automatically to 
help the Council carry out its expanded mandate and operate more efficiently. Neorealism would 
expect that the institutional capacity is expanding to create a balance in the region, but that great 
power interest ensures expansion in no way challenges the authority of states or their ability to 
control the Council. In essence, neorealists predict that, although it may appear that the 
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institutional capacity of the Council is expanding, bureaucratic growth does not indicate capacity 
expansion. Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that states are expanding the institutional 
capacity of the Council to help achieve absolute gains, tempered by norms, path dependence and 
the negotiation tactics of states. The second section undertakes historical process tracing to 
demonstrate how the debate over the institutional capacity of the Council has changed over time. 
Initially, Nordic policy-makers argued that the Council was an institution worthy of a stable 
budget and strong bureaucracy. Officials from Canada, Russia and the United States did not 
share this view. The debate shifted as the Nordic governments argued for the necessity of a 
targeted Council trust fund and demonstrated the utility of a permanent secretariat in the face of 
the Council’s growing workload. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that 
neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on absolute gains and negotiation tactics, explains 
the reasons for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. However, neorealism also 
provides insights, with its emphasis on great power interest and the importance of maintaining 
regional balance. The central argument is that the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is 
growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it helps the institution 
carry out its expanded mandate; however, states have increased institutional capacity in such a 
way as to ensure the institution will not become too powerful. In addition, the expansion of the 
Council’s institutional capacity may not have occurred had it not been for tactful negotiation 
tactics by the Nordic governments, which demonstrated that a secretariat would enhance the 
Council.  
This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, it tests competing 
expectations for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. Most research examining 
the Council characterizes it as an institution with a weak bureaucratic structure, as exemplified 
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by the writings of political scientists Oran Young,
583
 Rob Huebert,
584
 Timo Koivurova
585 
and 
Olav Schram Stokke,
586
 as well as American diplomat Evan Bloom
587
 and consultant Terry 
Fenge.
588 International law researcher Belen Sanchez Ramos argues that the Council’s 
institutional capacity is expanding “to face the rapidly changing circumstances in the Arctic that 
have increased the challenges and opportunities in both volume and complexity,” echoing 
reasons for the establishment of the permanent secretariat given by the Council itself.
589
 The 
author does not cite any particular examples of the “volume and complexity” to which the 
secretariat responds, nor type of challenges the new secretariat might address. She does not 
analyze the negotiations that led to creation of the secretariat. This chapter argues that Ramos’ 
explanation is inadequate to explain the current evolution of the Council.  Instead a more 
nuanced explanation of institutional capacity growth in the Council is necessary, namely that 
institutional capacity is expanding to help it fulfill its growing mandate. However, the 
negotiation process has also shaped evolution.  
Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body 
of work advocates that the Council should do more than it currently does. The implementation of 
the recommendations of these authors will require a larger Council bureaucracy than currently 
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exists.
590
 For example, some work advocates that the Council create more formal policies and 
treaties, which require bureaucracy for enforcement and implementation.
591
 Some work assumes 
the Council is powerful enough to take action independent of states, such as new regulations to 
protect the environment or the creation of a new agreement.
592
 This work largely ignores the 
political situation in the Council today and the type of action it is capable of taking. This chapter 
argues that the type of Council reforms authors advocate are not possible given the current 
institutional power of the Council. Ramos does not address this question. She evaluates the 
changes in the institutional capacity of the Council that have taken place and concludes that 
currently it is not possible to explain whether the changes are adequate to respond to the shifts 
taking place in the Arctic region.
593 
She argues, “The creation of an international organization is 
the best way to improve the global governance of the Arctic.”594 A critical evaluation of Council 
capacity is necessary.  
Third, this chapter provides a case study that tests the explanatory reliability and validity 
of contrasting functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism. It contributes to the 
body of cases that prove or disprove the predictions of various theories. It ultimately shows the 
explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism, tempered with elements of neorealism such as 
the goal of states to protect sovereignty.  
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4.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity   
Functionalists would make three predictions about the growth of the Council’s 
institutional capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve automatically so that 
states can make absolute gains. The first two hypotheses anticipate state preferences in Council 
expansion while the third anticipates the outcomes of institutional evolution.   
H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they 
all stand to gain something through expansion. 
 
Functionalists would predict that the institutional capacity of the Council is automatically 
expanding so states can make an absolute gain. Functionalists argue that international co-
operation “is a self-sustaining process that propels itself forward.”595 States respond to issues that 
demand action automatically, without the need for political posturing and negotiation.
596
 
Sometimes, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ to transfer 
policy making in related sectors.”597 Demands from interest groups or epistemic communities 
also could create a need for evolution.
598
 Thus, increasing the institutional capacity of the 
Council would occur in response to new responsibilities of the institution in order to help states 
carry out necessary action.  States would mutually benefit from the expansion of the Council’s 
institutional capacity. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism reject that institutional 
evolution occurs automatically. For example, the expanded mandate of the Council into 
economic areas makes its job more complex and increases its total number of projects. 
Functionalists would thus explain that the increased institutional capacity could be a means to 
respond to this complexity.  
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H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal 
around a less political issue area.  
 
 Functionalists argue that states would evolve the institutional capacity of the Council to 
fulfill state interest and accomplish goals, most likely around less political issue areas in which 
states can collaborate without concerns of vital state interest and survival.
599
 States create 
international institutions “to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to 
create information, ideas, norms and expectations.”600  International institutions also help states 
“to carry out and encourage specific activities,” “to legitimate . . . particular ideas and practices” 
and “enhance their capacities and power.” Centralization and independence, such as the creation 
of a secretariat, can “enhance efficiency” and the legitimacy of international institutions.601 
Creating independent organizations allows states to trust one another because the institution 
ensures accountability and that no individual state can dominate the agenda. Neoliberal 
institutionalists and neorealist theorists would agree that states evolve international institutions in 
response to less political issues but would reject that states desire to make international 
institutions independent.  States could allow the institutional capacity of the Council to expand to 
ensure that it can complete new tasks that emerge as its mandate and policy-making role expand.  
H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself 
competent. 
 
States are more likely to expand the institutional capacity of the Council once it has 
proven that it is competent.  According to political scientist Mark Imber, “Organizations that are 
judged to be competent will gain additional powers, those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy 
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task expansion.”602 States create independent international institutions to ensure efficiency and 
trust between states.
603
 However, creating independent international institutions allows them to 
take actions independent of states, such as gathering new information, creating new policy, 
initiating international negotiations and more.
604
 International institutions with strong 
institutional capacity can become independent actors that can challenge states for international 
power. Thus, the Council may propel its own evolution forward, assuming it is competent, owing 
to the independence that states have given the institution. Neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists would not argue that institutional competence is important. Neoliberal 
institutionalists would argue that path dependence means that international institutions are 
relatively unlikely to evolve, though some evolution is possible. Functionalists would predict that 
competence is a pre-condition for Council evolution.   
 Neorealists would make three predictions about the evolution of the Arctic Council, 
based on their explanation that international institutions evolve in response to relative gains. The 
first two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third anticipates outcomes.  
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not 
impact on state autonomy.  
 
Neorealists would argue that states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Council 
unless it did not largely influence the autonomy of states. Neorealists explain, “The central 
concerns of the state are its national interests, as defined principally in terms of military security 
and political independence.”605 They seek survival in an international system, which is anarchic 
and without a higher authority than individual states to enforce laws. Thus, states seek to 
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maintain autonomy in any interaction and improve their position relative to other actors.
606
 
Autonomous states need not rely on other states for security and survival, which enhances its 
security. Thus, states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to create 
an institution that can compete with states for power or take action independent of states, in 
contrast to the predictions of functionalists. Neoliberal institutionalists would agree with this 
hypothesis, though they emphasize security less than neorealists. Thus, despite the growth of the 
institutional capacity of the Council, the institution would remain a weak international body.  
H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the 
region.  
 
Neorealists argue that small and middle powers co-operate in international institutions to 
“balance” against larger great powers. States operate under the premise that “collaboration 
produces ‘balanced’ or ‘equitable’ achievements.”607 Small powers may band together and form 
an alliance to compete with a great power. Alternatively, small powers may band with great 
powers to create balance against a rival great power. International institutions are a manifestation 
of this balancing process. States sacrifice a small amount of autonomy but gain something 
relative to a rival. The six Arctic states other than the United States and Russia will seek to 
expand the institutional capacity of the Council to create balance against the United States and 
Russia. States also could be attempting to balance against a rival state outside of the Arctic 
region, such as China. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists, in contrast, do not hold that 
a major concern for states is the maintenance of a global balance. Enhancing the institutional 
capacity of the Arctic Council creates a stronger institution that small and middle powers can use 
to exert influence and maintain security, as well as autonomy, against great powers.  
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H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences 
of great powers.  
 
Neorealists believe that in any interaction, such as the expansion of Council institutional 
capacity, great powers must benefit more than rival powers.
608
 Great powers are strong enough to 
act independently from other states and thus have less need for co-operation than small or middle 
powers. Great powers in the Arctic, namely the United States and Russia, will thus have great 
power to achieve their goals in negotiation. These states will seek a weak institution that cannot 
challenge the international autonomy of states. International institutions also could be another 
means for great powers to exert power and influence on the world stage, as they are likely to 
dominate such institutions owing to their size and importance.  Small and middle powers are 
more likely to favour a strong Council that can control great powers, even though such an 
institution could place some small restrictions on their autonomy, as well. Neoliberal 
institutionalists, in contrast, argue that there are means for smaller powers to overcome the 
preference of great powers, while functionalists predict automatic evolution. Neorealists 
anticipate that the Council will reflect the will of great powers.  
Neoliberal institutionalists would make three predictions about the Council’s institutional 
capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve in response to absolute gains. The 
first hypothesis explains preferences, while the third explains outcomes.   
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand 
to gain something through expansion.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states are increasing the institutional capacity of the 
Arctic Council “when states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”609 They would expect that 
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states want the Arctic Council to be able to take on more tasks and thus states must increase the 
institution’s capacity. These gains are likely, though not necessarily, economic.610 This 
prediction is similar to predictions made by functionalists, though neoliberal institutionalists 
would expect that evolution of the Council would emerge due to a desire for material gains, 
whereas functionalists would expect that evolution occurs to deal with pressing issues. Both 
theories agree that states will co-operate as long as they gain something in absolute terms. In 
contrast, neorealists argue that gains should help states increase their abilities relative to a rival, 
which can make co-operation difficult. For neoliberal institutionalists, states expand the 
institutional capacity of the Council to make an absolute gain.  
H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the 
development of Council institutional capacity. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the “context within which interaction takes place,” 
or the strategies and tactics actors employ in negotiations (such as those to create greater Council 
capacity), influence outcomes.
611
 For example, the type of information that states bring forward 
can sway negotiations. States can also form effective alliances or coalitions that influence 
negotiations. States can develop very persuasive tactics that influence negotiations. Thus, small 
or middle powers can influence negotiations and outcomes can reflect their preferences. This 
prediction stands in contrast to neorealists who predict that outcomes will reflect great power 
preference. It also stands in contrast to functionalism that predicts that outcomes will be rational 
and reflect the best possible decision. Thus, it is possible that the development of the institutional 
capacity of the Council will reflect the interest and gains of small or middle powers that were 
able to negotiate with states successfully.  
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H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s 
institutional capacity. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the evolution of the institutional capacity of the 
Council will be shaped by path dependence or norms. Norms are “a standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity.”612 Path dependence refers to the idea that once actors 
establish standard practices, it can be difficult to move toward new ideas.
613
 Neoliberal 
institutionalists would thus predict that the institutional capacity of the Council would be 
unlikely to shift greatly because norms and path dependence make evolution difficult. Norms 
may develop that favour informal co-operation without strong institutional capacity. In essence, 
states have established practices for how the Council should operate. This idea is not to argue 
that institutions cannot evolve. The presence of evolution indicates that norms or path 
dependence do not exist in a given case. Functionalists and neorealists do not foresee that path 
dependence or norms should be significant problems. Neoliberal institutionalists could argue that 
despite gains in institutional capacity, the overall capacity of the Council should remain weak.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the growth of the 
Council’s institutional capacity according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the 
Council’s institutional capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear 
problems demanding a policy response? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was 
not consistent or automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the 
Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of 
negotiation? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute 
gains or the form of negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing 
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the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate 
great power interest? These predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains 
motivated states, or if the preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.  
Table 4.1: Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity Necessary (n)  
/ sufficient (s) 
Common ind. variables Likely less political issue area S 
 Economic gains S 
Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. gains mostly equal) N 
 Issue spillover  N&S 
 Independent institution N&S 
 Interest group or epistemic community lobbying N 
 Institution has proven competence N 
 Automatic response  N&S 
Neoliberal ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something) N&S 
 Shadow of the future N 
 Lack of path dependence N 
 Lack of contrary norms N 
 Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions) N&S 
Neorealist ind. variables Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals) N&S 
 No security ramifications N 
 “Balance” motivations N&S 
 
4.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Institutional Capacity 
 There have been three eras in the debate over the institutional capacity of the Arctic 
Council. From 1991 until 1998, states created the Council and debated whether the institution 
should have a secretariat and stable budget. From 1998 until 2007, states continued to debate the 
merits of a permanent secretariat and stable budget, though the discussion began to shift. From 
2007 until the present, states actively supported increasing the institutional capacity of the 
Council, largely due to actions by the Nordic countries. In general, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden have urged the Council to develop strong institutional capacity, which 
Canada, Russia and the United States resisted.  
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4.2.1 – 1991-1998 
From 1991 until 1998, states debated whether the Council should have a stable budget 
and a permanent secretariat. This section addresses four key questions. First, how did the 
question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerge? Second, what were the major debates 
regarding the Council’s institutional capacity? Third, what were the positions of the various 
actors prior to the creation of the Council regarding its institutional capacity? Fourth, why did the 
preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence? 
First, the question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerged because of the informal 
nature of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). When creating any new 
institution, questions of its powers quickly arise. To review, momentum for creating the Arctic 
Council started in the 1980s as states became interested in improving relations with the Soviet 
Union and addressing pollution in the Russian Arctic. States knew there was extensive pollution 
in the Soviet Arctic, but the extent of that pollution was relatively unknown.
614
 Finland organized 
negotiations to create the AEPS, which came into being in 1991. The AEPS was a strategy rather 
than an institution or an organization and it did not have a permanent secretariat. Rather, states 
set priorities at annual meetings and four working groups, staffed by government scientists and 
researchers, completed the work between meetings. It was a strategy for information synthesis 
and sharing. Through the work of the AEPS, by 1995, states and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations learned that there was extensive pollution due to unsafe storage of polychlorinated 
biphenyls in the Russian Arctic, some 180,000 tonnes produced during the Cold War.
615
 As 
noted in previous chapters, there was increasing pressure to expand the work of the AEPS to 
address human issues, particularly from Canada seeking to expand the Strategy’s work to include 
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work more relevant to North America, as well as the indigenous peoples’ organizations that 
sought a greater role in Arctic governance. In particular, the well-being of Russian indigenous 
peoples declined during the 1990s and indigenous peoples’ organizations wanted action.616 As 
noted, the seven Arctic states other than Russia wanted to ensure that Russia would be 
accountable amid reports of corruption following the collapse of the Soviet Union. States 
naturally had to address whether the Council would have bureaucratic powers similar to the 
AEPS, or whether the creation of an institution, as opposed to a “strategy,” warranted new 
bureaucratic arrangements.  
In regards to the second question, the main debate over the Council’s policy-making role 
concerned whether the new institution would have a stable budget and permanent secretariat. To 
briefly review, the government of Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in a 
meeting with the United States administration in February 1995, adopting a proposal for an 
international Arctic organization promoted by think tanks, academics and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations for a decade.
617
 After informal negotiations throughout 1995, as well as a formal 
meeting in June, policy-makers from the other Arctic states agreed that an institution would be 
beneficial and formal negotiations took place in 1996. At the third major round of negotiations in 
June 1996, states finalized a proposal championed by Canada and the Nordic states that the 
Arctic Council would have a broader mandate than the AEPS by including sustainable 
development, after compromise by the United States and Russia.
618
 The question of the 
bureaucratic mechanism necessary for this institution emerged as the new body would have a 
larger, more complex job than the AEPS. 
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As to the third question, two alignments emerged during the negotiations in June, each 
with different positions about the necessary institutional capacity of the Council. Canada, the 
United States and Russia opposed creating a Council with a stable budget and secretariat. In 
contrast, the Nordic states argued that the institution should have a permanent secretariat and 
stable budget. The permanent participants were amenable to a permanent secretariat and budget, 
although their main concern was securing their own participation in the Council. Canadian 
policy-makers opposed a permanent secretariat and budget on the grounds that these measures 
would make the Council Europe-centric. By virtue of their numbers, the Nordic countries would 
provide most of the budget for the Council and secretariat, which, according to Canadian 
officials, would ensure the Council focused on European projects.
619
 The alternative would be 
for Canada or the United States to provide the bulk of the Council’s budget, which would create 
an unsustainable financial burden. Meanwhile, United States and Russian policy-makers opposed 
a permanent secretariat and budget because they sought a weak organization that would rely on 
voluntary contributions from states. United States and Russian policy-makers feared that a strong 
Council would challenge autonomy to act in the Arctic region.
620
 In the summer 1996 
negotiations, United States policy-makers led the charge against the secretariat and stable budget 
by arguing that a strong Council would inappropriately act as a “regional voice.”621 Additionally, 
United States policy-makers were leery that, as a great power, the United States would be called 
on to provide most of the Council funding.
622
 Policy-makers were aware that a permanent 
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secretariat with a stable budget could challenge state autonomy.
623
 As one Canadian policy-
maker stated, “Permanent secretariats become their own gods.”624 Canada likely would have 
compromised on this issue if the Nordic countries presented a proposal to address Canada’s 
concerns, which was not true of the United States and Russia. These two countries would not 
tolerate strong bureaucratic elements. Two alignments emerged in negotiations, with Canada, the 
United States and Russia united in opposition to a permanent secretariat and budget for different 
though complimentary reasons.  
The Nordic countries wanted a permanent secretariat and budget for two reasons. First, 
they argued that a permanent secretariat and stable budget would make the Council a more 
legitimate institution. The Nordic countries are used to organizations with strong bureaucratic 
elements.625 Some policy-makers believe the Nordic preference for strong bureaucracies is 
cultural.
626
 In the later 2000s, Norway and Iceland supported a secretariat as both wanted to host 
the organization to increase their legitimacy as an Arctic power.
627
 Second, policy-makers were 
keenly aware that there was a strategic interest in a strong Council bureaucracy for the Nordic 
countries. Such institutions could help keep Russia accountable addressing environmental issues, 
as there was a fear that corruption in Russia would thwart efforts to protect the environment.628 
The secretariat could serve as a body to monitor the implementation of policy and funds in 
Russia, which would thus ensure that Russia lived up to its international obligations. The Nordic 
states favoured the creation of a strong Arctic Council institution and so favoured the creation of 
a strong Council bureaucracy.  
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As to the fourth question, the preferences of Canada, Russia and the United States 
prevailed over the preferences of the Nordic states because the governments of the United States 
and Russia would not compromise. United States and Russian policy-makers would simply not 
accept a Council with a strong bureaucracy and budget. The Nordic governments were more 
willing to compromise to ensure the creation of a Council, which was seen as a key tool to 
ensure co-operation with Russia. During the beginnings of the Council, the understanding 
emerged that host countries would provide secretariat services and organize meetings.
629
 In 
summary, the question of the appropriate institutional capacity of the Council emerged naturally 
as state delegations discussed whether to create a new institution. A major question was whether 
the Council should have a permanent secretariat and stable budget, or whether the Council 
should adopt the more flexible approach seen in the AEPS. The Nordic countries favoured a 
strong Council and thus a strong institutional capacity, while Canada, Russia and the United 
States saw that a Europe-centric institution could threaten state autonomy. Ultimately, the 
position of Canada, Russia and the United States prevailed, as Russia and the United States were 
unwilling to compromise. The Nordic countries did not provide compelling evidence that a 
secretariat was necessary.  
4.2.2 – 1998-2007 
From 1998 until 2007, the Nordic countries unsuccessfully pressed for a secretariat and 
states debated the merits of establishing systemized financial support for the Council. This 
section answers three key questions. First, what were key debates regarding the Council’s 
institutional capacity? Second, what were the positions of the various actors? Third, why did the 
preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?  
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In regards to the first question, the first major debate in this era was whether the Council 
should have a permanent secretariat. The Council rules of procedure, finalized in 1998 
negotiations, established that “an Arctic state may volunteer to provide secretariat functions” for 
any working group.
630
 In addition, the permanent participants would have a permanent 
secretariat, as the secretariat created in 1993 by Denmark to aid indigenous participation in the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy would continue.
631
 The “host country” or chair of each 
Council term was to provide “secretariat functions.”632 Denmark provided the bulk of Indigenous 
Peoples Secretariat (IPS) funding, about $110,000 a year,
633
 with additional support from Canada 
and Norway.
634
 The United States Department of Oceans Affairs provided secretariat functions 
for the Council from 1998 until 2000.
635
 Iceland hosted the Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna working group as well as the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group 
while Norway hosted Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (and the Arctic 
Contaminants Action Program, or ACAP) and Canada hosted the Sustainable Development 
Working Group as well as the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working 
group.
636
 Finland, Russia and Sweden did not host any secretariats. In 2000, the United States 
began hosting a temporary secretariat to facilitate the creation of the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment.
637
 Each secretariat had between two and six employees. The question lingered as to 
whether this arrangement would be workable.  
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In 1999, the Nordic countries wanted the Council to institute a stable budget and a 
permanent secretariat to improve the functionality of the Council. Their views had not changed 
since the negotiations to found the Council. Norway first raised the issue and made a statement 
advocating a permanent secretariat at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. At 
this meeting, in discussions concerning the Council’s secretariat functions, Denmark’s delegation 
raised the point that the country gave the IPS $110,000 in 1999 and that other states should 
contribute greater funds.
638
 In response, the Canadian delegation suggested that the indigenous 
peoples’ secretariat “pursue funding sources from the private sector.”639 The delegation from 
Norway then “reiterated its belief that the Council needs a common budget and that the members 
should share all the costs.”640 The United States’ objection to such capacity had not changed and 
its delegation vetoed further discussion of a permanent secretariat or stable funding as it 
immediately “repeated its position that it could not support mandatory funding for the secretariat 
or make the Council a formal ‘international organization’ but that it was currently trying to 
solicit funds from the private sector,” such as the MacArthur Foundation.641 Other delegations 
did not state their views.
642
 Discussion continued at two other Council meetings. First, at the 
October 2000 Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Norwegian delegation again argued  
“the need for a permanent secretariat.”643 It called for a “more balanced sharing of financial 
responsibility for the working group secretariats.”644 It also indicated that states should discuss 
the Council’s structure.645 Other states did not address the Norwegian statement. States drafted 
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and released a statement at the close of this meeting to restate their support for the Council. The 
resulting Barrow Declaration did not indicate interest in a secretariat but stated “strong support 
for achieving reliable funding for all Arctic Council activities.”646 Second, further discussion of 
the structure of the Arctic Council occurred in June 2001 at the Council meeting in Rovaniemi, 
Finland, during an agenda item reviewing the Council’s administration. To open these 
discussions, the Danish delegation indicated its support for a permanent secretariat.
647
 
Delegations from Norway and Sweden echoed Denmark’s support for a permanent secretariat, 
along with “more standing financial arrangements.”648 Before other states could state their 
opinions, the United States and Russia both opposed such  “drastic changes” in the Council, 
vetoing a permanent secretariat or standing contributions.
649
 The United States and Russia next 
indicated some willingness to entertain changes in the composition of the working groups, a 
small concession in response to the calls for a permanent secretariat and stable funding.
650
 
Nordic delegations advocated that the Council needed greater institutional capacity, which the 
United States and Russia vetoed.  
A problem with Nordic lobbying for greater institutional capacity is that they failed to 
demonstrate why a secretariat and stable budget were necessary. The statements above suggest 
these countries sought institutional capacity for its own sake. This failure reversed in 2001, after 
Finland became Council chair. Its government commissioned an independent consultant report 
that advocated states expand Council institutional capacity. It recommended a re-organization of 
Council working groups and identified that a permanent secretariat and stable funding could 
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solve long-term problems of institutional memory, capacity to fulfill instructions and 
outreach/communication.
651
 States responded that they recognized “the need to reinforce efforts 
to finance circumpolar co-operation due to Russia and the United States’ clear opposition to 
discussing the structure of the Council” in the 2001 Inari Declaration.652   
The debate changed in 2003 as the Nordic countries abandoned the lobbying of states for 
a secretariat and stable budget and a second debate emerged over a new idea, a “project support 
instrument,” to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In early 2003, ahead of the 
April Council meeting in Reykjavik, policy-makers from the chair country, Iceland, sought to 
develop new proposals to improve the institutional capacity of the Council. They asked the 
chairperson of the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO), Harro Pitkanen, to give 
a presentation to the Council about the potential for the corporation to fund Council projects or 
manage a “trust fund” for Council projects.653 The presentation occurred in April and state 
delegations, unsure about the utility of the idea, mutually agreed to hear more about the proposal 
after the preparation of a detailed proposal.
654
 The NEFCO is an international environmental 
granting agency consisting of the five Nordic countries. We can view the NEFCO as an 
extension of Nordic interests and policy rather than as an autonomous body. The next step in the 
policy-making process occurred in October 2003 at the Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland. 
At this meeting, the NEFCO gave a presentation and formally proposed that states establish a 
Council trust fund. The NEFCO proposed a simple system in which states would contribute to a 
NEFCO fund and administer that fund as an “assembly of contributors.”655  
                                                 
651
 Pekka Haavisto, Review of the Arctic Council Structures (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2001).  
652
 Arctic Council, The Inari Declaration.   
653
 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, April 9-10, 2003: Minutes 
(Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2003). 
654
 Ibid. 
655
 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Svartsengi,, Iceland, 23-24 October, 2003 
(Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2003).  
  
 
192 
The proposal theoretically had the support of the Nordic states, as NEFCO members, but 
lacked the support of Canada, Russia and the United States. Immediately following the 
presentation, the United States expressed opposition to this system, because it would “potentially 
change the way the Arctic Council was organized as a consensus forum, since not all the member 
states were likely to become contributors.”656 Canada echoed this concern and Russia held back 
its opinions, as a veto had already occurred.
657
 In response, Pitkanen promised more details but 
rejected the United States’ assertion that a trust fund would change the nature of the Council.658 
The NEFCO proposed that it set up an expert group to develop the proposal further, which no 
state rejected.
659
 The prospect of a trust fund did not look particularly promising.   
The policy-making process to construct the trust fund continued in 2004 and 2005. At the 
May 2004 Council meeting, Iceland announced an “ad-hoc expert group” led by Pitkanen and 
the NEFCO.
660
 Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States appointed representatives to the 
group.
661
 The United States participated, although it opposed changes to the Council’s structure, 
which at first glance seems curious. United States policy-makers likely participated to ensure 
they influenced the process and protected state interests. The group developed the proposal 
during the summer of 2004, with United States policy-makers warming to a project-oriented 
fund. It updated the Council about its progress at the November 2004 Council meeting in 
Reykjavik, Iceland, and emphasized that the fund would be “action-oriented,” “complimentary” 
and “voluntary.”662 States then mutually agreed to set up a trust fund pilot project specifically to 
fund Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) projects. The NEFCO would hold the fund 
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and contributors would allot the fund by consensus. The fund would be a “voluntary, non-
exclusive mechanism for financing specific priority projects that have already been approved by 
the Arctic Council.”663 The Council would not use the fund for operating costs but rather specific 
projects.
664
 A Council trust fund appeared in the offing. However, states did not agree on the 
importance of a trust fund and so the project ran into obstacles. To become operational, states 
agreed the fund would require 3 million euros.
665
  Three major events took place at the April 
2005 Council meeting in Yakutsk, Russia.
666
  First, delegations from Finland, Norway, Iceland, 
Sweden and Russia announced contributions to the fund, though Russia did not specify how 
much it would contribute.
667
 Second, delegations from Denmark and Canada stated that they 
would not contribute.
668
 Third, the United States delegation did not offer contributions. The trust 
fund had trouble obtaining necessary funds and so was not operational by October 2006.
669
 
In regards to the second question, as to the positions of various actors, we can see earlier 
divisions over Council institutional capacity reflected in this era. In the first debate, Canada, 
Russia and the United States opposed a permanent secretariat and stable budget, leery that these 
institutions would compromise state autonomy and ensure the Council reflected European 
interests. The Nordic states desired a strong Council to hold Russia to account in the Arctic. As 
to the second debate, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway strongly supported a Council trust 
fund as a means to accomplish some of the goals of a stable budget. It would provide some stable 
funding needed to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In addition, it would be a 
way to hold Russia accountable for environmental issues, as most funding would go to the 
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ACAP projects concerning Russia. The United States was hesitant amid typical concerns over 
autonomy, sovereignty and financial burden. The fund could increase the power of the European 
countries in the Council, which seemed eager to contribute to the fund. Canada and Denmark 
opposed a trust fund in which only contributors could allot funds fearing a shift in Council power 
dynamics. In order to participate in the trust fund, states would need to provide funds. This 
change could have impacted power dynamics in the Council. All states would have an equal say 
in the allotment of funds, even though states would give different amounts of money. If a given 
country could not make a financial contribution for any reason, it would not have a say in a key 
area of Council decision-making. Denmark also was leery about the trust fund’s impacts on its 
Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat support. It already contributed money to the secretariat for 
indigenous peoples’ organizations and did not want to contribute money to a new body. 
Denmark opposed the project support instrument even though it was a member of the NEFCO. 
Russia supported a trust fund if its officials could gear it to fulfill national interest and use it to 
support projects in Russia. The fund would provide resources for the ACAP projects, which 
mostly focused on Russia. However, it withheld information on its contribution because the 
Russian government wanted clear guarantees that the funds would support Russian projects.
670
 
In regards to the third question, as to which preferences prevailed, the United States 
proved to be the most important country in the negotiations as its policy-makers blocked efforts 
to give the Council greater institutional capacity. Yet, the Nordic countries, except Denmark, 
also exerted influence. They were able to set up a trust fund pilot project despite resistance from 
the United States and Canada. Denmark proved less influential, as the trust fund did not reflect 
its preferences, despite its NEFCO membership. The trust fund was a step toward increasing the 
capacity of the Council.  
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What about the permanent participants? These groups had relatively little involvement in 
discussions of a permanent secretariat and stable budget. They generally supported increasing the 
capacity of the Council, but had to prioritize their involvement in Council projects due to lack of 
funds, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. These groups simply cannot participate strongly in every 
Council project. The establishment of a permanent secretariat was not a top priority, whereas 
stable funding for their own participation and projects important to human development were.  
4.2.3 – 2007-Present 
From 2007 onward, the Nordic countries successfully negotiated to increase the 
institutional capacity of the Council. States opted to create a permanent secretariat to deal with 
the increasing workload of the Council, confident that such an institution could be tailored to suit 
state interests. This section answers two questions. First, when did the debate around the 
Council’s institutional capacity change and what were the positions of the various actors 
regarding institutional capacity? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over 
others and who exerted the most influence?  
In regards to the first question, the debate around the Council’s institutional capacity 
shifted in 2007 when three Nordic states opted to host a joint secretariat. At the April 2007 
Council meeting, without much warning, the delegation from Norway proposed that it would 
host a “joint secretariat” on behalf of Norway, Denmark and Sweden for six years.671 Denmark 
and Sweden accepted the proposal. Other member countries were not able to veto this action, as 
it was not a Council decision. The rules of procedure gave the host country the right to organize 
the secretariat and to establish a joint secretariat. The rules of procedure did not prohibit a joint 
secretariat and did not specify how states must host the secretariat.  
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As a result, at the May 2012 deputy ministers’ Council meeting, Sweden initiated a 
discussion of the effectiveness of the temporary secretariat and all of the assembled ministers 
mutually agreed this secretariat could become a permanent one.
672
 Despite earlier opposition to a 
secretariat, the new institution came together smoothly. The negotiation process took place in 
2011 and 2012 outside of Council meetings. States did not discuss the matter openly in Council 
meetings. The main disagreement in these negotiations was the location of the secretariat as the 
governments of both Iceland and Norway sought to host the new body. In negotiations, policy-
makers from the United States and Canada made it known they wanted it in Iceland, because it 
was about halfway between Europe and North America and thus an appropriate location.
673
 
Norway, however, promised to invest more resources in the secretariat.
674
 Russian policy-makers 
supported Norway’s proposal because Norway was closer to Russia than was Iceland.675 
Ultimately, in early 2012, the government of Norway sent communications to the government of 
Iceland and convinced the country to withdraw its bid by promising that the chair of the 
secretariat would be Icelandic.
676
 There was a strong Russian candidate who many policy-makers 
believed would make a good chair, but United States officials did not want a Russian in the 
position, amid lingering distrust between the countries.
677
 The government of Norway wanted to 
host the secretariat to establish Tromsø as the “capital of the Arctic” and a base for companies 
(as well as researchers) that operate in the Arctic region.
678
 It is already the home to several 
Arctic institutions. The Barents Council, for example, is already located in Tromsø. The 
government of Iceland wanted to host the secretariat because many policy-makers believe its 
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economic future is in the Arctic.
679
 Icelandic policy-makers believed the secretariat would give 
Iceland prestige and power.
680
 Iceland wants Reykjavik to be the “Arctic capital.”681 Ultimately, 
Iceland gave up its bid for the secretariat because it gained an acceptable compromise.
682
 The 
secretariat became operational in 2013. 
Why did states come to accept the utility for a permanent secretariat? Support for a 
permanent secretariat among Nordic countries has been consistent, stemming from the 
preference for the Council to be a robust international body. The reason that policy-makers from 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden wanted to create the temporary secretariat was to demonstrate the 
utility of a more permanent body.
683
 Why did the United States, Canada and Russia reverse 
earlier opposition to a permanent secretariat? There were two major reasons. First, United States, 
Canadian and Russian policy-makers had experiences in other organizations that led them to 
realize that states could control secretariats and that they could be useful,
684
 such as the Antarctic 
Treaty Secretariat.
685
 Some Council policy-makers became convinced that a secretariat would 
benefit the Council, as secretariats had been useful in other contexts.
686
 Second, policy-makers 
realized the Council’s work was becoming more complex and had to accept the benefits of a 
permanent secretariat, based on experience working with the temporary secretariat. As 
previously noted, the Council had 57 projects ongoing at a time from 1998 until 2004, which 
increased to 159 projects from 2005 until 2013, including 12 major projects. A permanent 
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secretariat increased institutional memory and eliminated the “learning curve” that a host country 
must address.
687
 The Council formed a secretariat when the mutual value of such an institution 
became apparent.  
The debate around the Council’s institutional capacity further changed when Council 
states began creating the project support instrument (PSI), which came into being in 2014. 
Progress to create a trust fund had stalled in 2006 and so states renamed the fund to emphasize 
that it would not be a tool to fund general Council operations. States first began to refer to the 
fund as the PSI in 2007. The implementation of the PSI proceeded in five rounds of negotiations. 
In November 2007 at the Council Senior Arctic Officials’ meeting in Narvik, Norway, Russia 
announced it would provide funds to the PSI, but that it had  “decided to focus on 1-3 projects 
beneficial to the [Russian Federation] to make the PSI operational.”688 In response, the Nordic 
Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) said that this was not acceptable and that 
countries would need to raise three million euros to make the project support instrument 
operational.
689
 Russia’s proposal would alter the intent of the PSI to support its interests. As of 
November 2007, the fund had collected only 340,000 euros, from Norway with the Saami 
Council.
690
 The rest of the donors said they would not donate until Russia made its contribution 
clear.
691
 Russian delegates said it would need to know other contributions before making its 
contribution known.
692
 At the conclusion of the Council’s 2007 meetings, a Council project 
support fund did not seem to be a promising prospect.  
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Following these failed negotiations, Russian policy-makers realized no trust fund would 
move forward until it announced its contribution and so at the next Council meeting, Russia 
pledged to contribute 2 million euros a year to the PSI for five years (2009-2013), but only for 
projects in Russia and only if other countries would contribute as well.
693
 Finland had pledged 
200,000 euros, Norway 237,000 euros, Sweden 200,000 euros and Saami Council 100,000 
Norwegian krones.
694
 Discussion subsequently turned to how the NEFCO would administer the 
money if all of the projects were in Russia.
695
 After Russia’s statement of intent, Norway said it 
would increase its contribution and Iceland announced it would contribute.
696
 The project 
support instrument still did not have the minimum funding needed to proceed.  The process to 
bring the PSI into operation was far from complete.  
Negotiations continued in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino, 
Norway. Russia stated it was ready to move forward with the PSI and had terms of reference 
ready for approval. The United States then stalled negotiations by asking,  
Given that all [Arctic Council] funding is voluntary and that project steering groups are 
subsidiary to the [working group secretariat] why the PSI committee should be limited only to 
those who financially contribute and suggested that no member of the [Arctic Council] should be 
prevented from participating in the PSI.
697
  
 
The United States delegation stated it would need more time to review the project support 
instrument (PSI), leery of potential corruption in Russia. In response, all states agreed to 
postpone approval of the PSI until December, to give the United States time to complete an 
internal review.
698
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This deadline passed as the PSI hit new roadblocks in Russia. The PSI was not 
operational because Russia had not finalized “its inter-agency process”699 to determine how it 
would administer the funds from the NEFCO within the complex structures of its government. 
After two years, in November 2011 at the Council meeting in Lulea, Sweden, the NEFCO said 
Russia had completed the inter-agency process.
700
 Russia was to be transparent with money 
provided by the trust fund. The United States delegation supported the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program working group and hosted its secretariat. The NEFCO would ensure that the 
money would not be wasted by the Russian government or lost to corruption. With this, after the 
NEFCO’s assurance of Russian accountability, the United States delegation said it would donate 
$1 million USD by the end of 2011, even though the trust fund would allot funds by 
consensus.
701
 Its contribution assured it would have involvement in the PSI. The trust fund now 
had the money it needed to continue.  
States contributions increased and the PSI became operational in 2014, with 16 million 
euros at its disposal.
702
 The fund is not for any Council project. It is for “action-oriented Arctic 
Council projects focusing on pollution prevention in the Arctic.”703 Russia is contributing a total 
of 10 million euros. The remaining contributors are Finland, Iceland, the NEFCO, Norway, the 
Sámi Parliament, Sweden and the United States.
704
 According to the NEFCO, “The PSI will be 
financing project preparation activities, such as project identification and concept development, 
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feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments, business and financing plans, preliminary 
design, preparation of tender documents, tendering and evaluation.”705 In addition, “The main 
focus of the fund is to finance initiatives that can mitigate climate change and reduce releases of 
hazardous substances.”706 The PSI is similar to a stable budget as it provides money states can 
rely on to fund projects, regardless of the whims of individual countries.  
In regards to the second question as to which state was the most influential in 
negotiations, Norway became most influential, as it was a leader in the movement to increase the 
Council’s institutional capacity. The United States exerted influence in ensuring that the Council 
is not a more powerful body. It led the case for a weak secretariat. It appears unlikely the 
secretariat will become extremely powerful because each state only contributes $125,000 
annually.
707
 Norwegian policy-makers wanted the institution to be more powerful;
708
 however, 
with its small budget, it will not have the ability to hire a large research staff or policy-makers to 
influence states. Norway found a means to reduce the influence of the United States by using the 
Council’s terms of reference to create a situation that demonstrated the utility of a permanent 
secretariat. It also created a tool similar to a stable budget, but which won approval from all 
states. The fact that a stronger fund or a stable budget did not result from efforts to better fund 
the Council reflects the preferences and interest of the United States. Overall, Norway led the 
cause to create a permanent secretariat, while the United States became a leader against the 
secretariat. 
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Returning to the literature, a new understanding of the evolution of the Council’s 
institutional capacity is necessary. In contrast to work by authors such as Oran Young,
709
 the 
Council is a stronger institution than ever before. Belen Sanchez Ramos is correct in arguing that 
new “challenges and opportunities” in the Arctic as well as increasing “complexity” is partly the 
cause of the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, as seen in the increase in the 
volume of Council projects.
710
 The Council secretariat arose partly due to the Council’s more 
complex mandate. However, the Council’s secretariat and project support instrument did not 
arise automatically and rationally. Rather, resistant countries only agreed to a stronger 
institutional capacity when it became clear they could control the institution. In addition, the 
Nordic policy-makers desired increased institutional capacity in order to have a means to control 
Russia and increase the credibility of the Council.  This chapter contributes a new understanding 
of the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.  
Scholars that advocate that the Council carry out more work than it does now would be 
wise to address the deficiencies in the institutional capacity of the Council.
711
 The Council lacks 
the capacity either to compel states to undertake any action or to enforce international 
agreements. Currently, the secretariat has less than one dozen employees. States have 
deliberately structured the Council secretariat and PSI to ensure it will remain a weak institution 
that states can control. These authors should examine what projects the Council can add to its 
workload given the current political situation.  
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4.3 – Analyzing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity 
 The hypotheses of functionalism do not explain the evolution of the Council’s 
institutional capacity.  
H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they 
all stand to gain something through expansion. 
 
This hypothesis has support as all states gain through institutional capacity expansion. 
Further, these gains are absolute. The Council’s work is more complex than in the past and the 
expansion of the institutional capacity is a response.  
H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal 
around a less political issue area. 
 
This hypothesis has limited support as some states have different, political goals in 
institutional expansion. It is not an automatic process. The United States is expanding the 
institutional capacity of the Council to fulfill technocratic goals. It wants the secretariat to help 
transmit information and make the Council more efficient. The project support instrument (PSI) 
enhances legitimacy because states structured it in such a way that accountability is guaranteed 
as states transfer money to Russia to address contaminants issues. The United States, Canada and 
Russia do not want the Council to become an organization that has independence from state 
control. The Nordic countries favour institutional expansion as many policy-makers hope that the 
Council can become an independently powerful institution, a political goal contrasting with the 
predictions of functionalism.  
The expansion was not automatic. Norway and the Nordic countries lobbied for years to 
expand the institutional capacity of the Council. The United States resisted this expansion until it 
was sure a secretariat could be contained. Norway has ambitions that the secretariat and project 
support instrument might make the Council into a powerful regional actor.  
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H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself 
competent. 
 
This hypothesis has support. The Council has proven itself a reasonably competent 
institution. States are investing more resources in the Council because it has proven that it can 
use those resources effectively. Policy-makers are investing new money and capabilities with the 
Council so that it can become a stronger organization that is even more competent. The 
temporary secretariat demonstrated the utility of such an institution. There are political processes 
that explain the reasons for the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. The Nordic 
countries want the Council to be a powerful international actor. Canada, Russia and the United 
States do not share this goal but have determined that a stronger Council is necessary and states 
can structure it so as not to threaten the power of states. Russia initially resisted calls for a stable 
budget, but supported the notion of an Arctic trust fund when it was clear the money would 
benefit Russia. Yet, states would not invest resources into an institution that did not work.  
Neorealism provides insights into the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity.  
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not 
have an impact on state autonomy.  
 
This hypothesis has some support because states constructed the secretariat and the PSI to protect 
state autonomy. The United States and Russia clearly sought to maintain autonomy and feared 
that a secretariat, as well as a stable budget, could threaten their international autonomy. Canada 
saw that a stronger Council could be European-centric, which could make it harder for Canada to 
accomplish its international goals. However, the Nordic countries advocated a stronger Council 
even though the secretariat and budget their policy-makers envisioned would threaten their 
regional autonomy. The end result was the construction of a secretariat and the PSI that states 
could control, which would not develop the powers to challenge the autonomy of states.  
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H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the 
region.  
 
This hypothesis has support. Maintaining a “balance” is clearly a goal of the Nordic 
countries in enhancing the power of the Arctic Council. The Nordic countries sought that a 
secretariat could keep Russia accountable and ensure it addressed the contaminants issue in its 
environment. The same is true of the project support instrument. The Nordic countries were to 
administer the fund and ensure that Russia addressed its contaminants issue. In spite of a 
weakening economy, Russia, in the 1990s, was stronger internationally than the Nordic states 
and there was little these countries could do to ensure that it addressed trans-boundary pollution 
issues. Other countries did not share these goals. Russia could see a secretariat as a direct threat 
to its power. The United States had less concern for these issues and for maintaining regional 
balance so it did not support a strong Council. The same is true of Canada. The evolution of the 
Council’s institutional capacity is partly intended to create regional balance, for some countries.  
H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences 
of great powers. 
 
This hypothesis has support because the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity 
reflects the preferences of great powers, despite Nordic influence. The United States and Russia 
resisted a powerful Council for more than a decade. They could have vetoed the creation of a 
permanent secretariat. Russia supported a Council trust fund when it became clear that it would 
provide funds for Russia. The Nordic countries sought a strong Arctic Council bolstered by a 
strong secretariat. The secretariat that emerged is weak, in keeping with the preferences of the 
United States. Canada opposed a secretariat, but had a limited impact on the process. Canada did 
not oppose the notion of a permanent secretariat, but rather it was concerned that the secretariat 
could make the Council European-centric. Outcomes clearly reflect the desires of great powers.  
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Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights into the growth of the Arctic Council’s 
institutional capacity.  
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand 
to gain something through expansion. 
 
This hypothesis has support because all states stand to make absolute gains in the 
evolution of the Council’s bureaucracy. The Council’s work is more complex as the institution’s 
mandate and policy-making role expands. A permanent secretariat and stable funding create 
smoother transitions between chairs and ensure institutional memory. For the Nordic countries, 
increased institutional capacity could be a first step to make the Council the type of strong 
institution they seek. For Canada, Russia and the United States, the bureaucracy of the Council is 
set up in such a way that it is possible for states to control. All of the states gained something by 
increasing the institutional capacity of the Council although their goals were somewhat different.  
H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the 
development of Council institutional capacity. 
 
This hypothesis has support because the form of negotiation was important in the 
evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Norway and the Nordic countries successfully 
negotiated to ensure that the Council developed a permanent secretariat. Norway cleverly 
established a temporary secretariat. The United States, Canada and Russia could not veto that 
proposal. The utility of this secretariat led to the creation of a permanent secretariat. When 
discussions over a stable budget floundered, the Nordic states organized “project support 
instrument” that would operate in a similar way to a stable budget. Nonetheless, other countries 
were able to ensure that the Council is not an overly strong body due to their successful 
negotiation tactics. The secretariat is an administrative body and a true stable budget does not 
appear to be in the offing.  
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H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s 
institutional capacity. 
 
This hypothesis does not have support. Path dependence and norms did not hinder the 
evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity, although they may have affected its evolution. 
Today, the Council is a stronger international body than ever before. States found that the status 
quo, a weak Council, did not serve their interests; hence, they chose to increase its institutional 
capacity. Momentum had been building toward this development since the birth of the Council. 
It is possible that path dependence or norms will stop the secretariat and other bureaucratic 
elements from becoming too powerful, in that the understanding that the Council is to be a weak 
body will become entrenched. The Council has evolved as a weak institution with a limited 
bureaucracy. It is possible that path dependence or norms did not exist in the Council’s case. Yet, 
it seems probable that these factors existed.  
In summary, the Council’s institutional capacity has evolved. Functionalism is correct in 
predicting that institutional capacity is evolving due to absolute gains and institutional 
competence. Neorealism is correct predicting that the evolution is occurring in response to 
“balance” concerns and great power interest, but somewhat incorrect in the prediction that the 
maintenance of international autonomy was a concern for all states. Neoliberal institutionalism is 
correct in predicting that absolute gains inspired states to increase the Council’s policy-making 
goal and that the form of negotiation was important to this process, but incorrect in predicting 
that path dependence and norms impacted the process. No theory explains the contention by 
some interviewees that policy-makers in the Nordic countries have less apprehension toward 
bureaucratic bodies than their counterparts in Russia and North America. None of the theories 
examined allows that culture could impact state decision making at the international level, as 
each assumes that states are rational entities influenced by interests and material gains.  
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Table 4.2 summarizes the results and shows that each of the theories examined provides 
some insights.  
Table 4.2: Analysis 
Theory Hypothesis Supported?  
Functionalism H1: States are allowing the institutional 
capacity of the Arctic Council to expand 
because they all stand to gain something 
through expansion. 
Supported – Council is 
expanding in response to 
expanding Council 
workload  
 
Functionalism H2: The institutional capacity is expanding 
automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic 
goal around a less political issue area. 
 
Not supported – Nordic 
support for institutional 
expansion highly political 
 
Functionalism H3: The institutional capacity is expanding 
because the Arctic Council has proven itself 
competent. 
 
Supported – Council has 
demonstrated competence  
Neorealism H1: States are expanding the institutional 
capacity of the Arctic Council because it does 
not have an impact on state autonomy. 
Not supported – secretariat 
and budget could threaten 
autonomy 
 
Neorealism H2: States are expanding the institutional 
capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power 
in the region. 
Supported – grew from 
Nordic interest in 
controlling Russia 
 
Neorealism H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity 
of the Arctic Council must reflect the 
preferences of great powers. 
Supported – secretariat 
weak, reflecting United 
States and Russia interests 
 
Neoliberal 
institutionalism 
H1: States are expanding the institutional 
capacity of the Arctic Council because they all 
stand to gain something through expansion. 
Supported – Council is 
expanding in response to 
expanding Council 
workload 
 
Neoliberal 
institutionalism 
H2: The form of negotiation (such as 
coalitions, information and persuasion) affects 
the development of Council institutional 
capacity. 
Supported – Nordic 
manoeuvring (i.e. 
temporary secretariat) 
convinced states of 
usefulness of secretariat 
 
Neoliberal 
institutionalism 
H3: Path dependence and norms will temper 
and challenge the evolution of the Council’s 
institutional capacity. 
Not supported – little 
evidence of path 
dependence or norms at 
play 
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Table 4.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of Council Capacity 
Event Functionalism  Neorealism Neoliberal  Why?  
1991-1998 
Nordic interest in 
permanent 
secretariat/stable 
budget 
 X X Interest in 
controlling 
Russia, ensuring 
strength of new 
Council 
Nordic “cultural” 
interest in 
bureaucracy 
   No theory 
anticipates role 
of culture 
United States 
/Russia/Canadian 
resistance 
 X X Mainly 
concerned with 
autonomy/power 
of secretariat 
1998-2007 
Nordic interest in 
permanent 
secretariat/stable 
budget 
 X X Interest in 
controlling 
Russia, ensuring 
strength of new 
Council 
United States 
/Russia/Canadian 
resistance 
 X X Mainly 
concerned with 
autonomy/power 
of secretariat 
Nordic 
innovation of 
trust fund 
 X X Main desire to 
strengthen 
Council and 
control Russia 
Resistance to 
trust fund 
 X X Mainly 
concerned with 
autonomy 
2007-Present 
Nordic 
temporary 
secretariat 
 X X Main desire to 
strengthen 
Council and 
control Russia 
Development of 
permanent 
secretariat 
X  X Mutual interest 
of all states, 
despite autonomy 
concerns 
Development of 
project support 
instrument 
X  X Mutual interest 
of all states, 
despite autonomy 
concerns 
 2 7 9  
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Table 4.4 reviews the necessary and sufficient conditions for the institutional capacity of 
the Council according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s institutional 
capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a 
policy response? The evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity has not been automatic, 
falsifying this hypothesis. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the 
Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of 
negotiation? States are responding to absolute gains and the form of negotiation is very 
important. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s institutional capacity to 
evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? Relative gains 
were not important, but “balance” and great power interest were key variables.  
Table 4.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis 
Dependent variable: expansion 
of the Arctic Council’s 
institutional capacity 
 
Necessary 
(n) / 
sufficient 
(s)  
Fulfilled 
(Y/N) 
Why fulfilled 
Common ind. 
variables 
Likely less 
political issue 
area 
S N Expansion of the institutional capacity 
of the Council highly political process 
 Economic 
gains 
S Y Expansion of the Council helps 
improve economic potential of Arctic 
region by supporting new mandate 
Functionalism 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (i.e. 
gains mostly 
equal) 
 
N Y All states gain from establishment of 
project support instrument and 
secretariat 
 Issue spillover  N&S N Nordic states pushed expansion of 
institutional capacity for years before 
successful, rather than due to an issue 
 Independent 
institution 
N&S N Council is not a strong institution in 
itself 
 Interest group 
or epistemic 
community 
lobbying 
N N No evidence of influence of groups 
lobbying the Council  
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 Institution has 
proven 
competence 
N Y Success of reports such as ACIA 
demonstrated competence of Council  
 Automatic 
response 
N&S N Expansion came as a result of political 
negotiations, not automatically 
Neoliberal 
ind. variables 
Absolute 
gains (i.e. 
states gain 
something) 
 
N&S Y All states gain from establishment of 
project support instrument and 
secretariat 
 Shadow of the 
future 
N Y All states must work together in the 
future due to regional proximity 
 Lack of path 
dependence 
N ? Council is evolving, which indicates 
lack of path dependence; perhaps 
should have been present 
 Lack of 
contrary 
norms 
 
N ? Council is evolving, which indicates 
lack of contrary norms; perhaps should 
have been present 
 Form of 
negotiation 
(i.e. 
information, 
coalitions) 
 
N&S Y Evolution came as a result of political 
process between Nordic countries and 
Canada/Russia/United States 
Neorealist 
ind. variables 
Relative gains 
(i.e. states 
gain more 
than rivals) 
 
N&S N All states gain from establishment of 
project support instrument and 
secretariat 
 No security 
ramifications 
 
N Y Secretariat and project support 
instrument are purposely weak  
 “Balance” 
motivations 
 
 
N&S Y Nordic countries seek to exert 
influence on Russia 
 Great power 
preference 
reigns 
supreme 
N&S Y Secretariat and project support 
instrument are purposely weak 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this chapter showed that the institutional capacity of the Council is 
growing as it establishes a permanent secretariat and project support instrument. The first section 
examined theoretical predictions by functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism. 
The second section analyzed the negotiations pertaining to the Council’s institutional capacity. 
The third section analyzed the results. It concludes that neoliberal institutionalism explains the 
expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, because it was a result of protracted and highly 
political negotiations. However, neorealism provides insights in that great power interest was an 
important factor in negotiations and the Nordic countries sought to increase the institution’s 
capacity to exert control against Russia. Overall, the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is 
growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it supports the region’s 
economic potential by helping it carry out its expanded mandate. However, states are increasing 
the institutional capacity to ensure that the Council will not be an overly powerful actor. The 
Nordic countries and their political manoeuvring proved to be a key factor, as well.   
 This chapter contributes to literature as it proposes a new understanding about the 
expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity as a highly political process inspired by power 
concerns. Earlier work by Belen Sanchez Ramos saw the expansion as a simpler process. This 
case study shows the explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism. It demonstrates that states 
have a greater concern for absolute compared to relative or mutual goals internationally. 
However, neoliberal institutionalism argues that institutions will be relatively unlikely to evolve. 
Neorealism provides insights that explain that “balancing” concerns also are important, as well 
as the interest of great powers. Functionalism provides the insight that states appear likely to 
invest new powers in institutions that show they are competent.   
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL 
International institutions and non-state actors can become observers in the Arctic 
Council, which are able to attend Council meetings and participate only with the consent of 
member state delegations.
712
 Why would a non-Arctic state seek to be an observer in an Arctic 
regional institution? Would it not be like Canada seeking membership in the African Union? The 
Council is a regional institution, but it addresses important issues for the entire world 
community. The melting of Arctic ice will raise sea levels around the world and cause coastal 
flooding. At the same time, the melting of ice will make the Arctic more accessible for potential 
economic development. In 2013, China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea sought to 
become observers in the Arctic Council. Media outlets reported that these countries cared mainly 
about the “trade and the energy potential of the planet’s Far North.”713 A large number of new 
observers primarily motivated by economic gains could shift the Council’s priorities away from 
the environment and change the dynamics within its meetings.  
 This chapter answers three related questions: 1) why do actors seek to join the Arctic 
Council; 2) why would member states agree to admit new observers, and; 3) once admitted, how 
influential are observers? It answers the research question by testing the hypotheses of three 
theories (functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism) on why and how states co-
operate. For functionalists, an actor would want to become an observer if the Council is working 
on problems it has an interest in solving. Functionalists would predict that member states allow 
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new observers in the Council if these actors can contribute to the work of the institution. 
Observer influence should be equal to member states because members will accept all 
information and perspectives necessary to solve international problems. Neoliberal 
institutionalists would expect actors seek to become part of the Council to gain something. States 
would allow new observers to make a gain, as well. For these theorists, observers can be as 
influential as member states based on agency. Neorealists would expect that actors seek to 
become part of the Council to enhance their position. Member states would allow a new observer 
for the same reason. For neorealists, the influence of observers should be less than Council 
members.  
This chapter concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on the 
importance of absolute gains, best explains the interest of observers in becoming part of the 
institution and the reason states admit these new actors. However, neorealists, with their 
tempered expectations of observer influence, best explain the actual influence of observers in the 
Council. The chapter argues that observers are weak actors in the Council. Despite this 
weakness, actors seek to become observers for two reasons. First, they want to contribute to the 
governance of environmental issues of global importance. Second, actors seek to benefit from 
the economic potential of the Arctic region. Existing literature overemphasizes the importance of 
observers in the Council and their interest in Arctic economics to explain Council participation, 
as is discussed later in the chapter.  
The chapter contributes to literature on the Arctic Council in two ways. First, it helps 
settle a debate on the impact of observers in the Council. Most work sees observers as the 
weakest actors in the Council, whose contributions hinge on the will of member states. Authors, 
such as Evan Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young, see observers as practically inconsequential 
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actors.
714
 In contrast, political scientist Timo Koivurova argues that Council observers are 
influential because they are re-defining the region as a global concern.
715
 This chapter confirms 
that observers are weak actors in the Council and that these actors strive to gain expanded 
influence; thus, we can consider these actors relevant in the Council’s affairs because their 
participation impacts Council dynamics. Second, this chapter helps settle a debate in literature 
about the reasons actors seek to become Council observers. Koivurova argues that actors are 
interested in becoming observers because of the importance of Arctic environmental issues, 
namely climate change.
716
 However, news reports
717
 as well some academic work by political 
scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer,
718
 argue economics (namely 
resources such as oil, gas and trade routes) are more important than environmental protection as 
a consideration of potential observers, particularly China. This chapter argues that neither of 
these perspectives adequately explains increased interest in the Council. It argues that 
environment and economic gains are equally important in explaining this increased interest.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the contribution of this research to academic. 
The second section reviews the history of observers in the Council, while the third section 
analyzes the utility of the three theories in explaining outcomes.  
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5.1 – Theory on International Co-operation and Observers 
Functionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of 
which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.  
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states 
will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve problems.  
 
Functionalists argue that the goal of any international actor is to solve problems and thus would 
seek to join an international institution to address a pressing issue and make an absolute gain,719 
likely in a less political area.
720
 An example would be climate change, which is an exogenous 
issue that changes states’ interest vis-à-vis the Arctic. Admission should be automatic,721 as soon 
as a contribution is clear.   
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and 
contributions.  
 
Functionalists assume that observers’ influence in an institution is based on their ability to 
contribute to problem solving and to provide quality information,
722
 acting as (or similar to) an 
interest group.
723
 It is likely that other states would be unable to stop observers from 
contributing, as functionalists predict that institutions “attain ever-higher levels of policy-making 
autonomy.”724 For functionalists, petty politics will not stop state contributions to solve 
problems. The theory would be disproven if states did not add observers that can help solve a 
problem automatically.  
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Neoliberal institutionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council, 
the first of which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.  
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not 
hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that primary goal of international actors is to make gains and 
predict that actors would want to join an international institution to “jointly benefit from co-
operation.”725 Actors seek to join the Council due to path dependence, namely that it is the 
recognized forum to participate in Arctic governance. Functionalists, in contrast, argue states 
seek to solve problems, which may or may not result in immediate gains. States accept these new 
observers to make gains in a recognized forum with strong rules. According to neoliberal 
institutionalism, states will accept observers with whom co-operation will be necessary in the 
future.
726
 Governments might not accept an observer if relations are strained over other issues.  
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that any actor could be influential in an international 
institution based on its agency.
727
 Agency (which is the ability to ally with states, employ 
successful negotiation tactics and draw on useful information) can be limited by institutional 
rules that limit the influence of some actors. Functionalists argue that influence should be 
automatic for any actor that can help solve problems. In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists 
argue actors must successfully employ tactics to meet their desired ends. The theory would be 
disproven if the gains from the addition of observers were not absolute. The theory also would be 
disproven if agency and the form of negotiation were not important to explain outcomes.  
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Neorealism would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of 
which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.  
H1: States want to become part of the Council to enhance their position; current states accept 
other states to enhance their position, as well. 
 
Neorealists argue that the goal of a state at the international level is to protect its position and 
thus a small power would seek to join an international institution to increase its influence
728
 and 
ensure regional balance.
729
 Great powers would seek to join to dominate the organization.
730
 
Member states would admit new observers to dilute the influence of a great power or enhance 
their own position. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists explain that states co-operate to 
make gains and solve problems. For neorealists, states seek power and to enhance their position. 
H2: Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members. 
 
Neorealists argue that observers would be less influential than member states in an international 
institution. Great power preference will reign supreme in any interaction and that states are 
concerned with their position relative to other states.
731
 Member states will structure rules and act 
to thwart potential observer influence. A great power observer could challenge other states, but 
for neorealists, it is unlikely member states would allow such a situation to unfold. The other two 
theories explain that states can overcome such concerns by providing information or exercising 
agency. Neorealists would not believe that non-member states or non-state actors could exercise 
influence as observers in an international institution, present mostly to respond to domestic 
pressures and democratic expectations. Such assumptions would be disproven if balance 
motivations were not important or great power preference did not reign supreme in outcomes.  
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5.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Observers 
 The evolution of the role and interest of observers in the Arctic Council has proceeded in 
three periods. From 1991 to 1996, state policy-makers created the Council to address 
environmental issues and promote Arctic co-operation. The question of which actors could 
participate in this process naturally emerged. In the second period, from 1996 to 2004, state 
policy-makers debated the role of observers and these actors emerged as weak Council 
contributors, able to participate with the consent of member states. In the third period, from 2005 
until the present, observers became more assertive in the Council as the severity of the problem 
of climate change became clear. A greater number of actors, especially non-Arctic states, sought 
to become Council observers. 
5.2.1 – 1991-1996 
 In the first period of Council history, from 1991 to 1996, the question of whether the 
institution would have observers emerged. This section answers three major questions. First, why 
did observers seek to be part of the Council and how did the question of their participation 
emerge? Second, why did state policy-makers allow actors to become Council observers? Third, 
what were the major debates about observer participation? In regards to the first question, at 
some level, states and non-state actors sought to become observers in the Council because it was 
clear the institution would promote co-operation around issues that were of global consequence 
when states founded the institution. Examples of such issues include the establishment of ties 
with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the improvement of relations between former 
Cold War rivals and the betterment of the poor state of the Russian environment. The Council 
was to address issues that had transboundary consequences. 
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In regards to the second question, as to why policy-makers allowed Council observers, 
non-Arctic actors became part of the institution because these entities could make a contribution 
to Arctic science. After the Rovaniemi conference in September 1989, states created the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in three rounds of fairly straightforward 
negotiations.
732
 The AEPS was to be a research strategy in which state scientists came together to 
share information about the environment. In negotiations, representatives from several states and 
organizations asked to be involved. The AEPS included eight observers, three of which were 
indigenous peoples’ organizations (namely the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami 
Council and the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North).
733
 The other observers 
included three European states (Britain, Poland and West Germany), two international 
institutional bodies (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the United 
Nations Environment Programme) and one non-governmental organization (the International 
Arctic Science Committee).
734
 Actors other than the indigenous peoples’ organizations sought to 
become observers for one reason: to contribute to Arctic science. The states outside the Arctic 
included in the AEPS have engaged in Arctic exploration and science for centuries. It made 
sense for other actors with an interest in Arctic science to participate in the AEPS. There is no 
evidence non-Arctic actors had an expectation of becoming full members. The AEPS rules of 
procedure make it clear that observers have limited power. These groups can attend and 
participate in meetings only with state permission.
735
 Observer status in the AEPS presented an 
opportunity to contribute to Arctic science. 
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 By 1996, the AEPS had found out much information about the poor state of the Arctic 
environment and human security and so policy-makers began discussing whether the AEPS 
should be formalized into an international institution. That the AEPS observers would have a 
similar role in the Arctic Council was never in question. The Ottawa Declaration, the document 
establishing the Arctic Council, grants observers the same powers as they had with the AEPS. 
Observer status was open to all states and non-state actors “that the Council determines can 
contribute to its work.”736 The Ottawa Declaration creates two categories of observers. 
Accredited observers (often called permanent observers) can attend all Council meetings unless a 
member state excludes them.
737
 Ad-hoc observers must apply to attend each Council meeting in 
advance. A key difference between the AEPS and Arctic Council is that indigenous peoples’ 
organizations successfully lobbied for an enhanced role, greater than observers but less than 
member states, termed permanent participant status.
738
 Chapter 6 examines this process in detail. 
For non-Arctic states and non-state actors, participation in the Arctic Council was a means to 
contribute to Arctic science, as these actors had in the AEPS.  
 In regards to the third question, there was one minor debate around observers in the 1996 
negotiations to create the Council. Policy-makers from Denmark, Iceland and Norway were 
against allowing environmental groups opposed to whaling to participate in the Council, which 
the other Arctic state policy-makers supported.
739
 For example, Greenpeace would criticize 
Norway and Iceland for allowing whaling during Council meetings.
740
 There also was a more 
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general concern that observers such as Greenpeace would be disruptive.
741
 The ultimate result of 
these negotiations was a compromise: organizations such as Greenpeace would not be part of the 
Council, while more moderate organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund would have a role. 
There was some debate about whether to allow institutions such as the Red Cross to become an 
observer, based on whether it carried out enough activity in the Arctic.
742
 That organization did 
not become an observer in 1996, but received the status later. Overall, the negotiations to include 
observers proceeded with little controversy.  
5.2.2 – 1996-2004 
 This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council? 
Second, what were the major debates around observers? In regards to the first question, 
observers were not overly influential in the Council from 1996 to 2004. After its founding, the 
Council became an environmental research institution that held two meetings a year, similar to 
the AEPS, with member states, permanent participants and observers sending delegations to 
share the results of research projects and plan new activities. The Council instituted 57 projects 
from 1998 to 2004, such as research on climate change, Arctic contaminants and the state of 
Arctic human security, one of which was co-sponsored by an observer. The observer project was 
a report co-authored by the United Nations Environment Programme, the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme and the European Environmental Agency “about the relationship 
between the Arctic and Europe.”743 Observers did not frequently take on leadership roles during 
the early history of the Council.  
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Whereas state delegations made on average 3.3 comments per meeting on 2.6 agenda 
items, observer delegations made an average of one comment on one agenda item. Further, only 
about a third of observers made comments at all.
744
 Not all observers commented equally. The 
most frequent commenters were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife 
Fund. Observer comments fall into three categories. First, observer delegations provided updates 
on their general Arctic activities to help coordinate research action.
745
 Second, observers 
provided suggestions about Council projects, sometimes verging on small criticisms. For 
example, at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, the delegation from the 
Netherlands suggested that the Council include “something” “that dealt with socio-economic 
development of indigenous people in the North,” advice Council states did not heed.746 Third, 
observers provided technical suggestions. For example, at the November 1999 Arctic Council 
meeting in Washington, D.C., the delegation from the United Nations Environment Programme 
provided advice about applying to the Global Environmental Facility to obtain project 
funding.
747
 Observers had little impact on Council activities.  
 In regards to the second question, about the major debates around observers, the question 
of European Union observer status presented some controversy. Denmark and Finland called for 
“closer co-operation” between the European Union and Arctic Council at the October 2000 
Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska.
748
 However, other Council states were less interested in 
close co-operation. It would become a more controversial issue later in the Council.  
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Despite a lack of influence, we can see increasing interest in the Council by some non-
Arctic states and non-governmental organizations from 1996 to 2004. At the October 2000 
ministerial meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council accepted one state, France, as a new 
observer.
749
 The number of observers that attended meetings doubled between 1998 and 2004.  
Fifteen additional international organizations and non-governmental organizations became 
permanent observers, all of which engaged in significant Arctic activity. More actors sought to 
be a part of the Council as its profile increased due to its good quality work advancing Arctic 
science. Economic motivations were not important before 2005.  
5.2.3 – 2005-Present 
 From 2005 until the present, the role of observers in the Council presented controversy. 
This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council and at 
what point did their influence change? Second, what were the major debates around observers 
and how has their role evolved?  
The role of observers expanded slightly in 2005 at the April Council meeting in Yakutsk, 
Russia. Three important events took place. First, observers made eleven statements, which 
marked an increase.
750
 Second, the European Union announced that it would be a lead sponsor 
on a project for the first time. The project was the Large Marine Ecosystem research project, 
sponsored by the European Union, Norway, Denmark and United States.
751
 It was a project to 
research “pertinent assessment strategies for assessing and improving ecosystem conditions.”752 
Third, the United Kingdom stated opposition to the creation of a project support instrument to 
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ensure stable council funding, the first time an observer had made an overt statement on Council 
reform.
753
 The influence of observers began to shift as state and international institution 
observers started to act more assertively in the Council by generally increasing their level of 
participation. Why did observers increase their activism at the April 2005 meeting? This change 
took place after the release the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004, the Council’s major 
four-year report that identified climate change as a global issue. It found, for example, “The area 
of the Greenland Ice Sheet that experiences some melting has increased about 16 per cent from 
1979 to 2002,” which will lead to a rise in global sea levels.754 The Council also has become a 
stronger policy-making body, creating agreements on search and rescue in 2011 and oil spill 
response in 2013. The observers became assertive after it was clear the Council dealt with key 
issues.   
 This new activism and participation did not constitute a sea change in the Council. On 
average, each observer made 1.375 comments, an increase from the previous era but not a large 
one. Observers began to sponsor projects more frequently. For example,  the Nordic 
Environmental Finance Corporation co-sponsored five projects under the Council Arctic 
Contaminants Action Program.
755
 The amount of sponsorship is not large, since the Council has 
an average of 159 projects ongoing at a time.
756
 The observers were more assertive in demanding 
a role in the Council. At the November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, 
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and the Netherlands stated that “observers wish to co-operate not only on science but also 
decision-making.”757 It went on, “The possibility of observers to co-fund Arctic Council projects 
is more likely if observers are involved early at the project development phase.”758  
In regards to the second question, there were two major debates around observers after 
2005. First, the question of whether the European Union should become an observer in the 
Council was particularly controversial. European Union leaders have long made it a priority to 
address climate change. In 2001, European Union officials, as part of their activities to address 
climate change, began research on the Arctic environment and work on an “action plan” to 
mitigate the effects of climate change in the Arctic. They provided updates to the Council on the 
European Union’s progress in the ensuing years. The action plan was finally completed in 2008, 
the same year the European Parliament voted to ban the import of seal products, save those 
harvested by indigenous peoples.
759
 In 2009, European Union policy-makers sought permanent 
observer status, to compliment its program to address Arctic pollution. The negotiating process 
unfolded in two steps. First, in February 2009, the United States Mission to the European Union 
organized a private meeting with all the Council states to discuss the possibility of accredited 
observer status for the European Union. At this meeting, all of the Council country officials 
supported the notion, though Denmark and Russian officials both stated some reservations.
760
 
However, all state policy-makers knew that the Inuit would oppose permanent observer status 
because of the seal ban.
761
 Seal harvesting is an important part of the Inuit economy and culture. 
Despite an exemption for seal products harvested by Inuit peoples, many leaders believed that 
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the ban eliminated the demand for their products in Europe, which is the where most of the 
fashion industry is headquartered.
762
 They believed the ban greatly decreased the possibility that 
fashion designers would incorporate seal fur into their designs. Even outside Europe, knowledge 
of the ban can stigmatize possessing seal furs, which hurts domestic demand. The United States 
has a similar ban in effect in its 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act.
763
 Inuit leaders are 
critical of this ban,
764
 but do not oppose it with as much vigour as the European Union ban. Inuit 
leaders emphasize that they strongly oppose the European ban because it has eliminated a crucial 
market for their products.  
The European Union officials responded that they were sure they could overcome such 
opposition.
765
 Norwegian officials had previously called for an enhanced European Union 
role.
766
 Nordic policy-makers wanted the European Union included because “they would be able 
to contribute a lot of funding to the various scientific projects that were being undertaken.”767 
The second stage in the negotiation process to include the European Union in the Council 
occurred after the February meeting, in September 2009, as Finnish policy-makers sent 
communications to all of the Arctic governments, and in particular the United States Department 
of State, emphasizing that the European Union should be a permanent observer.
768
 Meanwhile, 
Canada challenged the European Union seal product ban in the World Trade Organization by 
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arguing the ban constituted a discriminatory trade practice.
769
 The United States, Russia and even 
Canada did not oppose European Union observer status, as it was to be a weak actor.  
 Inuit opposition to European Union observer status, due to its seal ban, has delayed 
accreditation. The issue of observer status for the European Union came to the Council table in 
2013, four years after the discussion began, typical for a Council decision of this type. The Inuit 
Circumpolar Council led the charge against granting the European Union observer status, 
privately demanding and convincing Canada to block its permanent status in preparations for the 
May 2013 Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden.
770
 Other permanent participants were 
more open to its membership, optimistic about the opportunities partnerships might afford.
771
 
Canada supported the Inuit group due to domestic pressure and the economic impact of the seal 
ban. The issue was further deferred at the Council Ministerial Meeting in April, 2015.  
The second controversy was whether to allow non-Arctic, non-European states, 
particularly China to become permanent Council observers. The Council’s profile had increased, 
as up to 22 observers were attending Council meetings. For example, after 2005, Spain became a 
Council observer. After 2007, states such as China, South Korea, India, Italy, Japan and 
Singapore began to attend Council meetings and demanded to become accredited observers. It 
took longer for states to accredit non-European observers (for example, seven years to accredit 
China, South Korea and Japan, whereas France became an observer after attending meetings for 
two years). Policy-makers from all states wondered whether increasing the number of observers 
in the Council would make the institution less workable.
772
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 There was a particularly large amount over concern over the status of China, which began 
attending Council meetings in 2008. A lot of news coverage argues that China’s Arctic interest 
stems from its interest in exploiting Arctic energy resources.
773
 If its interest is mostly economic, 
it follows that Chinese officials will have limited interest in environmental protection. China is 
energy-hungry and the Arctic region contains 90 billion barrels of oil and more than 1,600 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
774
 Yet, Chinese officials sought to be part of the Council for 
both economic and environmental reasons. China has a history of polar research and is home to a 
polar institute and icebreakers.
775
 China’s production of maze, rice and wheat will fall by more 
than 35 per cent in the next 50 years because of Arctic climate change.
776
 Coastal flooding, due 
in large part to the melting of Arctic ice and the resulting rising sea levels, will impact more than 
20 million people in China during the next century.
777
  Similar concerns explain why other states, 
such as Japan and Singapore, sought observer status after 2008.  
For policy-makers from all Council states, three concerns hung over the decision whether 
these states should become observers. First, there was concern that permanent participant power 
“could be diluted in a growing sea of observers.”778 Second, Russian policy-makers had concerns 
that China could present an economic rival in the Arctic region.
779
 Third, there was a concern 
among some policy-makers that more observers would make it difficult to organize meetings.
780
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 Ultimately, state policy-makers knew that it would not be politically possible to deny 
accredited status to China and the other non-European states without a clear reason, such as a 
diplomatic tiff with China over a key policy or a key concern. There was general agreement that 
it would be good to include these countries as part of the Council. By 2010, state policy-makers 
knew that there was an expectation that a decision on whether to accredit the non-European 
states would be forthcoming. The process of deciding how to admit China proceeded in two 
stages. At the 2010 Deputy Ministers Meeting in Copenhagen, Canada proposed that the Council 
work on articulating an appropriate role for observers, which Russia and the ICC supported.
781
 
Second, in 2011, at the Nuuk Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states resolved to set out 
criteria for observer status in the Council.
782
 States created this document during the five Council 
meetings held between 2011 and 2013.  
 The end result was an observer manual. It is not a complex or contentious document, re-
emphasizing the existing rules of procedure.
783
 Observers must re-assert their interest in being an 
observer in the Council every four years by making a submission to the chair.
784
 Observers must 
agree to recognize the “Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the 
Arctic.”785 They also must agree to respect “the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic 
indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants” and support their work.786 All of the Council 
states showed unity and agreed on the role of the observers. Why, then, did states create the 
manual and delay the decision to accredit China and the other non-European observers? China, 
for example, had not indicated it would use the Council to challenge the role of the permanent 
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participants or the sovereignty of states. Nonetheless, the document allowed time for states to 
assess the impact of these new observers. It allowed time see if their participation would hurt the 
participation of indigenous peoples, challenge the Council states or make the Council too 
unwieldy.  State policy-makers wanted China to be a part of the Council. Yet, there was a level 
of mistrust toward China that led state policy-makers to proceed with caution. 
 Why were state policy-makers interested in granting China and the other non-European 
states observer status? Policy-makers reported the allure of potential investment was too great for 
all Arctic states.
787
 Russian policy-makers decided it was in their country’s interest to co-operate 
with China as its companies have undertaken numerous projects in Russia’s Arctic.788 China is 
the second-largest trading partner for both Canada and the United States. It is the biggest Asian 
trading partner for both Sweden and Finland. Policy-makers in Denmark have long held hopes 
that Chinese investment in Greenland’s offshore oil would lead to that country’s independence 
and end the annual $586-million payment from the mainland.
789
 The governments of Iceland,
790
 
Norway
791
 and Russia
792
 have each deliberately stated they hope to expand China’s already hefty 
investments in their various resource industries. Including China as part of the Council helps 
foster international relationships and potentially expands economic activities.  
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 Has the increased number and greater diversity of observers had an impact on the 
Council? The observers continue to make fewer comments than permanent participants and 
states. This pattern applies to both state and non-state observers. They sponsor relatively few 
projects, and participate in meetings respectfully. Increasingly, there are special meetings with 
observers (as sideline events) at Council meetings, which have not had an appreciable impact on 
the institution. The arguments against their inclusion all ultimately seem ill founded. The 
observers participate more in the Council than they did prior to 2005, but it is difficult to point to 
a case in which observer had a great impact on a Council decision or action.  
 The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife Fund continue to be the 
most frequent commenters at Council meetings. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are 
both countries with strong histories of Arctic exploration. Its policy-makers believe that these 
countries can make strong contributions to Arctic science, climate change and the governance of 
the Arctic region. The World Wildlife Fund is an activist organization with members that expect 
a certain level of action. Its comments are respectful, mainly consisting of technical suggestions 
and a general urging of stronger action. It has sponsored some events around Council meetings, 
intended to raise awareness on issues. For example, during the Whitehorse Council meeting in 
October 2013, the World Wildlife Fund co-sponsored a daylong conference on corporate social 
responsibility in the Arctic. The first day of Council meetings are closed-door with top 
delegation officials. The Council holds Sustainable Development Working Group meetings 
before Senior Arctic Officials meetings, and so there are a reasonable number of policy-makers 
with a day off between meetings. Events such as the one in Whitehorse provide an activity for 
these policy-makers and give the World Wildlife Fund an important venue to showcase its ideas 
and research.   
  
 
233 
 In sum, the power of observers in the Arctic Council has evolved over time. From 1991 
to 1996, Arctic governments sought to improve Arctic governance and non-Arctic states sought 
to contribute.  From 1996 until 2004, observers exerted little influence. After the release of the 
2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Council observers became more assertive. Seven non-
Arctic actors sought observer status, creating controversy. These actors sought to participate in 
the Council to help protect the environment and make economic gains. Six new observer states 
joined the Council in 2013, accepted due to potential new Arctic investment. Table 5.1 
summarizes the current Council observers 
Table 5.1: Council Observers as of 2015 
 
 
States China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Singapore, South Korean, Spain, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
International 
Organizations 
Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation, 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, United Nations Develop Programme, United 
Nations Environment Programme 
 
 
 
Non-
Governmental 
Organizations 
Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas, Arctic Cultural 
Gateway, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar 
Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International 
Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar 
Health, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, International 
Work Group for Indigenous affairs, Northern Forum, University of the 
Arctic, Red Cross, World Wildlife Fund 
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This work contributes to literature because it confirms that Council observers are weak 
actors, a contested assessment in Council literature. Observers seek influence by making 
comments and contributing to Council projects. Observer weakness does not indicate they are 
irrelevant. For example, as demonstrated, officials from the Netherlands have used the Council 
as a venue to advocate for action on issues it considers important, which impacts Council 
discourse. This work contributes because it shows that Council actors are interested in Council 
participation to address environmental issues and make economic gains, in contrast to arguments 
by authors such as Whitney Lackenbauer and James Manicom that emphasize non-economic 
motivations. Media reports and academic literature need not be so alarmist about the prospect of 
non-Arctic states joining the Council. In some ways, Council observer states show greater 
concern for the Arctic environment than member states. The states that have sought to become 
Council observers thus far have a significant interest in protecting the Arctic environment.  
5.3 – Analysis Using International Relations Theory 
Functionalism does not provide a useful account of Council observers.  
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states 
will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve the problem.  
 
This hypothesis does not have support because the addition of new observers has not been 
automatic. States such as Britain sought to become Council observers to contribute to Arctic 
science and to benefit by helping to solve problems. However, other states did not automatically 
allow contributions. In 2008, Council member states resisted adding countries, such as China, on 
the grounds that they would complicate the execution of the agreed-upon agenda. The amount of 
time required to admit observers increased by five years due to uncertainties over the emergence 
of potential rivals and mistrust.  
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H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and 
contributions. 
 
This hypothesis does not have explanatory power because the influence of observers is very 
limited. It is difficult to point to any strong outcomes observers have achieved, aside from the 
sponsorship of a few projects. Various observers have sponsored Council projects and have 
sought to express positions, but this action has not resulted in strong outcomes.  
Neoliberal institutionalism gives a somewhat useful explanation for Council observers.  
 
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not 
hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain. 
 
This hypothesis has support because states add observers to the Council to make an absolute 
gain. States accept observers when it is clear that these actors can contribute to the Council. In 
China’s case, it became an observer because it had promised to invest in the Arctic region. The 
main reason that China sought to become an observer is to make economic gains and improve 
the Arctic environment in the preeminent Arctic forum. There are other possible motivations, but 
these two are foremost. Organizations that oppose whaling have been blocked from Council 
membership by Denmark, Iceland and Norway, as they will criticize these countries.  
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency. 
 
This hypothesis has limited validity because agency does not seem to help observers achieve 
outcomes in the Council. The influence of observers in the Council has been small. Council rules 
allow observer influence, as they can participate in most of the institution’s work. Actors have 
tried to use agency by providing information and contributing to Council projects. Agency has 
not helped observers influence the Council. It is possible that observers have not utilized agency 
to its full potential. It is likely the influence of new observers will be similar to observers in 
previous eras as their legal rights and responsibilities have not changed.  
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Neorealism provides a somewhat useful explanation of Council observers. 
 
H1: States want to become part of the Council to enhance its position; current states accept 
other states to enhance its position, as well. 
 
This hypothesis does not have strong explanatory power because positional concerns are not 
overly important. Russia demonstrated concern about adding China to the Council as an 
observer, which does indicate some concern for balance in the region. The prospect of absolute 
gains proved more important as Russia eventually decided to accept China as an observer.  
H2: Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members. 
 
This hypothesis has support because it explains the limited power of observers.  Member states 
have structured the Council so that observers have far fewer formal rights and privileges than 
they do and they have ignored the observers’ requests for action. They have been apprehensive 
about adding new members, seeking to protect their own autonomy and interests and only 
admitting new observers once the gains of so doing are clear.  
Table 5.2: Results  
Functionalism 
One 
Observers want to contribute to the Council to help 
solve important problems; other states will not 
hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help 
solve the problem. 
 
Not supported – addition of 
new observers is not 
automatic 
Functionalism 
Two 
Observers can be influential, based on their ability to 
provide quality information and contributions. 
Not supported – observers 
have little influence 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
One 
Observers want to contribute to the Council to make 
an absolute gain; other states will not hesitate to 
allow contributions if they perceive a gain. 
Supported – states add 
observers to make an 
economic gain 
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
Two 
Observers can be influential, based on their ability to 
use agency. 
Not supported – observers 
have little influence 
Neorealism One States want to become part of the Council to enhance 
its position; current states accept other states to 
enhance its position, as well. 
Not supported – states add 
observers to make an 
economic gain at the 
expense of balance 
Neorealism Two Observers will be less influential than great powers 
or full Council members. 
Supported – observers have 
little influence 
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Conclusion  
 This chapter discussed the evolution of observers in the Arctic Council. It argued that 
observers are weak Council actors that seek influence to help solve Arctic environmental issues 
and make economic gains. Member states see the acceptance of  observers as being conducive to 
furthering the formers’ economic gains. Neorealism provides the best explanation for observer 
influence in the Council, while neoliberal institutionalism explains the interest of states in 
Council participation. Neorealists are wrong to emphasize the importance of relative gains for 
motivating state behaviour as absolute gains prove to be the more potent motivator in this case. 
In a way, non-Arctic states are more interested in protecting the environment than Arctic states in 
this case. New observers want to help address climate change in the Arctic. Member states are 
more interested in their own economic interests than in helping  these new observers to fight 
global warming.  
 What are the major implications of this research? The Arctic Council is changing from 
being a strictly regional organization to being a body with a more global outlook as the relevance 
of the region becomes more widely recognized. More states seek to participate in Arctic 
governance, reconstituting its invisible boundaries. Commentaries that emphasize the economic 
interests of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic are overly alarmist. The presence of non-Arctic states 
in Arctic Council will not necessarily further shift the Council from an environmental body to an 
economic body. If anything, non-Arctic observers, that have demonstrated an interest in the 
Arctic environment and climate change, will slow the evolution of the Council from an 
environmental body to a body with strong economic interests.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL PERMANENT 
PARTICIPANT’S STATUS, RIGHTS AND INFLUENCE 
When states created the Council, there was debate about whether indigenous peoples’ 
organizations should be equal in status and rights to states.
793
 The Arctic Council that emerged is 
the only international institution that grants indigenous peoples’ organizations a second-tier role 
that is comparable to states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations, termed permanent participants in 
the Council, have quite similar rights to states, but importantly cannot vote on Council decisions. 
The institution is important to these groups because it is charged with promoting co-operation on 
environmental and sustainable development issues that are vital to indigenous peoples. 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations are important to the Council because they provide a conduit 
between Arctic communities, the Council and governments. Arctic governments serve a wider 
constituency than Arctic residents. As noted in Chapter 1, there are six indigenous peoples’ 
organizations in the Arctic Council: the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic 
Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the 
Saami Council. All together, these groups represent approximately 659,000 indigenous peoples 
from every Arctic country,
 794
 with the exception of Iceland.
795
  
                                                 
793
 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013. 
794
 Arctic Council, “Inuit Circumpolar Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/inuit-circumpolar-council (accessed May 21, 2013); 
Arctic Council, “Arctic Athabaskan Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/arctic-athabaskan-council-aac (accessed May 21, 2013); 
Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: The Saami Council,” Arctic Peoples, 2012, 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/589-permanent-participant-article-
series-saami-council (accessed January 14, 2013); Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: RAIPON,” 
Arctic Peoples, 2012, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/596-permanent-
participant-article-series-raipon (accessed January 14, 2013); Arctic Council, “Aleut International Association,” 
Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-
participants/aleut-international-association-aia (accessed May 21, 2013); Arctic Council, “Gwich’in Council 
International,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/permanent-participants/gwich-in-council-international (accessed May 21, 2013). 
  
 
239 
What is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? How has 
their role and influence evolved over time? When are the permanent participants successful (or 
unsuccessful) in exerting influence on the Council? The major goal of this chapter is to answer 
these questions. Influence refers to the ability to sway or direct outcomes. The first section 
discusses expectations of functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism about the 
influence of non-state actors. We can consider the permanent participants non-state actors. The 
second section of this chapter traces the role, influence and evolution of the permanent 
participants and shows that these groups have had influence in many cases. The third section 
concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its tempered expectations of non-state actors in 
international institutions, provides the best explanation for the influence of the permanent 
participants. Permanent participants have less role and influence than states in the Council, but 
nonetheless have significant influence based on their evolving agency. 
This chapter contributes to academic literature because it examines which of three 
perspectives on permanent participant influence best explains the current situation in the 
Council. Several news articles from the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996 anticipated that 
permanent participants would be roughly equal in influence to states.
796
 In 2010, political 
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scientist Timo Koivurova rated their influence very highly, writing, “The fact that the Council 
has accorded a unique role for the region’s original occupants has certainly served its legitimacy 
and also contributed to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in 
international policy making.”797 In contrast, in 1997, lawyer Jennifer McIver disagreed with the 
view that permanent participants could be influential actors and argued that the rights and status 
that states invested with these groups do not enable them to be influential in the Council.798 She 
argues, “Excluding indigenous peoples from holding equal status in the Arctic Council is a short-
sighted approach to environmental management of the Northern region, rendering the structure 
of the Council obsolete before it even begins.”799 Beyond these perspectives, most authors, 
including  political scientists Terry Fenge,
800
 Olav Schram Stokke
801
 and Oran Young,
802
 argue 
that the Council is a state-centric institution that provides an important role for permanent 
participants in dialogue. In 1999, United States State Department policy-maker Evan Bloom 
agreed and wrote that indigenous groups “participate in all aspects of the Council's work.”803 
Historian John English argues the institution is state-centric, though he says the “lobbying and 
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pressure” of indigenous peoples’ organizations has “had an impact” on Arctic governance.804 
None of the existing literature systematically explains the role and influence of the permanent 
participants, or its implications for our understanding of non-state actors in international 
relations, a task this chapter undertakes. It argues that none of the existing perspectives 
adequately explains permanent participant influence, though the third, state-centric perspective 
of Fenge and others comes closest. Beyond their legal rights and status, the permanent 
participants have influence in the Council, though less influence than states. They demonstrate 
most influence when they convince a state to veto an undesirable policy, or to reverse an earlier 
veto, but demonstrate less influence when it is required to convince a number of states to 
undertake a desired course of action.  
This chapter contributes a case that assesses the reliability and validity of the predictions 
that functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism make about the influence of non-
state actors. Functionalists would expect that non-state actors could influence international 
institutions, while neorealists would argue it is not possible. Neoliberal institutionalists would 
provide an explanation between the two theories, as they would argue that non-state actors could 
have influence that stems from their agency. Agency refers to the ability to effectively research, 
organize, communicate, lobby and ally with states. Major international relations theories do not 
anticipate that non-state actors will be influential global actors. In the post-Soviet world, that 
possibility seems greater than ever before. This chapter reinforces the predictive power of 
neoliberal institutionalism due to its emphasis on the importance of agency.  
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6.1 – Theoretical Predictions on the Influence of Non-State Actors 
 Functionalists hold that permanent participants can influence the Council by providing 
information and perspectives states and the institution itself find compelling. 
H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful 
information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality 
of the information they provide.  
 
Functionalists argue that states automatically and rationally respond to issues, including external 
international issues that demand co-operation where state interests intersect.
805
 Thus, 
functionalists conclude that non-state actors become part of international institutions when they 
provide information that makes states aware of issues, “interests, beliefs and expectations.”806 
According to functionalists, “international institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making 
autonomy.”807 Functionalists stress “the role of interest groups (especially organized business 
and trade unions) in this self-expansive integration process.”808  Non-state actors can form an 
interest group that can pressure the Council to undertake certain action.
809
 Functionalists argue 
that states create institutions independent of states to promote efficiency; these institutions can 
then make decisions automatically, independent of the will of any particular state.
810
 Thus, for 
these theorists, the demands of non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations, 
influence international institutions even when their arguments conflict with state interest.
811
 
These groups contribute local knowledge to solve problems. According to functionalists, the 
influence of non-state actors evolves when they provide new information to states.   
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Neorealists argue that the influence of permanent participants will not evolve because 
states will never grant them rights and status that will allow competition with states. 
H1: The permanent participants will not be a strong actor in the Arctic Council and their 
influence will not evolve.  
 
Neorealists would argue that the permanent participants have not influenced states to do anything 
they would not have otherwise done. This argument stems from the fact they assume that states 
are the pre-eminent actor in the international system.
812
 In an anarchic world system, states are 
the most important actor, following their rational material, positional self-interest.
813
 In this 
system, no actor can force states to undertake action without the threat of force.
814
 Neorealists 
contend that, “States are the only actors that really ‘count.’ ”815According to neorealists, non-
state actors do not have the means to impact how states operate. Neorealists argue that permanent 
participants can give states credibility and information, but cannot impact states’ material self-
interest. They do not process territory or sovereignty so they cannot use force against a state. The 
question is thus, why would states allow the permanent participants to be part of the Council in 
the first place? Neorealists would expect that states did not see non-state actors as a challenge to 
their interests, prosperity or security. Including permanent participants may have addressed 
domestic political concerns that do not impact vital state interest.
816
 For small powers, permanent 
participants help dilute the influence of great powers. States could use non-state actors to 
promote their interest. Thus, it could appear that non-state actors are influential, though in fact 
this would not be the case. Neorealists would not expect that permanent participants would be 
able to influence states in the Arctic Council.  
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Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the permanent participants can have some 
influence, but their influence will never be equal to states. 
H1: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally 
demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization, 
communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).  
 
Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that non-state actors are more influential than 
neorealists predict, but less influential than functionalists predict. For neoliberal institutionalists, 
the modern world order includes “increasing linkages among states and non-state actors.817 
Including permanent participants also ensures institutional legitimacy. Neoliberal 
institutionalists, like neorealists and functionalists, believe states co-operate when it is in their 
interest to do so.
818
 Unlike neorealists, they argue that norms
819
 and the form of negotiation
820
 
impact state behaviour. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that non-state actors can convince states 
that a given action is in their interest,
821
 if they can overcome any norms and path dependence 
that inhibit their contributions.
822
 They can use agency to influence states, or a keen ability to 
research, organize, communicate, lobby and build coalitions. Neoliberal institutionalists argue 
that states will undertake action as long as they secure an absolute gain.
823
 This prediction stands 
in contrast to functionalism, which argues that in independent institutions non-state actors can 
rival states for influence. Neoliberal institutionalists argue the influence of permanent 
participants can evolve as they gain new strategies to convince states a action is in their interest.  
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 Table 6.1 summarizes theory on non-state actors in international institutions. 
Functionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in international institutions will 
evolve when they obtain new information that makes international institutions or states aware of 
important issues. Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in 
international institutions will evolve when they use their agency to convince states of the utility 
of a desired action. Neorealists do not believe the influence of non-state actors in international 
institutions will evolve because states will not invest non-state actors with influence to challenge 
states.  
Table 6.1: The Importance of Non-State Actors in International Institutions 
Theory Can non-state actors 
influence international 
institutions? 
When will non-state 
actors influence 
international 
institutions? 
 
When will their 
influence evolve? 
Functionalism Yes When they provide 
compelling 
information about an 
important issue to 
states 
 
When they obtain 
compelling 
information about an 
important issue for 
states 
 Yes When they provide 
compelling 
information about an 
important issue to 
autonomous 
international 
institutions 
 
When they obtain 
compelling 
information about an 
important issue for 
autonomous 
international 
institutions 
Neorealism No They will not, as 
states are the 
important actors in the 
international system 
They will not, as 
states will never give 
them rights and status 
that challenges the 
power of states 
 
Neoliberal 
institutionalism  
Somewhat When they use their 
agency to convince 
states of the utility of 
their position 
When they develop 
new or better agency 
to lobby states 
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6.2 – The Evolution of the Permanent Participants 
 There are four eras of permanent participant involvement in the Arctic Council. In the 
first period, from 1991 to 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied 
governments to be included in the Arctic Council. They accomplished this goal by winning the 
support of countries because states did not perceive them a threat to state influence. In the second 
period, from 1998 to 2004, permanent participants participated in the Council significantly less 
than states and were able to initiate only limited Council projects. The third period comprises one 
year, 2004, when the participants successfully allied with like-minded nations to force the 
Council, and particularly the United States, to increase its action on climate change, which 
created new promise that they might be influential Council actors. In the fourth period, from 
2005 to 2013, the permanent participants were able to influence the Council significantly in two 
cases. However, overall, states continued to limit the influence of permanent participants and 
their ability to achieve desired outcomes appeared weaker than ever. Authors that argue that the 
permanent participants are “full participants” in the Council overestimate their influence. 
Likewise, authors who predict they will have little to no influence in the Council, such as 
Jennifer McIver, underestimate their influence. The Council is a state-centric institution, 
confirming the assessments of authors such as Oran Young. However, the permanent participants 
are important actors in the Council, which contrasts some predictions made by state-centric 
theories.  
6.2.1 – 1991 to 1998 
It is necessary to understand how states constructed the role, status and rights of the 
permanent participants to understand how their role has evolved. Permanent participants had a 
limited role and influence during the founding of the Arctic Council, from 1991 until 1998. Why 
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did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become permanent participants? States had 
to consider two key questions. First, would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the 
Arctic Council? Second, what would be their role in the Council, as well as their influence on 
Council decision-making? In regards to the first question, there was no debate that indigenous 
peoples’ organizations would at least be observers. The three existing indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) the Saami Council and the Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), participated in the precursor 
organization to the Arctic Council, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), 
although only as observers. This participation in the AEPS secured their role in the Arctic 
Council.  
As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the AEPS allowed observers and so indigenous peoples’ 
organizations found an avenue to participate in that status. The AEPS’s 1991 founding document 
lists the ICC, USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North (later renamed RAIPON), and the 
Nordic Saami Council (later renamed the Saami Council) as observers, along with Germany, 
Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme and the International Arctic Science Committee.
824
 The 
document, in a clearly symbolic gesture, lists the indigenous peoples’ organizations before the 
other observers. However, these groups could only comment on matters in the AEPS or 
participate in meetings with the consent of states. The AEPS was a state-centric scientific 
strategy and non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations, had little input or role in 
the process to create it.   
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Indigenous peoples’ organizations increased their role in the AEPS by successfully 
lobbying states. This lobbying created an expectation that indigenous peoples’ organizations 
should have greater status and rights than other observers did when states opted to create the 
Arctic Council. It was unacceptable to indigenous peoples that their organizations, which 
represented Arctic residents, had the same status as non-Arctic countries in the AEPS. The 
negotiation process occurred during the fall of 1993 when states held a meeting in Nuuk, 
Greenland, to overview the activities of the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations could 
attend the plenary meeting, but could not attend closed-door negotiations among the eight Arctic 
countries. Leaders of the three indigenous peoples’ organizations demanded a side meeting, 
conducted in private, with representatives of Arctic states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations 
presented a united front and leveraged the fact that their groups together comprised significant 
numbers of northern residents, particularly indigenous peoples. They jointly “characterized their 
exclusion as unwarranted and contrary to the spirit of co-operation in the circumpolar world.”825 
These arguments proved persuasive. The eight Arctic states agreed and “these organizations 
were thereafter permitted to attend and intervene in all meetings of the AEPS,”826 although they 
were still technically observers. In 1994, Denmark created the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat to 
help all of the permanent participants participate in the AEPS, at a cost of more than $2.5 million 
U.S. dollars per year.
827
 The Indigenous Peoples Secretariat was to “assist and provide secretariat 
support functions to the permanent participants.”828 Its website says, “The role of the secretariat 
has always been to facilitate contributions from the [permanent participants] to the co-operation 
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of the eight Arctic states and to assist the [permanent participants] in performing 
communicational tasks.”829 As shall be revealed, the permanent participants secured a role in the 
Arctic Council based on their successful negotiation of a privileged role in the AEPS. The role of 
indigenous peoples’ organizations proved to be the major difference between the Arctic Council 
and its predecessor. 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations did not enjoy greater status in the AEPS because states 
created it to increase engagement with Russia, rather than as a forum to address issues important 
to Arctic residents. There are numerous social issues in indigenous communities stemming from 
unprecedented cultural change since first contact with Europeans during the 16
th
 century.
830
 In 
the 20
th
 century, this cultural change continued as the rate of urbanization of indigenous peoples 
increased. Meanwhile, traditional lifestyles and languages declined across the circumpolar 
world.
831
 These changes have led to increasing activism among indigenous peoples in the latter 
half of the 20
th
 century as they sought the right to self-determination.
832
 Examples include the 
rise of indigenous advocacy organizations, such as Canada’s Assembly of First Nations, the 
United States’ Association on American Indian Affairs or the aforementioned Nordic Saami 
Council. Further, there were significant human security issues in the Arctic in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, Russia saw a decline in life expectancy of 
indigenous peoples in its North.
833
 Rates of suicide are higher than the national average in every 
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part of the circumpolar north.
834
 Despite these issues, as other chapters make clear, the AEPS 
emerged because of a growing willingness by the Arctic states to engage with Russia, rather than 
indigenous peoples’ issues or activism.835 All of the Arctic states had an interest in scientific co-
operation to deal with under-researched, yet very pressing Russian Arctic environmental 
issues.
836
 Although there is a human element to these problems, the AEPS did not emerge due to 
indigenous activism. 
Regarding the second question, the role and influence of indigenous peoples’ 
organizations was a key point of debate and disagreement in the negotiations to establish the 
Arctic Council. During informal 1995 negotiations, two major alignments emerged.
837
 The first 
alignment supported making indigenous peoples’ organizations full Council members.838 Canada 
led this alignment of indigenous allies, which also included Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden.839 Indigenous peoples’ organizations should have the same status, rights and 
influence as states. The second alignment, led by the United States and including Russia,840 
favoured a second-tier status for indigenous peoples’ organizations similar in status and rights to 
observers.
841
 States sought to complete their negotiations on the creation of the Arctic Council by 
the end of 1995.
842
 The status and rights of indigenous groups was the major obstacle that 
delayed the creation of the Council until a founding meeting in Ottawa in September 1996.
843
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The negotiating process on the rights and status of the permanent participants unfolded 
during 1996 and 1997. During the June 1996 negotiations to create the Arctic Council, the 
United States offered a compromise: it would support either adding security to the Arctic 
Council’s mandate or making the aboriginal groups second-tier members.844 Lloyd Axworthy, 
then Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, later said that Canada chose to include the permanent 
participants in the Council. Russia and the Nordic countries accepted this compromise. 
Traditional military security was not a central concern in the negotiations that led to the 
Council,
845
 so it seems like a plausible compromise.  Thus indigenous peoples’ organizations 
received a second-tier status as permanent participants, lacking a vote on Council matters 
Ultimately, the role and status of the permanent participants would be similar to states, 
certainly with fewer legal rights but able to have an impact on Council outcomes. The permanent 
participants argued that they should be full members of the Council. The ICC and its president 
Mary Simon, in particular, pressured Canada to support their full participation in the Council. At 
the June 1996 negotiations, after finding out about Canada’s compromise, some indigenous 
group representatives present were not happy the groups were not to be full members of the 
Council. Simon, the leader of Canada’s delegation, told the indigenous peoples’ representatives 
that if the groups could not accept permanent participant status, Canada would walk away from 
the talks.
846
 Ultimately, the groups decided that the Council could accomplish good work with 
indigenous peoples’ organizations groups as second-tier members and decided to accept 
permanent participant status.
847
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States had not yet defined the precise rights of permanent participants.
848
 The permanent 
participant issue dominated December 1995 and April 1996 negotiations, which left two 
meetings in June and August to negotiate the declaration creating the Council. At the first Arctic 
Council meeting, in September 1996 in Ottawa, states set three goals for the next two years: 1) to 
develop rules of procedure; 2) to develop terms of reference for the Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS) to the Arctic Council.
849
 The third task was straightforward; the first and second 
tasks were more contentious.  
On the first matter, the permanent participants sought to establish the strongest legal 
rights possible for themselves in the rules or procedure. The 1995 and 1996 negotiations 
established that permanent participants would not be able to vote on Council matters. States 
negotiated the rules of procedure at five meetings, mostly held in Canada, throughout 1997 and 
1998.
850
 Articles 4 and 5 of the Council rules or procedure state that permanent participants may 
participate “in all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council.”851 It also says, “The category of 
permanent participants is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the 
Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.”852 The permanent participants can 
help set the Council agenda,
853
 vote on delegation sizes
854
 and propose Council projects.
855
 The 
rules of procedure protect some rights for permanent participants. 
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Still, the rules privilege the rights of states in other ways. The Arctic states have the 
prerogative to meet in private without the permanent participants.
856
 Only Arctic states can set 
working group meeting agendas.
857
 Article 7 says, “All decisions of the Arctic Council and its 
subsidiary bodies . . . shall be by a consensus of the eight Arctic states.”858 In the words of Terry 
Fenge, “They are not listed as founding members of the Council, do not have a vote, did not sign 
the declaration and are not considered ‘peoples.’ ”859 Most importantly, the Ottawa Declaration 
caps the number of permanent participants at seven.
860
 The Arctic states can veto permanent 
participant projects, as all must receive approval by Arctic Council ministers.
861
 In essence, 
every Council state has a veto over any Council action because the forum operates by consensus. 
The permanent participants had fewer rights in the Council than they would have preferred.  
On the second matter, creating terms of reference for the SDWG, the permanent 
participants sought the right to help set the agenda. The permanent participants sought a SDWG 
in which indigenous peoples’ organizations would identify “shared priorities.” In general, the 
other Arctic states supported this proposal. The United States, weary of an overly broad Council 
agenda, opposed this approach, favouring an ad-hoc mandate that would see the working group 
adopt specific projects as states saw fit. Ultimately, the Council that emerged from this process 
was a Council that placed a greater influence on science and the environment than on human 
security. Government and academic scientists dominated the Council during the period from 
1998 until 2004, creating the majority of the Council’s projects.862 
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What were the positions of the alignments in negotiations? Canada led the first alignment 
and made five key arguments to demand full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations. 
First, some policy-makers referred to a norm to include Aboriginals as full members. In the 
words of one government official, “You can’t speak of the North without involving Aboriginal 
folk.”863 Second, there was some sense that it was logical to give indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, which represented northern residents, a special status above that of observers, 
such as the Red Cross.
864
 Third, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied for their 
own inclusion.
865
 These groups wanted to be members of the Arctic Council. They each 
increasingly viewed international co-operation and interaction as necessary to accomplish their 
goals.866 The ICC, RAIPON and Saami Council each had representatives impress the importance 
of indigenous representation as they participated in the informal negotiations throughout 1995.
867
 
Fourth, and most importantly, there was a strategic advantage for the small powers to include 
indigenous peoples’ organizations apart from states in the Council. If indigenous peoples were 
mere observers in the Council, states would be responsible for including their views in their 
international positions at the Arctic Council, because indigenous peoples’ organizations are 
significant domestic actors. Giving these groups membership in the Council allows them to 
express their views, themselves. It means that states do not need to do so in official positions. 
Fifth, applying only to Canada, some Canadian decision-makers believed that Canada’s 
constitution created an obligation to include the indigenous groups in the Council. Section 35 of 
the Canadian constitution protects the responsibility to consult with Aboriginal peoples about 
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issues vital to their interest.
868
 In the words of one Canadian policy-maker, Canada is “conscious 
of involving our Aboriginal people” because there is an expectation to do so in the 
Constitution.
869
 To quote a permanent participant representative, Canada had a “pious hope that 
indigenous peoples had the same status as states.”870 
In these informal negotiations, the second alignment (the United States and Russia) made 
four arguments opposing full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations. First, United 
States policy-makers worried about the legal ramifications of their inclusion. The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was under negotiation at the time of Council 
negotiations.
871
 The United States argued that “granting Aboriginals full voting rights” in the 
Council could create a legal precedent for “their right to have their own country.”872 The United 
States sought to draft “neutral language” in all Council documents and avoid references to 
“aboriginal peoples.”873 Part of the negotiation process in the United Nation was a question 
whether to grant the right of self-determination to indigenous “peoples” and so the United States 
sought to avoid this wording in all contexts, as well as any action that could support the 
indigenous right to self-determination. The eventual Article 3 of the resulting declaration grants 
this right of self-determination.
874
  One representative of an indigenous peoples’ organization 
recounted that in 1996 Council negotiations, United States negotiators argued that recognizing 
indigenous peoples would encourage the rise of “liberation fronts” and embolden aboriginal 
leaders with radical politics.
875
 Russian policy-makers shared this concern as indigenous peoples 
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in Russia mobilized interest groups to confront the government about worsening living 
conditions in the Russian Arctic; this activism was new in the recently post-Soviet Russia.
876
 For 
example, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North came into existence in 
1990. United States and Russian policy-makers feared legal issues if permanent participants had 
too many rights.  
The secondary reason that the United States and Russia were reluctant to add indigenous 
peoples’ organizations to the Arctic Council was a concern that they would have too much 
influence. United States officials believed that indigenous peoples’ organizations would use their 
domestic influence to impact their home country’s vote and then cast a vote themselves, which 
would in essence give them two votes.
877
 Russia shared the United States’ concern. For example, 
the Saami Council, based in Norway, could influence Norway to support its view on Council 
matters. If the Saami Council also could vote, United States and Russian officials believed it 
would have two votes. In this scenario, the United States or Russia could be out-voted. These 
countries operated under the assumption that Arctic Council states likely would support the 
views of their domestic aboriginal groups. This assumption is paradoxical, in light of the efforts 
by the first coalition to have indigenous groups speak for themselves, expressly so they would 
not have to do so. The permanent participants in general relied on states in the first alignment to 
represent their interests against the second alignment and so communication was not always 
face-to-face. More importantly, United States policy-makers believed it was inappropriate to 
grant indigenous peoples the same influence as states.
878
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Third, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that if permanent 
participants received a vote in the Council, Alaska would demand a vote.
879
 The United States 
policy-makers supported a role for indigenous peoples in the Council because  the “input of the 
community’s needs” was important in the Council.880 One former United States delegation 
member summarized, "It may have looked like it was the United States against the indigenous 
communities, but we were working for a Council that met our objectives, including our legal 
requirements," such as avoiding strong language about indigenous rights to avoid previously 
mentioned issues in the United Nations.
881
 The United States took the lead in opposing full 
membership for  the permanent participants; hence Russia did not need to make its opinions 
clear.
882
 Russia supported the United States’ view, opposing indigenous group membership. 
Fourth, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that indigenous peoples’ 
organizations would voice opinions contrary to United States interests. John English, in his book 
Ice and Water, writes that the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) had been critical of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act, which transferred various land rights to indigenous peoples. In a 
1985 report, the ICC said the act sought to assimilate Alaskan natives into Western culture.
883
 
Several Alaskan politicians mistrusted the ICC and its support for an Arctic council.
884
 In 1995, 
the ICC published a report called Collapse of the Seal Skin Market, critical of the United States’ 
1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products into the United 
States.
885
 These criticisms raised suspicion of the ICC among United States policy-makers.  
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It also is worth nothing that the lead negotiator for Canada during the creation of the 
Arctic Council was Mary Simon, an Inuit leader. She was president of the ICC from 1980 until 
1994 and had worked to negotiate the creation of the territory of Nunavut. In 1994, she became 
Canada’s first (and so far only) circumpolar ambassador. The government of Canada appointed 
her due to her northern experience, credibility and diplomatic experience. Her appointment to 
lead negotiations no doubt annoyed many Alaskan politicians suspicious of the ICC. 
In the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, the United States and Russia emerged as the 
winners because they sought a lesser role for indigenous peoples’ organizations. They wanted 
representation from indigenous peoples, but could not support the notion that indigenous groups 
would have the same legal rights as states.
886
 Policy-makers in these countries believed that it 
would be “inappropriate” to grant aboriginal groups equal legal rights.887 Canada and the Nordic 
states lost in the negotiations because indigenous peoples’ organizations did not receive full 
membership. The United States and Russia did not seriously consider the option of granting full 
membership to indigenous peoples’ organizations.888 A United States government official 
present in the negotiations said, “I don’t remember that there ever was a trade-off between 
permanent participants and security.”889 This indicates that Canada did not present the permanent 
participant position as vigorously as sometimes indicated. The indigenous peoples’ organizations 
were somewhat successful in negotiations. The ICC, RAIPON and the Saami Council worked 
together and presented a united front in negotiations. These groups have different domestic 
situations and interests, but all shared the goal to gain influence in the Council. They have fewer 
rights than states in the institution and are not “full members,” but they have a privileged status.  
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In summary, from 1991 until 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations secured a place in 
the Arctic Council. Why did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become 
permanent participants? Would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the Arctic 
Council at all? States allowed the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations as permanent 
participants because they had an elevated role in the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations 
were mere observers at the onset of that largely environmental organization, but successfully 
lobbied states to increase their role in 1993. What would be their role in the Council, as well as 
their influence on Council decision-making? During negotiations to create the Arctic Council, 
Canada and the Nordic states pushed to include indigenous peoples’ organizations as full 
members due to perceived norms, recognitions and lobbying efforts, as well as for strategic 
bargaining reasons. The United States and Russia opposed full membership for indigenous 
peoples’ organizations for fear of the legal implications of their inclusion and concerns over 
potential challenges to state power. A compromise emerged in which the status of the permanent 
participants is similar to states,  but without a vote on Council matters. They are members of the 
Council, although they are second-tier members, below states. They can attend all Council 
meetings, contribute comments, help set the Council’s agenda, vote on small matters and sponsor 
Council projects. States have the ability to meet without the permanent participants and any 
permanent participant comment, idea or project is subject to a state veto. This veto is the only 
major right that states possess which permanent participants do not.  
To return to the literature, overall, the influence of the permanent participants 
disappointed some commentators, such as Jennifer McIver, leery that the Council was a state-
centric institution. Others believed that the compromise meant they would be full members.  
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6.2.2 – 1998 to 2004 
 To assess the growth of permanent participant influence on the Council, it is necessary to 
establish a baseline by describing their level of influence at the beginning of the institution’s 
operations. From 1998 until 2004, the permanent participants exerted influence on the Arctic 
Council,
890
 though less than did states. This section provides less of a historical trace and more of 
an overall assessment of influence.  Actors can influence the Council in several ways.  Council 
members can initiate projects, such as a treaty, environmental assessment or technical project. 
They also can provide comments to shape project content. States have a clear advantage in this 
regard, because they can veto any Council project they do not support. Permanent participants 
sought to actualize their influence outlined in the Arctic Council rules of procedure. Toward this 
end, they sought: 1) to attend all Council meetings and participate in those meetings; 2) to add 
new permanent participants to the Council through the creation of new indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, 3) to sponsor projects in the Council, and; 4) to provide significant content-
shaping comments on projects. This section describes the ability of the permanent participants to 
fulfill these goals and explains the reason for their success, or lack thereof.  
In terms of the first goal, the permanent participants were successful attending and 
participating in Council meetings, although they participated less than did states.
891
 As indicated 
in earlier chapters, the Council holds between two and four meetings annually in which states 
approve projects commissioned in previous meetings. Government bureaucrats and permanent 
participant employees complete those projects between meetings. From 1998 until 2004, the 
                                                 
890
 As noted in the introduction, influence refers to the ability to sway or direct outcomes.  
891
 To measure participation, the researcher coded instances in which Arctic Council meeting minutes record 
comments by a permanent participant. This measure is the best available, but is imperfect. In certain instances, the 
minutes record comments by “delegations,” without specifying which delegation made the comments. In addition, 
according to the Arctic Council rules of procedure, states have the right to expunge comments from the meeting 
minutes; thus, the meeting minutes for any one meeting may not be completely accurate. Meeting minutes for the 
May 2004 SAO meeting in Selfoss, Iceland, are not available and so were not included in calculations.  
  
 
261 
Arctic Council held 18 meetings, hosted by four different countries, depending on which was its 
chair. Five of the six permanent participant groups sent representatives to all 18 meetings.
892
 The 
exception was the Aleut International Association (AIA), which missed two meetings in 2001, 
but overall attended 16 of 18 Council meetings.
893
 A measure of participation is the number of 
comments made by delegations at Council meetings. States decide on initiatives at Council 
meetings. To participate fully, delegations must be able and willing to comment at Council 
meetings. As a whole, the permanent participants provided comments an average of 11.72 times 
per meeting, making their voices heard. Individually, on average, they provided fewer comments 
than did states. United States delegates, for example, made remarks an average of 11.4 times per 
meeting from 1998 until 2004. Counted individually, the most any one permanent participant 
group spoke at a meeting was seven times.
894
 The more established groups, namely the ICC and 
the RAIPON, make more comments than other permanent participants. At eight different 
Council meetings, a permanent participant group did not make any comment, according to 
meeting minutes. For example, at the November 1999 Council meeting, representatives from 
neither the AIA nor the Saami Council made any comments, while the other permanent 
participant groups provided several comments. On 18 occasions at these eight meetings, a 
permanent participant group did not provide any comments.
895
  
Another measure of participation to consider is the size of permanent participant 
delegations, an important factor in a group’s ability to achieve outcomes. Permanent participant 
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delegations at these meetings were smaller than those of states. For example, states sent an 
average of 7.1 representatives to the June 2001 Arctic Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, 
whereas permanent participants sent an average of 3.8 representatives. Each group sent around 
the same number of representatives. We can conclude that the permanent participants attended 
and participated in Council meetings, though individually they commented half as much as did 
states.  
 In terms of the second goal, permanent participants were successful adding new 
indigenous peoples’ organizations to the Council. In 1996, at the first Council meeting in 
Ottawa, the Council included three permanent participants: the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council. 
These three groups helped form three new indigenous peoples’ organizations, which emerged 
specifically to participate in the Council. Permanent participants sought to introduce groups to 
represent the three major indigenous groups that did not have representation in the Council. All 
of the Council states were receptive to including additional permanent participants in the Council 
because the current groups did not represent every indigenous group. Existing permanent 
participants contacted the major tribal councils that did not have representation to ask them to 
form groups for the Arctic Council throughout 1996 until 1998. They shared information about 
the Council and its objectives, arguments why a presence in the Council would be in an 
indigenous person’s interest and expertise about how to organize appropriate groups. The Arctic 
Athabaskan Council (AAC) formed from the 18 Athabaskan tribal councils in Canada and 
Alaska.
896
 The Aleutian/Pribilof Islands Association, an Alaska native land claim corporation, 
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formed the Aleut International Association (AIA).
897
 The Gwich’in Council International (GCI) 
formed out of a union between six Gwich’in communities in Alaska and the two major Gwich’in 
tribal councils in Canada.
898
 The AIA first participated in the Council in 1998, whereas the AAC 
and the GCI began attending in 2000. There are now permanent participants representing most 
major Arctic indigenous groups. The rules of procedure allow up to seven permanent 
participants, as noted earlier. Indigenous groups successfully doubled their membership in the 
Council between 1996 and 2000, content with six permanent participants.  
Apropos the third goal, the permanent participants were somewhat successful sponsoring 
Council projects. As noted, sponsoring a project entails conceiving of an initiative, designing the 
specifics, funding all of the necessary costs and executing the agenda. Sponsoring a project 
allows an actor to lead a Council initiative and direct outcomes. The Council initiated 57 
significant projects from 1998 until 2004. Permanent participants initiated only five of these 
projects, summarized in the next paragraph.
899
 The permanent participants were successful 
executing all of the projects they sought to bring the Council as they pursued small-scale projects 
states had no reason to veto.
900
 The three largest Council projects stemmed from the interest of 
the Arctic states in understanding Arctic pollution. These were the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, a major climate change assessment, the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, which 
sought to the address the aftermath of 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic 
during the Cold War, and the Arctic Human Development Report, which collected statistics and 
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information about human security in the Arctic region. The permanent participants did not 
sponsor any of these large, ambitious projects.   
The permanent participants were able to sponsor five projects that were small in scale. 
First, in 2000, the ICC, the RAIPON and Russia sponsored a project to “assess pollution impacts 
on the health of indigenous people of Arctic Russia, and to ascertain the level of ‘country’ food 
contamination as a result of pollution from global and local sources.”901 The project was 
completed in 2004 and created an assessment under the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme working group entitled Toxic Substances, Food Security and Indigenous Peoples of 
the Russian North.
902
 The RAIPON and the ICC updated the Council about its progress at the 
Council’s meetings between 2000 and 2004. The process to execute this project was 
straightforward. States limited their comments to small technical suggestions and notes of 
support. Second, in 2000, the RAIPON and Denmark sponsored a project in the Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna working group entitled Biological Significance of Sacred Sites of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic: A Study in Northern Russia, which sought to identify 
biologically and culturally important sites in Russia for possible protection by collecting 
traditional knowledge in communities.
903
 Again, the RAIPON briefed the Council about its 
progress at the Council meetings between 2000 and 2004. States allowed the RAIPON to carry 
out the project without interference. This project was completed in 2004 and led to follow-up 
projects in subsequent years.
904
 The Saami Council initiated the third and fourth projects. One 
compared coastal fishery management systems in Norway, Greenland and Canada.
905
 The other 
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was a “networking programme” that compiled a “compendium of best practices for teaching and 
learning about sustainable development in the Arctic.”906 Both projects were completed in 
2002.
907
 However, both projects largely occurred outside of the Arctic Council, without major 
status updates or discussion at Council meetings. It is possible that if the Council did not exist, 
the group would have been able to complete these projects in other forums. A fifth project was 
initiated in 2000 by Denmark (with the Saami Council, the ICC, and the RAIPON), and resulted 
in the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic.
908
 This project consisted of “comparative 
investigations of the living conditions of the Inuit and Saami populations in the Arctic and the 
indigenous people of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula” in Russia.909 Permanent participants 
briefed states about their progress between 2000 and 2004 and the report proceeded without 
disruptive comments or vetoes. The scope of the survey expanded in subsequent years. These 
five projects are small in scale compared to a project such as the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, involving hundreds of scientists and a secretariat.  
Overall, the permanent participants sponsored less than 10 per cent of the Council’s 
projects between 1998 and 2004. Of the five projects they initiated, three had states as co-
sponsors and providers of the major funding. Permanent participants were successful sponsoring 
projects when they secured funds from a like-minded, supportive state co-sponsor. It is likely 
that permanent participants would have sponsored more projects if they secured greater funding 
from states for staff and logistics. Additional funds for these projects came from the Global 
Environmental Facility, a World Bank funding agency affiliated with the United Nations, as was  
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the case of the ICC/RAIPON toxic substances project.
910
 These projects focused on specific 
areas of human development in the Arctic and were limited in ambition, as well as scope.  
 The permanent participants were somewhat successful in achieving their fourth goal to 
provide comments on Council projects. The permanent participants provided comments on 
projects at Council meetings, as seen in the number of agenda items on which they spoke. As a 
point of comparison, the United States spoke an average of 11.4 times per meeting on an average 
of 7.2 agenda items, or roughly half of the Council’s agenda.911 The permanent participants 
spoke on seven or more agenda items only one time.
912
 The permanent participants made 
significant contributions to two of the three major Council projects from 1998 until 2004: 
namely, the Arctic Human Development Report and Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. The 
former received state approval at the five Council meetings from April 2003 until November 
2004. The permanent participants served on the project steering committee and contributed 
community perspectives as well as traditional knowledge to the project.
913
 The next section 
discusses the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. 
The permanent participants attempted on two occasions to change the course of action 
decided upon by a state, on a project they had not sponsored. In one case, this intervention was 
successful. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was successful intervening in a project 
introduced at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. State delegations discussed a 
project led by the United States National Science Foundation entitled the Inventory of Arctic 
Research, which was a synthesis of the state of Arctic science. The project won quick support 
from all states as delegations stated they would provide information to support the project. The 
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ICC “intervened to stress the necessity of including local observations and traditional knowledge 
in research and inventories.”914 The goal of the United States was to create a useful tool for 
scientists. There was no reason to exclude the information requested by the ICC. The United 
States delegation then stated that it agreed with the ICC’s request and pledged to involve 
permanent participants in the collection of information to include in the inventory.
915
 This 
intervention was successful because the leading state did not veto the change, because the 
suggested alternation was relatively small and did not alter the purpose of the project.  
At the next Arctic Council meeting, in November 1999, the ICC was unsuccessful in its 
attempt to convince a state to reverse a course of action. In the plenary meeting, states heard an 
overview of efforts in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program to understand the extent of the 
unsafe storage of PCBs in the Russian Arctic. Norway and the Nordic countries, armed with 
scientific information confirming the danger to human health from PCBs, proposed that the 
Council create a formal policy to address Arctic contaminants.
916
 The United States’ response 
was somewhat ambiguous. Canada vetoed a formal policy on contaminants, before Russia 
indicated whether it supported the action and Norway detailed what sort of policy it 
envisioned.
917
 The Canadian delegation was leery of the obligations that a formal policy would 
create. It believed that it could achieve desirable outcomes without a policy.
918
 The ICC wanted 
firm commitments from states and tried to convince Canada not to block attempts to create a 
formal policy on the Arctic Contaminants Action Program. Its delegation stated that action on 
contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of indigenous people in the 
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Arctic.”919 This intervention was not successful because the ICC lacked the ability to compel 
Canada to consider its view and the ICC did not address Canada’s concerns about sovereignty. 
The Council did not undertake further discussion about the contents of a policy on contaminants.  
 The permanent participants also supported two minor Council initiatives. First, the 
permanent participants jointly helped states write the Arctic Council’s submission to the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. The goal of the 
summit was to negotiate an international policy on sustainable development. At its May 2002 
meeting in Oulu, Finland, the Arctic states prepared a statement to contribute to the summit and 
pledged action on the reduction of contaminants, as well as defining the “Arctic as an indicator 
region of global environmental health.”920 The ICC, in particular, contributed language to the 
draft and urged language to “encourage further comprehensive environmental monitoring in this 
region.”921 States stated they could not add the language to the submission for logistical timeline 
reasons.
922
 The summit was not successful in creating international policy.
923
 Nonetheless, the 
permanent participants contributed a lot to the Council’s submission to the summit.  
Second, the permanent participants supported an attempt by Canada to encourage 
“capacity building” projects in the Council, which were to promote bottom-up decision-
making.
924
 Capacity building is the notion that “development” must give communities skills and 
knowledge to be “authors of their own development.”925 Communities were to generate their 
own projects for the Council under this approach. Canada encouraged this approach by co-
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hosting a workshop with Finland in November 2001.  Indigenous groups participated in this 
workshop, held in Helsinki, Finland.
926
 Canada sought to have “capacity building” identified as 
an overall theme for all sustainable development projects, although it did not seek to introduce 
this requirement into the Council formally. The permanent participants supported this notion, 
although today in the Council capacity building is not an over-arching theme. In total, the 
permanent participants made significant contributions to six projects they did not sponsor.  
Returning to the major debate about the influence of the permanent participants in the 
academic literature, neither accurately predicts the level of participation by the permanent 
participants from 1998 until 2004. Jennifer McIver predicts that the permanent participants will 
have little influence in the Council,
927
 while Evan Bloom predicts they will be “full 
participants.”928 McIver underestimates their participation, while Bloom overestimates their 
participation. The permanent participants were not “full participants” alongside states because 
they contribute to only about one-fifth of the Council’s projects. Yet, they had greater influence 
than observers, since observers did not sponsor Council projects or convince any member states 
to take any particular course of action. Permanent participants have demonstrated the ability to 
achieve some desirable outcomes. 
Why did the permanent participants contribute to the Council less than many authors and 
media reports predicted? The permanent participants contributed to 20 per cent of Council 
projects and initiatives (or 11 projects out of 57). Why were they able to influence the Council 
only to this extent? Indigenous peoples’ organizations blamed the lack of adequate funding from 
states for their inability to send larger delegations to meetings and participate in or create more 
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projects. Most groups lacked funds to attend every working group meeting. These groups rely on 
state funding to participate in the Council, which amounts to $250,000 to $300,000 a year, 
depending on the size of the group.
929
 Though travel and administration funds differ between 
groups, the permanent participants work together on this issue. States provide money for their 
domestic indigenous peoples’ organizations to attend meetings and hire experts to represent 
them. For example, Canada provides funds for the Canadian branches of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI) and Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) 
to attend meetings, while Norway provides funds for the Saami Council. These groups also can 
receive funds from the Global Environmental Facility, although these funds are unreliable, 
project-specific and difficult to obtain.
930
 Permanent participants are too small to rely on 
membership fees or other donations. Funding that comes from states is often unreliable and 
fluctuates year-to-year. Overall, 14 of 18 Council meetings held between 1998 and 2004 were in 
northern cities, which are usually more expensive to travel to than southern locales. The financial 
needs of the permanent participants vary. The Saami Council, for example, frequently possesses 
adequate funds to attend meetings but seeks funds to hire more staff for its delegations. The ICC, 
in contrast, seeks travel funds as well as funds for staff. Nonetheless, all of the groups require 
additional funding and so work as a bloc to obtain additional funds.  
Permanent participants raised the issue of funding eight times at Council meetings 
between May 1999 and October 2004. For example, at a May 1999 Council meeting in 
Anchorage Alaska, “The Saami Council stated that this may be the last Council meeting it would 
be able to attend, and requested the chair to formally ask member countries to answer in writing 
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what they were doing to help permanent participants participate in the Council.”931 The Aleut 
International Association (AIA) raised the issue of funding at the October 2000 meeting in 
Barrow, Alaska. The United States responded, “Financing for participation in international 
meetings is a big problem, even for the United States.”932 Permanent participants impressed upon 
states the need to increase their funding.  
The major negotiations over permanent participant funding occurred at the October 2004 
Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland. Canada, a financial supporter of the permanent 
participants, proposed that all Arctic states contribute $300,000 a year to facilitate permanent 
participant access to the Council, in response to the permanent participant request for more 
funding.
933
 Sweden, strongly opposing the proposal, immediately vetoed this model before other 
states could make their support known and stated its preference for a system of “assessed 
contributions” that differed by state.934 The United States, seeking a compromise that would not 
create a financial burden, offered that permanent participant funding would be “in the budget of 
projects and other Arctic Council initiatives.”935 The Saami Council, the GCI and the Russian 
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) stated that the United States’ solution 
would not solve financial problems.
936
 The chair said that the indigenous peoples’ secretariat was 
to draft a paper on the two proposals to present to the Council for consideration.
937
 States did not 
implement either proposal, instead pledging that working groups and states would consult with 
permanent participants about funding before undertaking Council projects at the next Council 
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meeting.
938
 States did not genuinely support increasing funding for the permanent participants in 
these negotiations because their current level of participation suited state interests. Delegates of 
the permanent participants did not believe that states genuinely intended to reform the Council 
funding model, despite what appeared to be progress in pushing for solutions.
939
 The permanent 
participants had not threatened state power but their involvement has provided some benefits to 
member states.  Their presence lends a degree of legitimacy to the Council and frees states from 
having to include the positions of indigenous peoples in their Arctic Council policy. Increasing 
the funding to groups other than states could present a challenge to state influence in the Council. 
The influence of the permanent participants was further curtailed by the fact that states could 
veto Council action. States did not need to address the views of permanent participants on vetoed 
matters, as seen in the aforementioned Arctic Contaminants Action Program policy example. 
These groups attended meetings, provided comments and contributions to Council projects, 
created other projects and increased their membership in the Council.  
Permanent participants were not satisfied with their influence as 2004 ended.
940
 In line 
with most writers about the Council, such as Oran Young, the Council was a fairly state-centric 
institution from 1998 until 2004 to which permanent participants contributed. It was necessary 
for these groups to find ways to influence the Council that did not require additional funding. 
Permanent participants developed a strategy to exploit domestic politics and increase their 
influence in their response to the development of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, which 
the next section describes.  
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6.2.3 – 2004: The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment  
 The permanent participants increased their role in the Arctic Council through their 
influence on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). They used domestic politics to 
embarrass a state to reverse a veto. At the 2000 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states 
decided to create the ACIA climate change report. Government scientists and academics from 
every Arctic country wrote the document outside of Council meetings.
941
 The document took 
four years to assemble. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Finland, states decided that 
along with a scientific assessment, they would create a policy document, proposed by Iceland. 
Denmark, Canada, Norway and Finland expressed enthusiasm for an ACIA policy document.
942
 
Russia, the United States and Sweden did not exercise a veto.
943
 At the April 2003 Council 
meeting, the scientists creating the ACIA predicted that the policy document would be “at least 
30 pages,” addressing “about eight different subject areas.”944 They also reported that the fourth 
and final draft of the document would be ready by April 2004.
945
 The Arctic states stated that the 
permanent participants would be part of the drafting committee.
946
 The first draft of the policy 
was circulated on June 15, 2003, ahead of a set of negotiations to create a policy document in 
Svalbard, Norway, during August 2003. The United States, in those negotiations, proposed a 
policy document that was only one page, which the other seven Arctic states rejected.
947
 At this 
point, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of a policy document.
948
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 The permanent participants had previously contributed to the ACIA. It included 
information from permanent participants and the inclusion of traditional knowledge. For 
example, in 2000, representatives from the ICC travelled to Banks Island, Northwest Territories, 
to collect observations about climate change; they presented a video of the observations to the 
Council in October 2000.
949
 Contributors to the report believe that the traditional knowledge 
improved the quality of the scientific information within the ACIA. For example, Aboriginal 
groups collected observations about climate change that conventional science did not confirm for 
several years.
950
 The permanent participants helped ensure the project included a chapter about 
the “human and economic aspects” of climate change.951 
 The permanent participants promoted the addition of a policy document and did not 
accept the veto by the United States. Sheila Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council opted 
to go before the United States Senate Commerce Committee and tell of the United States’ 
attempts to stifle the policy document on March 3, 2004.
952
 This testimony was embarrassing 
enough for the United States that it reversed its veto in November 2004, at the next Arctic 
Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.
953
  All of the Council states initially supported the 
inclusion of a policy document in the report, but the United States changed its view in 2004 for 
fear of its implications ahead of its upcoming Presidential election.954 The policy document 
ultimately came out three weeks after the election. The document that resulted from that meeting 
is not strong, comprising only eight pages of vague platitudes about the need for action on 
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climate change.
955
 Nonetheless, the permanent participants had demonstrated for the first time 
that, acting alone, they could persuade the powerful United States to reverse its veto. The other 
Arctic Council states did not play a role in this process. They could not go before the United 
States Senate. The permanent participants supported a policy document because it highlighted 
the threat that climate change poses to indigenous livelihoods.
956
 They were successful because 
they found a tool of influence that did not require a veto or extensive funding and that worked 
within the Council’s rule of procedure. They used domestic politics to force a state to reverse a 
veto.  
To return to the literature, the permanent participants did not act as full participants, and 
sometimes they were forced to act outside the Council to achieve their objectives. However, they 
found ways to work around those legal limits on their influence highlighted by Jennifer McIver. 
This case represents an instance in which permanent participants increased their influence 
because it was the first time that they convinced a state to reverse a veto on a major project.  
 Table 6.2 summarizes the activities of the permanent participants from 1998 until 2005.  
Table 6.2: Permanent Participant Participation, 1998-2004 
 All RAIPON ICC AIA AAC GCI SC 
Average comments per meeting 11.72 2.8 3 0.55 1.5 1.57 1.91 
Average delegation size (example) 3.8 3.6 5.6 1.4 5.25 2.25 3.8 
Projects sponsored 5/57 3 2 0 0 0 3 
Project contributions 6 4 6 4 4 4 4 
Major project contributions (Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment, Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program, Arctic Human Development 
Report) 
3/3 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Total project contributions 11/57 9 11 6 6 6 6 
Failed interventions (Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program) 
1 
 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
Successful interventions (Inventory of Arctic 
Research, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment) 
2 
 
0 2 0 0 0 0 
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6.2.4 – 2005 to 2013 
The influence of the permanent participants increased between 2005 and 2013. They had 
goals similar to those of the previous era. These groups sought to: 1) attend Council meetings 
and comment at these meetings; 2) initiate Council projects important to their membership, and; 
3) contribute to other Council projects. They added a fourth goal, based on their experience 
influencing the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Permanent participants sought to intervene in 
Council projects that proposed action contrary to the interest of indigenous peoples and their 
membership. They did not actively seek to add new permanent participants to the Arctic Council 
because there was a member representing every major indigenous group in the Arctic. Overall, 
permanent participants continued to contribute to the Council less than did states.  
In terms of the first goal, permanent participants attended Council meetings and made 
remarks at those meetings, though they made fewer remarks than did states. State delegations 
spoke an average of 3.3 times per meeting on an average of 2.6 agenda items between 2005 and 
2013.
957
 Permanent participant delegations spoke an average of one time per meeting on one 
agenda item. Their level of commenting was similar to observers. An average of 4.7 observers 
provided comments per meeting, out of the roughly 15 observers who attended each Council 
meeting. Observers who provided comments interjected the same average number of times per 
meeting as permanent participants; namely, one comment on one agenda item.
958
 Based on a 
sample of five meetings, states send an average of 7.4 representatives to each Council meeting; 
permanent participants send only 3.5 representatives per meeting. An average of 15 observers 
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attends each meeting, sending an average of 1.5 people per meeting.
959
 Permanent participants 
provided fewer comments at Council meetings than did states, indicating that they did not 
participate in the Council as “full participants,” to use terminology from academic literature.  
Permanent participants attended all of the major Council meetings held between 2005 and 
2013. However, in 2008 and 2010, states excluded permanent participants from major events 
pertinent to Arctic governance. In 2008, Denmark sent diplomatic cables proposing a conference 
to discuss Arctic oceans policy. Denmark volunteered to host proceedings due to an interest in 
countering the perception that there was potential conflict in the Arctic.
960
 The United States and 
Denmark wanted to limit participation to the five Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean 
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) while Canada and Norway sought to 
include the other Arctic states (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden), as well as permanent 
participants.
961
 Denmark and the United States argued in diplomatic cables that the other actors 
did not have the same set of interests as the five Arctic Ocean states, while Canada and Norway 
sent cables arguing that that these groups and states still had significant interests.
962
 Russia was 
ambivalent about the meeting and its composition.
963
 Norway suggested that the Arctic Council 
would be the appropriate venue to have the meeting, which the United States resisted, informing 
Denmark that, “We have at times considered the [Arctic Council] as unwieldy for political 
discussions.”964 In May 2008, Denmark hosted the Arctic Oceans Conference in Ilulissat, 
Greenland, with the other four Arctic Ocean states. This conference was significant because it 
was the first instance of international Arctic governance to exclude indigenous group 
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contributions since 1996. In March 2010, Canada held a second conference in Ottawa. The 2010 
meeting was again controversial because Canada did not invite the permanent participants or the 
non-Arctic Ocean states, despite arguing that the permanent participants should be part of the 
2008 conference.
965
  According to media reports, United States Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
“skipped the closing news conference scheduled for the daylong session of five foreign 
ministers” after indicating that aboriginal groups had contacted her and made her aware that they 
did not receive invitations to the meeting.
966
 Some commentators, namely Mike Blanchfield of 
the Canadian Press, questioned Clinton’s motivations for skipping the meeting since it was not 
“clear why Clinton showed up for a meeting that in her view lacked key participants.”967 Why 
did the United States change its view on including permanent participants? According to political 
scientist Tornbjorn Perdersen, the United States had re-evaluated its Arctic policy under the 
Obama Administration and decided that it was necessary to avoid controversy in the execution of 
its Arctic policy.
968
 Between 2005 and 2013, states excluded the permanent participants from 
some Arctic governance. Timo Koivurova writes that permanent participants have “contributed 
to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy 
making.”969 In these instances, states broke the principle of automatic participation by indigenous 
peoples in Arctic governance.  
In terms of the second goal, the permanent participants sponsored 12 Council projects 
between 2005 and 2013. However, the proportion of Council projects they sponsored was similar 
to the period from 1998 to 2004. The Council had an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given 
time. Some of these projects took place without a state sponsor. Rather, working groups 
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sponsored projects with universities or carry out projects within their general mandate. States 
may fund a project without formally sponsoring it, especially in the case of small projects, such 
as a factsheet about a particular bird in danger. States organize the majority of Council projects 
by proposing the goal, structure, execution, personnel and funding. In 2013, for example, states 
each sponsored an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsored 12 of the 
Council’s projects from 2005 until 2013, or two projects per group. Observers sponsored or co-
sponsored seven projects in the same timeframe.
970
  
Table 6.3 summarizes permanent participant-sponsored projects. The projects sponsored 
by permanent participants are small in scope, focused on local outcomes and human security. 
States did not interfere in most permanent participant projects. These groups created the projects, 
organized the funding and updated the Council about their progress. States limited their 
comments to notes of support and technical suggestions for improvements. The exception was a 
2007 project by the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Improving and Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of the Arctic Council.
971
 The AAC presented a plan at the April 2007 Council 
meeting in Tromsø, Norway, that the Council initiate a task force to reform the structure of the 
Arctic Council and improve the standing of permanent participants. Russia, Iceland, the United 
States and Sweden each vetoed the proposal, content with the current structure of the Council.
972
 
States were not interested in revising the basic structure of the Council, which lead to the only 
veto of a proposed permanent participant project in the history of the Arctic Council.  
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Table 6.3: Permanent Participant Projects 
Year Sponsor Name Description Ongoing  
2005 RAIPON/GCI Indigenous Peoples 
Contaminants Action 
Program 
Training, education, removal 
and storage of pesticides and 
contaminants in Arctic 
Yes 
2006 RAIPON Sustainable 
Development of 
Indigenous Peoples of 
the Russian North 
To research and provide 
education about development 
in Russia 
Yes 
2006 AIA/CAFF Traditional Use and 
Conservation of Plants 
from the Aleutian, 
Pribilof and 
Commander Islands 
Assessment on conservation 
status of plant life on Aleutian 
Islands 
Yes 
2007 RAIPON Sacred Sites Workshop Organize workshop to promote 
conservation of culturally 
significant areas in Russia 
No 
2007 Saami Council Community-Based 
Flora and Fauna 
Monitoring 
Encourage/enable local 
monitoring of flora and fauna 
in Saami lands 
Yes 
2007 AIA/U.S.A Bering Sea Sub-
Network  
Collection of traditional 
knowledge about environment 
in Bering Sea area to assist 
PAME 
Yes 
2007 AAC/GCI Vulnerability and 
Adaptation to Climate 
Change in the Arctic  
Project to monitor caribou 
populations in 
Athabaskan/Gwich’in lands 
Yes 
2007 AAC Improving and 
Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of the 
Arctic Council 
Proposed approach to Council 
reform 
No 
2009 RAIPON/ 
Russia/ 
Norway/ 
UNEP 
Integrated Ecosystems 
Management Approach 
Strategies for ecosystem 
management in Arctic  
Yes 
2011 AIA/Saami 
Council 
Survey of Arctic 
Indigenous Marine Use 
Understand marine use in 
Aleutian/Saami lands 
Yes 
2011 ICC Biodiversity Trends 
2010 Response 
Statement on previous Council 
report, “Biodiversity Trends 
2010” 
Yes (not 
complete) 
2013 ICC “A Circumpolar-Wide 
Inuit Response to The 
AMSA” 
Inuit response to previous 
Council report, Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment 
Yes (not 
complete) 
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In terms of the third goal, the permanent participants provided contributions to Council 
projects that they did not sponsor, but they had less success than they had from 1998 to 2004. 
They contributed to five Council projects they did not sponsor, compared to six such projects 
from 1998 to 2004. First, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) 
co-chaired the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) with Norway from 2005 to 
2007.
973
 The RAIPON chaired the SDWG meetings and organized the agenda for each meeting. 
Second, the RAIPON organized a series of community workshops in Russia to communicate the 
outcomes of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and the Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program’s persistent organic pollutants program from 2004 until 2005.974 Third, the 
Saami Council organized a series of workshops in Saami territory to collect traditional 
knowledge for the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment in 2006 and 2007.
975
 Fourth, all of the 
permanent participants helped states carry out the surveys necessary to complete the Survey of 
Living Conditions in the Arctic, especially in 2010.
976
 
 Fifth, the permanent participants made a small contribution to the drafting of the Arctic 
Council search and rescue agreement. At the May 2009 Arctic Council ministerial meeting in 
Tromsø, Norway, Russia and the United States proposed that states create an agreement to co-
operate on search and rescue in the Arctic, which won support from all member states. The 
Council negotiated the agreement in a special task force at five meetings between 2009 and 
2010.
977
 The drafting of the treaty produced few disagreements between states.
978
 Permanent 
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participants did not have funding to send personnel to meetings.
979
 However, they sent some 
information to the task force about the Canadian Rangers and their response to emergencies.
980
 
The Canadian Rangers are a component of the Canadian Army that conducts patrols along 
Canada’s northernmost frontier. It largely comprises First Nations. From reviewing the 
provisions of the treaty, this information appears to have had little impact, but it nonetheless 
constitutes a contribution to a Council project.  
The permanent participants were less successful contributing to major, crosscutting 
Council projects. The major Council projects from 2005 to 2013 were as follows:  
-  The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)  
-  Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (the AMAP) working group pollution assessments 
(2005-2013) (the AMAP) 
-  Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)  
-  Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
(initiated 2009) (Task Force)  
-  Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment working group) 
-  Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)  
-  Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 
(completed 2013) (Task Force)  
-  Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)  
-  Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)  
-  Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)  
 
As previously indicated, the permanent participants only contributed to two of these projects, 
namely the search and rescue agreement as well as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. 
These are two of the Council’s most important reports. However, it is significant that they made 
only a small contribution to the most pressing work of the Council in this era. Due to lack of 
resources, the permanent participants had to prioritize their involvement and they chose to place 
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a greater focus on vital development and environmental issues in communities.
981
 Thus, the 
permanent participants determined that the major Council projects of the era did not contain a 
strong enough human security element to consider within their vital interest.  
 An exception was one major project, the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment 
(SWIPA), in which states blocked contributions from the permanent participants. Norway 
proposed a follow up to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) at the October 2005 
Council meeting in northern Russia.
982
 There was consensus among all of the Arctic states, until 
the United States exercised its veto, citing opposition to “a second ACIA.”983 Norway proposed a 
smaller-scale project at the November 2007 Council meeting in Navik, Norway, which became 
the SWIPA.
984
 The SWIPA is an environmental assessment that is similar to the ACIA, which 
tracks levels of snow cover, ice cover and permafrost in the Arctic. It is more limited in scope 
and impact than the ACIA. Discussions about the SWIPA continued at nine Council meetings 
between 2007 and 2012, with government scientists briefing the Council about the progress of 
scientific research and synthesis.
985
 The permanent participants indicated that they wanted to 
contribute traditional knowledge to the report on two occasions. The Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC) offered to contribute at the April 2008 Council meeting in Svolver, Norway, while the ICC 
and the Saami Council said they would like to contribute at the November 2008 Council meeting 
in Kautokeino, Norway. It perhaps seemed natural that since the permanent participants 
contributed to the ACIA, they would contribute to the SWIPA as well.  
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In the end, the permanent participants did not contribute to the SWIPA. Governments 
instructed researchers on the SWIPA to use only peer-reviewed academic material in the 
assessment. Thus, they did not seek information from aboriginal peoples and they did not draw 
on traditional knowledge.
986
 This move is surprising, since the ACIA included aboriginal 
traditional knowledge. Some policy-makers say that traditional knowledge can enhance scientific 
knowledge and even provide information where gaps exist.
987
 The Arctic Council ignored 
traditional knowledge because certain individuals within state governments were suspicious of 
the use of traditional knowledge. The permanent participants often rely on non-indigenous 
consultants to carry out negotiations,
 988
 which states do not trust to deliver honest traditional 
knowledge. The permanent participants failed to convince all Council states that their input on 
Arctic matters is essential.   
Funding again explains why the permanent participants could only participate in the 
Council as much as they did from 2005 until 2013. Canada is the only country that consistently 
funds the permanent participants, as it has never denied a funding request from its domestic 
aboriginal group (the ICC) and has pressured other countries to contribute more.
989
 Yet, even its 
contributions to indigenous peoples’ organizations are below expectations.990 Discussions on 
whether to increase permanent participant funding continued at every Council meeting, either 
formally or informally.
991
 For example, at the Council meeting in November 2008, the Saami 
Council stated that the Arctic Council states have an obligation to include permanent participants 
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in the Council under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
992
 At 
the May 2009 ministers meeting in Tromsø, Norway, states pledged to increase the capability of 
permanent participants to attend meetings.
993
 Nothing significant emerged from these efforts, 
which led to questions about whether states genuinely wanted to increase permanent participant 
funding.
994
 Why did states fail to support these groups consistently after 2004? The lack of 
support corresponds with the 2004 demonstration by permanent participants of their potential 
influence in their influence over the ACIA. States did not support these groups after they 
demonstrated that they could challenge state power in the Council.  
Can we argue that the influence of permanent participants increased from 2005 to 2013? 
Table 6.4 summarizes the participation by permanent participants across the Council’s history.  
Table 6.4: Permanent Participant Participation 
 1998-
2004 
2004-
2013 
RAIPON ICC SC AIA AAC GCI 
Comments per meeting 11.72 6.1 1.7 1.3 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.2 
Delegation size (example) 3.8 3.6 3.6 5.6 1.4 5.25 2.25 3.8 
Projects sponsored 5/57 
(8.8%)  
11/159 
(7%) 
4 2 1 3 2 1 
Project contributions 6 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 
Major project contributions 3/3 2/12 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Total project contributions 12/57 16/159 10 6 6 7 6 5 
Failed agency 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Successful agency 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 
 
Table 6.4 demonstrates that  the influence of permanent participants has actually decreased both 
in absolute terms and most especially in relative terms in six of the eight categories. They 
commented less in meetings, sent smaller delegations, sponsored a lesser proportion of Council 
projects and contributed to a smaller proportion of Council projects. Yet, their influence 
increased in one category: the permanent participants intervened in Council affairs to block 
action contrary to their interest in three cases. This situation was apparent in the Arctic Climate 
                                                 
992
 Ibid.  
993
 Arctic Council, The Tromsø Declaration (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2009). 
994
 Terry Fenge, representative for AAC and formerly ICC, February 21, 2013. 
  
 
286 
Impact Assessment case cited earlier, as well as two cases discussed in the following paragraphs. 
In this one category, they have gained state-like abilities in the Council, even though the Arctic 
Council rules of procedure purposely deny them a voice in consensus. Do these situations 
represent a trend? They are important because these cases represent significant, public actions on 
controversial issues. If the permanent participants had not successfully intervened, the outcome 
of three major Council decisions would be different. The earlier intervention was minor, namely 
including traditional knowledge in a relatively minor Council project. It is important not to 
overstate their influence; the influence of the permanent participants has increased according to 
one measure of influence.  
 They successfully blocked the European Union’s bid to become a permanent observer in 
the Council. There are two categories of observers in the Council: accredited observers, which 
have a standing invitation to meetings, and ad hoc observers, whose attendance states must 
approve before every meeting. The European Union has been an ad hoc observer since 2001. 
AMAP has collaborated on projects with the European Environmental Agency.
995
 The European 
Union has given many presentations at Council meetings promoting its northern policy.
996
 In 
September 2009, Finland informed the United States Department of State that the European 
Union should be an observer due to its longstanding contribution to Arctic science.
997
 Norway 
expressed interest in a greater role for observers, with a greater ability to speak in working 
groups and at meetings.
998
 The United States’ Mission to the European Union held a meeting to 
discuss European Union membership in the Arctic Council during February 2009. According to 
diplomatic cables, all of the Nordic countries supported European Union observer status, 
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including the two states that are not part of the European Union (Iceland and Norway). Denmark 
had been “difficult” but was supportive. Canada, the United States and Russia also supported the 
notion, though Russia “was most concerned.”999 The main obstacle in this meeting was 
opposition among the Inuit, though the European Union was sure it could overcome this 
problem.
1000
 Canada exercised its veto and blocked the European Union from becoming a 
permanent observer at the May 2013 Council meeting in Sweden,
1001
 due to the urging of the 
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in private consultations during this meeting. The other 
permanent participants did not oppose EU observer status, but supported the ICC. The ICC had 
made its opposition publically known prior to 2013.   
The ICC’s position resulted from the EU’s ban on the import of seal products.1002 The EU 
has a ban against the import of seal products, but has an exemption for products harvested by 
Inuit peoples. The ICC nonetheless opposed the EU ban because it hurt demand for seal 
products. As noted in Chapter 5, Europe is a major fashion centre and designers were not willing 
to incorporate seal fur into their designs as a result the stigma that a ban created. Canada allowed 
the ICC to block EU entry into the Council as part of a pattern not to publically rebuke positions 
strongly held by permanent participants. The permanent participants can block Council decisions 
if they oppose them strongly enough.
1003
 A former Canadian Senior Arctic Official said, “I can 
never recall a situation at the table where the Canadian representative contradicted what the 
permanent participant said.”1004 The Arctic Council operates by consensus, which can sometimes 
be an advantage to permanent participants because they only need to convince one Arctic state to 
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delay or prevent a decision.
1005
 In these cases, states and permanent participants generally 
undertake further discussions “in an attempt to find a consensus position.”1006 The ICC 
convinced Canada not to support European Union entry into the Arctic Council as a permanent 
observer, even though the other member states were interested in an enhanced role for the 
European Union. Would Canada have blocked European Union membership if the ICC had not 
intervened? It is likely that Canada would have accepted permanent observer status for the EU, 
due to limited legal rights that observers have in the Council.  
Second, in 2012, permanent participants demonstrated their influence by overcoming an 
attempt by Russia to ban its Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) 
group from the Arctic Council. The other Council states reaffirmed the importance of permanent 
participants in the Council, regardless of the wants of any state. In November 2012, the Russian 
Department of Justice deregistered the RAIPON. In Russia, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) must register with the government to operate; Russia can choose which non-
governmental organizations can operate. Commentators suggested that Russia deregistered the 
RAIPON due to fears over its power,
1007
 foreign influence
1008
 and links to separatist 
movements.
1009
 In addition, commentator Ron Wallace argues that Russia attempted to ban the 
RAIPON due to its opposition to “oil production on the Arctic continental shelf in areas of 
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traditional land use.”1010 Russia has a history of making sure that its non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) align with the overall goals of the state.
1011
 In the past, the Russian 
government has asked NGOs, including the RAIPON, to re-register under new and often more 
onerous regulations, a difficult task for the RAIPON.
1012
 It is likely that Russian policy-makers 
were suspicious of the RAIPON because they received support from United States and Canadian 
governments (as well as Aboriginal groups) and developed some policy positions based on that 
influence.
1013
 The RAIPON, for example, adopted calls for co-management of indigenous 
peoples’ lands based on the influence of North American aboriginal groups.1014 The influence of 
the permanent participants appeared weak, as it seemed that Russia could unilaterally block any 
permanent participant from attending Council meetings. In preparations for the next Council 
meeting in November 2012, the permanent participants privately urged states to take a stand 
against Russia. 
In preparatory meetings, permanent participants insisted that states re-affirm the 
importance of the RAIPON. States responded to Russia’s deregistration of the RAIPON from the 
Council by asserting the group’s membership in the Council, under the rules of procedure, and 
calling for its reinstatement at the domestic level. States simply refused to accept that the 
RAIPON could not be part of the Council. Senior Arctic Council officials, including Russia’s 
own Senior Arctic Official, issued a statement of support for the RAIPON at its November 2012 
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meeting.1015 Following this international rebuke, the RAIPON received registration in April 2013 
after adjusting its leadership slightly.
1016
 This example is significant for two reasons. First, it 
forced states to reaffirm the importance of permanent participants in the Arctic Council, through 
a letter of protest. Second, it forced states to acknowledge that indigenous peoples’ organizations 
are Council members, regardless of the views of one state. The permanent participants 
successfully intervened to support the membership of the RAIPON in the Council and reaffirmed 
the importance of its membership.  
In summary, from 2004 to 2013, permanent participants were increasingly able to achieve 
desirable outcomes, though they remained weaker than states. In some cases, they appeared 
strong, drawing on the influence they demonstrated in 2004 when they successfully intervened to 
create an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) policy document. A permanent participant, 
the ICC, blocked the European Union from becoming a permanent observer in the Council due to 
positions that conflicted with Inuit interests. In 2012, states re-affirmed the importance and 
independence of permanent participants when Russia tried to block the RAIPON from attending 
Council functions. They accomplished this influence by convincing states of the validity of their 
position. In other cases, they appeared weak, as they lacked funds to participate in the Council 
fully. In 2010, Canada failed to invite aboriginal groups to important international meetings. In 
2012, the Council decided to publish the SWIPA without aboriginal input or traditional 
knowledge in the final document. States limited permanent participants challenging state 
influence. The Council is state-centric, as per the assessment of authors such as Oran Young. 
Yet, the permanent participants have more influence than predicted by Jennifer McIver.  
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6.2.5 – 2014: The Future Influence of Permanent Participants 
The influence of permanent participants could increase because states increasingly 
recognize them as legitimate Council actors, along with states. Several policy-makers have 
expressed respect for the permanent participants and their contributions to the Council.
1017
 
Representatives for the permanent participants said they feel a greater level of respect from states 
in the Council. Earlier, they reported treatment similar to observers in Council meetings or 
working group meetings.1018 Such instances are becoming less frequent as permanent participants 
are increasingly treated with the same courtesy as states.1019 For example, earlier in the Council, 
states seated the permanent participants with the observers in some meetings, separated from 
state delegations. Today, permanent participants always sit at the same table as states. These 
facts indicate that states have recognized the importance of the involvement of aboriginal groups. 
States recognize that the permanent participants have a privileged place in the Council that 
observers do not have.  
Yet, the permanent participants will not become as influential as states in the Council for 
at least two reasons, aside from the fact that the legal rights of the permanent participants have 
not changed. First, all of the permanent participants face some ongoing financial problems.
1020
 
By the estimate of one representative, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) does not have 
resources to become involved in 80 per cent of Council priorities, which this thesis confirms.
1021
 
One permanent participant representative said in interviews, “We often are there to listen and 
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perhaps give very general comments.”1022 Second, they face human resource problems in that 
states have larger delegations than permanent participants can afford. At Arctic Council 
meetings, Canada and the United States may bring up to 15 delegates, while aboriginal groups 
contend with four or five. The ICC, for example, has less than 20 full-time employees in the 
entire world; with this staff, states expect them to represent people in communities spread across 
more territory than in all of Europe.
1023
 The permanent participants sometimes employ outside, 
non-aboriginal consultants to conduct their business in the Council. One former high-ranking 
official with the government of Canada reported that these consultants are sometimes “not quite 
on the same agenda as the people” for which they work, in that they express positions contrary to 
the permanent participant groups.1024 As seen in this chapter, the lack of human resources forces 
permanent participants to work together as one block. It makes sense for the permanent 
participants to work together to achieve desirable ends, though the permanent participants are not 
a monolithic group.
1025
 Many Inuit have historically relied on access to water to obtain their 
livelihood, while the Athabaskan people historically live inland; as a result, these groups 
developed different cultural traditions.
1026
 They jointly lobby for more funds, even though the 
financial needs of each group differ greatly. Overall, it is important for the permanent 
participants to be able to send representatives to meetings. There are policy makers in the 
Council who do not share same goals as permanent participants. Some policy-makers have 
condemned the morality of Aboriginals who engage in subsistence hunting or doubted whether it 
was necessary to gather the input of aboriginals on every Council project.
1027
 One remedy to the 
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situation of the permanent participants might be to work together to develop a solid agenda for 
reform of their role and resources. They should do so in such a way to attract media attention. 
Representatives from states have reported that they sometimes feel that the permanent 
participants do not give clear, workable answers when states consult about means to increase 
their role.1028 If the permanent participants constructed a clear plan and made that plan public, it 
likely would be difficult for states to ignore their requests to play a greater role in regional 
governance.  
In conclusion, the influence of the permanent participants has evolved throughout the 
history of the Arctic Council. From 1991 to 1998, aboriginal groups successfully lobbied to 
become members of the Arctic Council. Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding 
aboriginal groups to the Council as full members, to buttress bargaining power. The United 
States and Russia opposed giving such rights for fear of having their influence reduced. From 
1998 to 2004, the aboriginal groups participated in the Council to a lesser extent than states. This 
situation resulted from a lack of finances to attend and participate in Council meetings. The 
financial needs of the permanent participants differed, but all required additional funds. In 2004, 
the permanent participants demonstrated influence by successfully convincing the United States 
to adopt an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment policy document. From 2004 to 2013, the 
permanent participants demonstrated influence to achieve desirable ends in the Council when 
they only needed to convince one state to support their action, as seen in the European Union 
observer status example. They had less success when it was necessary to influence multiple 
states to change a chosen action, as seen in the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost example. The 
permanent participants did not have enough money to contribute to all Council activities. Several 
examples show their influence, such as the success of the ICC blocking European Union 
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membership in the Arctic Council. As of 2015, it is possible that the influence of the permanent 
participants will continue to increase. Permanent participants have demonstrated an ability to 
exert influence on major Council decisions, despite the restrictions on their legal rights in the 
Council. States recognize their privileged place in the Council. With limited resources and 
without voting rights, they will remain less influential than states. The influence of the 
permanent participants in the Arctic Council has evolved in two ways. First, at the onset of the 
Council, the permanent participants had little influence over outcomes. Today, they are better 
able to influence the Council when they use their agency. Second, at the onset of the Council, 
there was great debate and controversy as to whether aboriginal groups should be allowed to 
participate. Today, there is widespread acceptance of their role in the Council.  
6.3 – Analysis Using Theories of International Relations 
Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for permanent participant influence.  
H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful 
information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality 
of the information they provide.  
 
Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of permanent participants in 
the Arctic Council because the process is more political than functionalists anticipate.  They are 
not merely providers of information. They influence the operation of the Council using agency. 
States do not respond to the problems presented by permanent participants automatically. State 
delegations have rejected quality information provided by permanent participants for political 
reasons, as seen when the Council rejected including traditional knowledge in the Snow, Water, 
Ice and Permafrost assessment. They have achieved desired ends by convincing one or more 
Arctic Council countries of their position, sometimes contrary to the wishes of other states.  
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  Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence  of permanent 
participants. 
 H1: The permanent participants will not have influence in the Arctic Council and their influence 
will not evolve.  
 
Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of the permanent participants 
because it does not anticipate that the permanent participants could have any real influence over 
great powers in the Council. In fact, the permanent participants have convinced the Council to 
undertake action contrary to the desired outcomes of the United States, such as the adoption of 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) policy document. Neorealists would not anticipate 
that the permanent participants would achieve rights to challenge great powers in the Council. 
Neorealists would predict that states would work to limit the influence of the permanent 
participants. Certainly, at various times, states have resisted the permanent participants. In 
addition, neorealists cannot explain why the United States agreed to add permanent participants 
to the Council.   
Neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of permanent 
participants in the Arctic Council.  
H1: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally 
demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization, 
communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).  
 
States have usually resisted the influence of permanent participants. Canada supported adding 
permanent participants to the Council to improve its relative bargaining position, freeing 
delegations from having to represent the wishes of indigenous peoples and adding another voice 
to compete with the United States, as well as Russia. The United States resisted the permanent 
participants for fear of a challenge to their influence. It supported some role based on the 
existence of a possible norm. States have denied the permanent participants adequate funding 
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and challenged their role numerous times. However, the permanent participants exercised 
influence over the Council by winning support for an ACIA policy document and blocking 
European Union membership in the Council. The permanent participants were able to do so by 
using their agency and convincing Arctic Council member states of the validity of their position, 
as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. Functionalists would predict that states would respond to 
quality information provided by permanent participants automatically. In fact, the agency of 
permanent participants is of key importance. States have demonstrated their vulnerability to the 
power of persuasion. The permanent participants are more influential in the Council than 
neorealists would anticipate. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism does not anticipate the 
importance of domestic politics. The permanent participants won support for their position in the 
2004 ACIA policy document controversy by appealing to the United States to overrule the 
Presidential Administration. However, overall, neoliberal institutionalism does the best job 
illuminating the reasons for the influence of the permanent participants.  
The permanent participants have less of a role in the Council than states, but they have 
influence based on their agency. Agency refers to their ability to research, organize, 
communicate, lobby and ally with states. The goal of this chapter was to answer three questions. 
First, what is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? The permanent 
participants are members that have a privileged role in the Council, but they cannot vote on 
decisions. They have influence, but must exercise that influence through states. These groups 
must convince state policy-makers to adopt their desired position. Second, how has their role and 
influence evolved over time? They have grown more influential over time. They are increasingly 
able to block action contrary to their interests. Third, when are the permanent participants 
successful in exerting their influence? The permanent participants are most successful when one 
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state is blocking a desired action. Permanent participants can use their agency to convince that 
state to reverse its action. They have done so in multiple major cases. This scenario is clear when 
permanent participants convinced the United States to adopt an ACIA policy document, or 
Russia’s attempt to block the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North from the 
Council. They also are successful when they must convince one state to veto a policy action they 
do not desire. This scenario was made clear when the permanent participants convinced Canada 
to block European Union permanent observer status. They are less successful when they must 
convince multiple states to adopt their view. This scenario is clear in that permanent participants 
have been unable to build a coalition to increase their funding. It also is clear that states 
somewhat resist the growing influence of the permanent participants. None of the perspectives in 
academic literature adequately explains the influence of the permanent participants, such as Oran 
Young,
1029
 Olav Schram Stokke,
1030
 Evan T. Bloom
1031
 and Jennifer McIver.1032 
Table 6.5: Analysis 
Functionalism The permanent participants can have 
influence in the Council because they 
provide useful information that impacts 
state decision-making; their influence will 
evolve based on the quality of the 
information they provide. 
Not supported – states do not 
act on good quality 
information from permanent 
participants automatically.  
Neorealism The permanent participants will not have 
influence in the Arctic Council and their 
influence will not evolve. 
Not supported – permanent 
participants have 
demonstrated influence.   
Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
The permanent participants will be a 
secondary actor in the Arctic Council, 
occasionally demonstrating influence 
based on their agency (that is, their 
research, organization, communication, 
lobbying and coalition-building ability). 
Supported – permanent 
participants influence stems 
from agency.  
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Conclusion 
 This chapter assessed the influence and role of the permanent participants in the Arctic 
Council. The first section examined the predictions of three dominant international relations 
theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Functionalists would 
predict permanent participants could be influential if they provide the Council with good quality 
information; neorealists would predict they could have no influence. Neoliberal institutionalists 
predict that the permanent participants could have influence by persuading states of the utility of 
their views, even though states will generally resist their influence. The second section discussed 
their evolution from a weak Council actor to somewhat influential actor. The third section 
concluded that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of 
permanent participants. The permanent participants have less influence in the Council than 
states, but they can exercise influence based on their agency.  
This research has two important implications for international relations theory. First, 
there is debate about the potential influence of non-state actors. This research shows that non-
state actors can exert influence in international relations if they can exercise effective agency 
Second, it demonstrates that states are susceptible to the power of persuasion, rather than basing 
their decisions purely on rational conceptions of state interests. This finding stands in contrast 
with the expectations of rationalist theories such as functionalism. This research also has 
implications for those interested in the workings of the Council. The permanent participants are a 
crucial link between Arctic communities and the Arctic Council. This work finds that they are 
not as influential as no doubt many would like. The Council operates according to state interest, 
dominated by people who are not from the North and central governments located far away from 
northern frontiers. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that the Arctic’s economic potential has created an incentive for 
states to enhance governance through the Arctic Council. In this process, the great powers are the 
most influential actors. The goal of this concluding chapter is threefold. First, it provides a brief 
recap of the history of the Council to demonstrate the contribution of this work to the literature 
through an understanding of how the institution operates. It recasts the Council as an 
institutionally-strong, international, policy-making, research body that takes action on 
environmental and economic issues. Second, it reviews the theoretical contribution of each 
preceding chapter and demonstrates the overall theoretical contribution of this thesis. It 
concludes that neoliberal institutionalism best explains state interests in international co-
operation, but neorealism best explains outcomes. Third, this chapter points to directions for 
further research.  
7.1 – The History of the Arctic Council 
 This thesis presents a new understanding of the Arctic Council. Currently, the literature 
understands the Council as a policy-recommendation body focused on environmental 
conservation research. Authors describe it as an institutionally weak, state-centric, low-profile, 
technocratic body. This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making 
body as well as a research body focused on environmental issues and economic issues. It is 
becoming an institutionally strong, international body. It is a venue in which complex politics 
and state interests intersect. The Council also is notable because indigenous peoples 
organizations have the significant capacity to influence the institution.   
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 The Council emerged as a weak institution stemming from grand ambitions. It was 
founded as a modest institution to encourage co-operation between two former Cold War rivals. 
The capitalist and democratic United States stood in conflict with the communist Soviet Union. 
Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were on the United States’ side of the ideological divide, 
while Finland and Sweden struggled to maintain neutrality.
1033
 Finland’s government desperately 
wanted to improve relations between Russia and the United States, but it also had great concerns 
about pollution in Russia’s Arctic. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic countries shared this 
concern. Co-operation in an Arctic environmental institution would not only be a means to 
encourage greater co-operation between West and East, it also would present an opportunity to 
share information and take action to protect the Arctic environment.
1034
 The government of 
Finland hosted meetings between relevant officials in September 1989 in Rovaniemi, which led 
to three additional rounds of discussions.
1035
  
 The ultimate result of these talks was the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS) in June 1991.
1036
 The group was a venue for scientists to share information on 
Arctic environmental protection. It was not a robust institution. The AEPS led to the creation of 
the Council. Government scientists met twice each year in four working groups to share 
information and research.
1037
 Through these meetings, scientists learned of environmental and 
human security problems in Russia that led many policy-makers to wonder aloud whether an 
Arctic international institution was necessary.
1038
 Their work showed that there were large 
quantities of cancer-causing coolants stored in the Russian Arctic region and that the life 
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expectancy of Russian indigenous peoples was on the decline.
1039
 Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, particularly the Inuit Circumpolar Council under the leadership of Mary Simon, 
lobbied governments for an Arctic international institution.
1040
 This work led to the genesis of 
the Council.  
 The process to create the Council was sometimes highly political. As detailed by 
historian John English in his book, Ice and Water, the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, 
proposed an Arctic council to United States President Bill Clinton during a meeting in Ottawa in 
February 1995.
1041
 Canadian officials brought aboard the other Arctic states and organized four 
rounds of negotiations in Ottawa during 1995 and 1996.
1042
 The Canadian and Nordic 
delegations
1043
 wanted the new Council to be a strong institution able to facilitate co-operation 
on security, include a new emphasis on sustainable development and create policy, which policy-
makers from Russia and the United States resisted greatly.
1044
  The Nordic state delegations 
wanted the new institution to have a permanent secretariat, which the delegations from Canada, 
Russia and the United States could not agree to amid sovereignty concerns.
1045
 The Canadian and 
Nordic delegations sought equal membership in the institution for indigenous peoples’ 
organizations, which raised concerns over sovereignty among policy-makers from Russia and the 
United States. All of the governments involved sought to create an Arctic forum. Nordic and 
Canadian policy-makers sought a strong Council, while officials from the United States and 
Russia did not.  
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 The structure of the Council was the result of compromise. In June 1996 meetings, 
Canadian and United States policy-makers held side negotiations. The Canadians proposed a 
compromise that security would not be part of the Council’s mandate, but in exchange 
sustainable development would be and indigenous peoples’ organizations would be second-tier 
“permanent participants.”1046 The United States officials accepted, as did the other countries. The 
understanding emerged that the Council would not be a policy-making body and the secretariat 
would rotate between countries.
1047
 United States officials favoured a Council to share 
information and ensure that other international bodies did not try to interfere in regional 
politics.
1048
 Russian officials sought funding for projects it could funnel into other higher priority 
projects.
1049
 Canada and the Nordic governments mainly sought to compel Russia to face its 
environmental issues.
1050
 The Canadian government also faced pressure from its indigenous 
peoples’ organizations to create more robust international Arctic governance to improve human 
security.
1051
 The Arctic Council was intended to be a weak, environmental research body.  
 It is accurate to characterize the Council as a weak body in the early history of the 
institution. The Council negotiated its rules of procedure and formal mandate in 1997 and 1998, 
with the mission emerging that it would,  
Provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states 
. . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on 
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.
1052
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There was some debate as to the meaning of sustainable development, with states opting to avoid 
formally defining the term.
1053
 Media reports anticipated that the Council would be a robust, 
strong governance body.
1054
 Scholars who wrote during this period, such as political scientists 
Oran Young
1055
 and Rob Huebert,
1056
 disagreed with the media and understood the Council as a 
small-scale environmental research institution. Some experts, such as diplomat Evan Bloom, 
believed the permanent participants would be full participants,
1057
 which other scholars, such as 
lawyer Jennifer McIver, doubted.
1058
  
 The Council carried out environmental and sustainable development work within its 
mandate, launching 57 research projects.
1059
 Examples include the Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program, the Arctic Human Development Report and the beginnings of the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment. This situation does not indicate that matters were totally settled, as seen in 
three major instances. First, at a meeting in May 1999, security came to the forefront as the 
United States delegation suggested one of its officials brief the Council on its and Russia’s 
efforts to reduce the environmental impact of its military vehicles.
1060
 Canada’s delegation 
ultimately resisted, fed up with obstructionism by the United States and eager to get on with the 
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work of the main Council mandate.
1061
 Second, at a meeting in November 1999, the Nordic 
delegations tried to begin creating a Council policy to reduce Arctic contaminants.
1062
 
Delegations from Canada, the United States and Russia resisted, citing sovereignty concerns and 
unconvinced such action was within state interests.
1063
 Third, in October 2000, officials from 
Russia and the United States worked to quash a report that might have called for policies to deal 
with emergency situations, concerned about the implications for its sovereignty.
1064
 
 The Council began to shift in 2004 due to new research that brought Arctic 
environmental issues to the forefront. In November 2004, the Council released its Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment, which showed that climate change caused by humans was profoundly 
endangering the Arctic region.
1065
 The United States government tried to quash a policy 
document, concerned that it might have an impact on the upcoming United States presidential 
election.
1066
 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, from the Inuit Circumpolar Council, testified in March 2004 
before the United States Senate Commerce Committee about the United States’ actions, 
embarrassing its policy-makers into allowing a policy document after some further 
uncertainty.
1067
 The Council began to change. Russian delegations began to advocate that the 
Council increase its work on emergency preparedness.
1068
 The number of Council projects 
increased, from an average of 57 in 1998 to an average of 159 in 2005.
1069
 The number of major 
projects the Council undertook quadrupled, as well.
1070
 Nordic officials began to construct a pilot 
project to provide more funds to the Council, which could increase the power and robustness of 
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the institution.
1071
 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment had highlighted that climate change 
would make Arctic resources easier to exploit. Authors, namely political scientist Olav Schram 
Stokke, began to see the Council as a soft-law body, or a research institution creating 
international norms.
1072
 
 After 2008, the policy-making role and mandate of the Council increased. The United 
States and Russia sponsored an Arctic search and rescue treaty in November 2008, negotiated 
quickly in five rounds of negotiations.
1073
 In May 2011, Norway, the United States and Russia 
sponsored a similar agreement on response to oil spills, also negotiated in five rounds of non-
contentious talks.
1074
 For the first time, the Council was acting as a policy-making body as it 
created its first formal agreements. Policy-makers agreed to create these treaties because co-
operation and formal policy would benefit all states. These treaties would make the Arctic region 
safer for investment. They arose due to requests from industry for increased regulations to 
encourage regional investment amid warnings from the insurance industry that Arctic investment 
was too risky.
1075
 For the first time, the Council was working deliberately to increase the 
economic potential of the Arctic region. We see the expansion of the Council’s mandate into 
economic areas.  
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After 2008, the Council became stronger institutionally. In 2007, officials from Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden created a temporary common secretariat between the three countries for 
the six consecutive years they would be chair.
1076
 In May 2012, policy-makers decided to create 
a permanent secretariat.
1077
 Nordic policy-makers wanted a permanent secretariat so that the 
Council would be a strong international body that could hold Russia accountable for its 
environmental issues. Canadian, Russian and the United States officials were leery such a body 
would be too powerful. Authors explained that the new secretariat emerged “to face the rapidly 
changing circumstances in the Arctic that have increased the challenges and opportunities in both 
volume and complexity.” 1078 This work finds there is more to the story. By 2012, state policy-
makers became convinced they could control such an institution, assured it was necessary.
1079
  
 In 2014, the transition of the Council from an environmental body to a more 
encompassing body was furthered. The Council saw the first-ever meeting of the Arctic 
Economic Council, a new body independent of the Council designed specifically to allow 
business an opportunity to address the Council.
1080
 It was the first time the Council had taken 
such deliberate economic action, or a project without a strong environmental component.
1081
 
Also in 2014, a project support instrument became operational, after years of political haggling 
and delay.
1082
 The Council is now institutionally stronger than ever before.  
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Scholars who wrote after 2008 understood the Council to be a soft-law body that makes 
the Arctic a more international, global region. Examples include such as political scientists Timo 
Koivurova,
 1083 
Leena Heinamkai
1084
 and David L. Vanderzwaag.
1085
 This work cannot identify 
any soft law that has resulted because of work by the Arctic Council. Other work portrayed the 
Council as an environmental research body, consistent with earlier conceptions, such as work by 
Terry Fenge.
1086
 This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making 
body as well as a research body focused on environmental and economic issues, both as separate 
and interrelated functions. It is becoming an institutionally strong, policy-making, robust, 
international body.  
 Also notable after 2008 is that more actors are interested in participating in the Council. 
In 2008, six new non-Arctic states sought to become observers in the Council, such as China and 
India, creating controversy and suspicion.
1087
 The European Union was a controversial applicant, 
whose bid to become a permanent observer was blocked by Canada.  The latter’s position was in 
response to successful lobbying by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which convinced Canada that 
European Union membership was unacceptable in light of the latter’s  ban on importing seal 
products.
1088
 Political scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer argue that 
the interest among non-Arctic states in the Council is largely economic.
1089
 This work finds that 
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economics partly motivate the Arctic interests of these countries, but environmental motivations 
also are important.
1090
 It is clear that the Council has become an international body of global 
consequence.  
 A body of work emerged after 2008 that saw the Council as the antidote to every problem 
of Arctic governance.
1091
 This work finds that this literature does not fully acknowledge the 
political realities of the Council. The Council is not necessarily evolving to become an all around 
governance institution for the Arctic region to address every issue area. It is becoming a body to 
research environmental issues and encourage economic investment in the Arctic.  
 One notable finding of this work is information about levels of participation by 
permanent participants. As noted, earlier work by authors such as Evan Bloom and Jennifer 
McIver debated whether they would be full participants in the Council. Clearly, there are 
instances in which the permanent participants have used agency to achieve objectives and thwart 
the will of states, an impressive feat for non-state actors. An example is the adoption of a policy 
document as part of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Yet, the permanent participants only 
are able to contribute to about one-fifth of Council projects due to lack of funds and 
personnel.
1092
 There does not appear to be tremendous political will to fix these financial 
problems.
1093
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7.2 – Contributions to Theory 
 The thesis argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the 
evolution of the Arctic Council, though modifications are necessary. Chapter 2 examines the 
reason that the Council’s mandate is evolving. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism best 
explains the evolution of the Council’s mandate, with its emphasis on the form of negotiation 
and economic interest; however, institutional competence, as predicted by functionalists, also is 
important. State policy-makers are undertaking economic work in the Council because they all 
stand to gain by doing so. All states benefit by improving the Arctic economy, even though 
Russia likely will gain more than other states. The form of negotiation was important, as seen in 
the fact that prompting by Russian officials to increase the Council’s emphasis on emergency 
preparedness led to the growth in the institution’s mandate. Russia discussed emergency 
preparedness at several Council meetings and made the topic a theme of its turn as chair, which 
led to new work on the topic.  
 Chapter 3 examines reasons for the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role. It 
argues that neoliberal institutionalism’s focus on absolute gains explains why states want to 
create policy in the Council, but neorealist balance politics and great power predominance 
explains outcomes. All states stand to gain through the creation of agreements on search and 
rescue, as well as oil spill prevention. These treaties improve Arctic economies. However, the 
United States and Russian governments resisted all policy that would not directly benefit their 
economies, as seen, for example, in resistance to an Arctic contaminants treaty in 1999.  
 Chapter 4 examines reasons for the growth in the Council’s institutional capacity, such as 
the development of the new Council secretariat and the project support instrument.  It argues that 
neoliberal institutionalist absolute gains explain why states wanted to create a permanent 
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secretariat, but neorealism explains state hesitation. The Council’s institutional capacity has 
grown as it became clear that it was necessary to deal with the increasing complexity of the 
Council’s work. It did not occur sooner because some state governments, most importantly 
Russia and the United States, had concerns a strong Council would challenge state sovereignty.  
 Chapter 5 explains reasons for the increased interest of observers in the Council and 
examines their influence in the institution. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism explains the 
interest of observers in the Council and neorealism explains their influence. These actors are not 
as powerful as states, but aspire to influence the institution. Governments and other actors seek 
to become part of the Council to make absolute gains, such as increased economic investment. 
However, state policy-makers carefully covet power and deny it to the observers.   
 Chapter 6 probes the influence of permanent participants in the Council and argues they 
are not as influential as states, but still reasonably influential. It argues that neoliberal 
institutionalism explains the role of permanent participants in the Council. Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations can exercise influence by exercising agency. 
 Overall, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the evolution of the 
Arctic Council. In every case, an absolute gain motivated states. There is little evidence that 
states had great concern for relative gains. Evolution of the institution has not been automatic, 
but rather the result of highly political processes. Economics proved to be the major catalyst for 
evolution of the institution. Agency is important, in that it explains the influence of non-state 
actors in the Council. Three tweaks to neoliberal institutionalist theory are needed. First, state 
policy-makers are likely to want to evolve competent institutions. Thus, functionalist 
institutional competence partly explains the evolution of international institutions. This tenet 
explains why path dependence did not stifle Council evolution as neoliberal institutionalists 
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predict. Second, great power preference is more important than the interests of other states. The 
great powers demonstrated a concern for protection of their autonomy. They led evolution, such 
as was the case when Russia and the United States sponsored efforts to create an Arctic search 
and rescue treaty. This tenet of neorealism explains the outcomes of negotiations in international 
institutions, in this case. Third, state officials pay attention to regional balance in making 
decisions at the international level. Thus, balance is an important consideration for states. States 
demonstrated concern for autonomy and sovereignty in the controversy over creating the Council 
secretariat. This tenet of neorealism also explains outcomes in international decision-making, in 
this case.  
 How does this fit in with other assessments of the theory? Political scientist Michael 
Mastanduno finds that relative gain concerns are most important in explaining outcomes in 
military matters, while absolute gain concerns are more important on economic matters.
1094
 
Furthermore, political scientist Duncan Snidal finds that relative gain concerns are important in 
situations with few actors, while absolute gain concerns are important in situations with many 
actors.
1095
 This work finds absolute gain concerns explain state preferences and partly explain 
outcomes, while neorealist great power preference dynamics and balance concerns partly explain 
outcomes. Meanwhile, functionalist questions about institutional competence partly explain 
preferences and outcomes.  
7.3 – Directions for Future Research 
 There are at least six directions for further research stemming from this work. First, does 
the evolution of the Arctic Council proceed in a way that is similar to the way that other forums 
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evolve? To confirm the explanatory validity of neoliberal institutionalism, as demonstrated in 
this analysis, new research could examine two questions. First, do the prospect of economic 
gains and absolute gains inspire states to make institutions stronger in cases other than the 
Council? Secondly, can agency overcome the resistance by great powers and balance 
considerations in cases other than the Council? It could be fruitful to determine if the version of 
neoliberal institutionalism advocated in this paper is applicable in higher-profile institutions that 
deal with more difficult issues.   
 Second, new research could answer three questions to confirm the theoretical assertions 
made in this chapter. Do international institutions evolve only when their competence is 
established? Do great power preferences most frequently influence outcomes in the evolution of 
international institutions? Thirdly, do states demonstrate consideration of maintaining regional or 
global balance in patterns of international co-operation? An affirmative answer to these questions 
would strengthen the theoretical arguments made in this thesis.  
 Third, new research could answer the following question: what is the impact of domestic 
politics on the process of Council evolution? There is some evidence that domestic politics 
influenced Council evolution. The United States government resisted the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment out of concern it would impact the 2004 United States presidential election. It 
allowed a policy document after representatives from the Inuit Circumpolar Council embarrassed 
the United States. The role of the Inuit Circumpolar Council in the Canadian government during 
the 1990s in part convinced Canada that an Arctic council was necessary. There are other 
examples in this work, as well. The theories examined do not argue that domestic politics can 
greatly influence international relations and state foreign policy.  
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Fourth, research could ask the following question: where did the information about the 
economic potential of the Arctic come from and is it valid? State policy-makers are acting as 
though the economic future of the Arctic region is strong. This thesis did not probe whether these 
claims were true. There are signs that indicate this situation might not be the case. There is a lot 
of optimism about the prospect of shipping. The International Maritime Organization is 
developing new Arctic shipping regulations, anticipating a bright future for Arctic shipping.
1096
 
Still, studies from the Arctic Institute, a research think tank, find that only a few dozen ships 
utilize Arctic passages each year, namely the Northern Sea Route, considered the most promising 
sea route available.
1097
 There is a lot of interest in Arctic oil and gas resources. However, at the 
current time, Russia is the only country that produces oil from platforms in the Arctic Ocean. 
Attempts by Shell Oil to develop new offshore resources in the United States’ Arctic region have 
thus far been unsuccessful and costly.
1098
 
Fifth, further research could address the question: what is the value and worth of the 
Council? The Council is in many ways a disappointment. It has not developed strong policy to 
safeguard the Arctic environment. It was supposed to facilitate environmental action, but 
politics, interests, power concerns and economics often stifle its work. Can an institution 
motivated at least in part by economic gains be counted on to safeguard the environment? Do 
trends spell trouble ahead for Arctic environmentalists? The Council has produced good 
research, such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Is this work adequate for an 
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international institution? Further, what impact has this work had on international policy outside 
of the Council? As noted, work by Terry Fenge has highlighted how other international forums 
have used Council work to create policy.
1099
 Is this contribution widespread, or are instances 
isolated?  
Finally, this work could help answer the following questions: what should the Council 
do? How should it evolve in the future? Chapter 3 of this thesis concludes that a new conception 
of the Council’s policy-making role must recognize the highly political nature of decision-
making in the Council. What might this conception entail? It is clear that potential economic 
gains motivate action in the Council, such as growth in the institution’s mandate, growth in its 
policy-making role and institutional power. Thus, it seems that the safest course of action for 
those who advocate a role for the Council should be to emphasize the economic benefits of 
suggested evolution. Would such an approach work in reality? Environmental concerns do not 
appear to greatly motivate policy-makers in Arctic governance, nor the very real human security 
concerns of Arctic residents. The original concerns that led to the creation of the Council are not 
motivating its evolution. Is it reasonable that advocates avoid such arguments? 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation has sought to explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. At a time 
when climate change threatens the future of the planet, the Council is evolving to help states 
make economic gains and exploit Arctic resources. The Council still provides good quality 
environmental research and policy recommendations. This situation is explained in that states 
seek to make gains through international co-operation and economic growth is something on 
which all Arctic policy-makers can agree. Further, states seek to protect their position in the 
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international order and exploit their power position. For those who work in the resource industry, 
it is a good time to have an Arctic portfolio. For those who care about the Arctic environment 
and for Arctic residents, this situation could spell trouble.  
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Questions  
General 
 
How, if at all, has the Council evolved and changed during your time working for the Council? 
 
Mandate 
 
There is a case in 1999 in which Canada worked to stop discussion about a program called 
AMEC. It was a program in which the United States and Russia wanted to increase the 
environmental efficiency of their military vehicles in the Arctic. The two countries wanted to 
make a presentation about the program. Canada stopped the presentation, saying that it was a 
military matter and thus outside the prevue of the Council. Why do you think Canada would 
do that? 
 
Policy-Making 
 
The European countries seemed particularly anxious to create an Arctic contaminants treaty 
early in the Arctic Council, but Canada opposed such action. In fact, in 1999, Canada said, 
“Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.” Why do you think the 
European countries favoured strong action while Canada opposed such action? 
 
In 2000, EPPR wrote, “We have finalized the analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
agreements; we concluded that agreements in force are currently adequate.” Yet, less than a 
decade later, the Council negotiated a new protocol on oil spills. What do you think changed in 
regards to search and rescue and oil? 
 
In 2008, the United States proposed the creation of a search/rescue treaty. Were other 
countries surprised? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What obstacles 
did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty?  
We see work underway to create an “oil spill response issue.” How did states come to decide 
such a treaty was necessary? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What 
obstacles did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty? 
Institutional Capacity 
 
In the meeting notes, every country at one point or another acknowledged that the Council 
needed more stable funding. Norway, in particular, has pushed for more stable funding and has 
given a considerable amount of money to the Council. If everyone agrees the Council needs 
more stable funding, why have countries not achieved stable funding? 
 
In 2007, the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish delegations announced they would create a 
temporary permanent secretariat in Norway to be in effect during their six years as chairs. 
Why do you think they did this? 
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In 2011, why did the Council decide to create a permanent secretariat after so long without 
one? 
 
Observers 
 
Why do Council states seem reluctant to add China to the Council as a permanent observer?  
Why do certain Council states seem reluctant to add the European Union to the Council as a 
permanent observer?  
 
Permanent Participants 
 
I saw Lloyd Axworthy give a talk about the Arctic Council and he said that Canada really 
wanted the Aboriginal groups to have full membership in the Arctic Council. He said that the 
United States allowed the Aboriginal groups to be less powerful permanent participants in 
exchange that security not be an issue on the Council. Is Axworthy’s account true? Why did 
Canada want the Aboriginal groups to be full members of the Council?  
 
RAIPON was recently banished from the Council by Russia. Why do you think this happened? 
Some say it is due to a general Russian crackdown on NGOs, others say they want a more 
streamlined foreign policy or accepting foreign funding or support for Ivan Moseyev, 
supporter of Pomor brotherhood. 
 
Has the involvement of the permanent participants been beneficial for the Arctic Council? Has 
the involvement been beneficial for the organizations themselves? 
 
What are the major accomplishments of the permanent participants? 
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APPENDIX B 
The following interviewees agreed to have quotes and facts attributed to them:  
 
Name Country/Organization Department/Affiliation  
Mikael Anzén Sweden Foreign Affairs 
Tom Armstrong United States Global Change Research 
Ray Arnaudo United States State Department 
Steven Bigras Canada Canadian Polar Commission 
Christopher Cuddy Canada Aboriginal Affairs 
Ben DeAngelo United States Environmental Protection Agency 
Adele Dion Canada Foreign Affairs  
Terry Fenge ICC and AAC Consultant 
Bernard Funston Canada Northern Canada Consulting 
Chester Reimer ICC Consultant 
Sauli Rouhinen Finland Environment 
Marideth Sandler United States Government of Alaska 
Tucker Scully United States State Department 
Russel Shearer Canada Aboriginal Affairs 
Harley Trudeau Canada Government of the Yukon 
 
Interviews took place with 18 people who did not want to be identified or have quotes attributed 
to them: 
 
 A Canadian environment official 
 Two Canadian foreign affairs officials 
 A Canadian Aboriginal affairs official 
 A Danish environmental official 
 A Finnish foreign affairs official 
 Two Icelandic foreign affairs officials 
 A Norwegian foreign affairs official 
 A Norwegian environment official 
 A Russian government official 
 A Russian scientist 
 A United States State Department Official 
 A United States Department of the Interior official 
 Four United States environmental official 
 
  
  
 
319 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Theory  
 
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998): 3-32. 
 
Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner. “Theories of European 
Integration: A Critique.” In A Ruined Fortress?: Neoliberal Hegemony and 
Transformation in Europe, edited by Alan W. Cafruny and Magnus Ryner, 17-46. 
Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003. 
 
Ashley, Richard K. “The Poverty of Neorealism.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by 
Robert O. Keohane, 255-300. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
 
Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. “Achieving Co-operation under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions.” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-254. 
 
Baldwin, David A. “Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics.” In Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by David A. Baldwin, 3-25. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
Burchill, Scott. “Realism and Neo-Realism.” In Theories of International Relations, edited by 
Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, 67-92. London: Macmillan Press, 1996. 
 
Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” Political Science and Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 
823-830.  
 
Deutsch, Karl W. “Medieval Unity and the Economic Conditions for an International 
Civilization.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 10, no. 1 
(1944): 18-35. 
 
Donnelly, Jack. “The Ethics of Realism.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, 
edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 150-162. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008 
 
Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt. “Realism.” In The Globalization of World Politics, third 
edition, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, 161-184. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norms Dynamics and Political Change.” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 12, 
no. 2 (2006): 219-245. 
 
  
 
320 
Gilpin, Robert. “A Realist Perspective on International Governance.” In Governing 
Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, edited by Anthony McGrew 
and David Held, second edition, 237-248. London: Polity Press, 2002.  
 
Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507. 
Grieco, Joseph. “Modern Realist Theory and the Study of International Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century.” In Millenial Reflects on International Studies, edited by Michael Brecher and Frak 
P. Harvey, 65-78. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 
Grieco, Joseph, Robert Powell and Ducan Snidal. “The Relative-Gains Problem for International 
Co-operation.” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 727-743. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. “The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America.” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 5, no. 4 (1967): 315-343. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration.” International 
Organizations 30, no. 2 (1976): 173-212. 
 
Imber, Mark. “Functionalism.” In Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global 
Governance, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew, 290-305 (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Polity, 2002). 
 
Keohane, Robert O. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies 
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1988): 379-396. 
 
Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory: Response to 
John Mearsheimer." International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39-51. 
 
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. Power and Independence. Second edition. New York: Harper 
Collins, 1989. 
 
Lamy, Steve L. “Chapter 7: Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-
Liberalism.” In the Globalization of World Politics, fifth edition, edited by John Baylis 
and Steve Smith, 114-229. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Mastanduno, Michael. “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial 
Policy.” In Neorealism and Neoliberalism, edited by David Baldwin, 3-25. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, 
no. 3 (1995): 5-49. 
 
Mitrany, David. “The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional.” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 4, no. 2 (1965): 119-149. 
 
  
 
321 
Nye, Joseph. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. New York: 
Routledge, 2004. 
 
Popper, Karl. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1972.  
 
Powell, Robert. “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” In Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by David Baldwin, 209-233. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
Snidal, Duncan. “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation.” In Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism, edited by David Baldwin, 170-208. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Tansey, Oisin. “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling.” 
PS: Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 765-772. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Progressive Power of Realism.” American Political Science Review 91, 
no. 4 (1997): 932-935. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. The Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
   
Arctic Council Literature 
 
Bailes, Alyson J.K. “Understanding the Arctic Council: A ‘Sub-Regional’ Perspective.” Journal 
of Military and Strategic Studies 15. No 2 (2013): 31-49. 
 
Bloom, Evan T. “Establishment of the Arctic Council.” The American Journal of International 
Law 93, no. 3 (1999): 712-722. 
 
Byers, Michael. Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Agenda for the Arctic Council. Ottawa, 
Ontario: Rideau Institute, 2012. 
 
Canada Centre for Global Security Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs and the Walter 
and Duncan Gordon Foundation. Rethinking the Top of the World: The Arctic Council. 
Toronto, Ontario: Canada Centre for Global Security Studies at the Munk School of 
Global Affairs and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2011. 
 
Cedar, Oded. “The Arctic Council: Gatekeeper or Doormat to the World’s Next Major Resource 
Battle?” Sustainable Development Law and Policy 12, no. 1 (2011): 40, 51, 61, 67. 
 
Charron, Andrea. “Canada and the Arctic Council.” International Journal 67, no. 3 (2012): 775-
783. 
 
Dodds, Klaus J. “Chapter 1: Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-Emption, 
Precaution and Preparedness.” In The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic 
  
 
322 
Governance, edited by Thomas S. Axworthy, Timo Koivurova and Waliul Hasanat, 1-28. 
Toronto, Ontario: The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, the Munk School of 
Global Affairs and Arctic Centre, 2012. 
 
English, John. Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council. Toronto, Ontario: Allen 
Lane, 2013.  
 
Fenge, Terry. “The Arctic Council: Past, Present and Future Prospects with Canada in the Chair 
from 2013 to 2015.’ Northern Review 37 (2013_: 7-35.  
 
Fenge, Terry. “Canada and the Arctic Council: Our Turn to Conduct the Arctic Orchestra.” 
Policy Options, April 2012, 63-67. 
 
Griffiths, Franklyn. Towards A Canadian Arctic Strategy. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian 
International Council, 2009. 
 
Huebert, Rob. “New Directions in Circumpolar Co-operation: Canada, the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council.” Canadian Foreign Policy 5, no. 2 (1998): 
37-57.  
 
Huebert, Rob and Brooks B. Yeager. A New Sea: The Need For A Regional Agreement on 
Management and Conservation of the Arctic Marine Environment. Oslo, Norway: World 
Wildlife Fund, 2008.  
 
Kao, Shih-Ming, Nathaniel S. Pearre and Jeremy Firestone. “Adoption of the Arctic Search and 
Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime Toward a Hard Law Basis?” Marine 
Policy 36, (2012): 832-838. 
 
Koivurova, Timo. “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of 
Arctic Governance.” Polar Record 46, no. 2 (2010): 145-156. 
 
Koivurova, Timo and Leena Heinamaki. “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in 
International Norm-Making in the Arctic.” Polar Record 42, no. 2 (2006): 101-109. 
 
Koivurova, Timo and Erik J. Molenaar. International Governance and the Regulation of the 
Marine Arctic: Overview and Gap Analysis. Oslo, Norway: World Wildlife Fund, 2009.  
 
Koivurova, Timo and David L. Vanderzwaag. “The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and 
Prospects.” UBC Law Review 40, no. 1 (2006): 121-194. 
 
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. From Polar Race To Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada 
and the Circumpolar World. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian International Council, 2009. 
 
Manicom, James and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. East Asian States, The Arctic Council and 
International Relations in the Arctic. CIGI Policy Brief no. 26, April 2013. Waterloo, 
Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013. 
  
 
323 
 
McIver, Jennifer. “Environmental Protection, Indigenous Rights and the Arctic Council: Rock, 
Paper, Scissors on the Ice?” Geographical International Environmental Law Review 10, 
no. 147 (1997): 147-168. 
 
The Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program. Canada as an Arctic Power: Preparing for the 
Canadian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2013-2015. Toronto, Ontario: Munk 
School of Global Affairs and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2012. 
 
Pedersen, Torbjorn. “Debates Over the Role of the Arctic Council.” Ocean Development and 
International Law 43, no. 2 (2012): 146-156. 
 
Ramos, Belén Sánchez. “Strengthening the Capacity of the Arctic Council: Is the Permanent 
Secretariat a First Step.” In Arctic Yearbook 2013, edited by Lassi Heininen, 264-279. 
Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum, 2013. 
 
Ronson, Alison. “Political Climate Change: The Evolving Role of the Arctic Council.” Northern 
Review 33 (2011): 95-111. 
 
Scrivener, David. “From Ottawa to Iqaluit: Towards Sustainable Arctic Co-Operation?” 
Environmental Politics 7, no. 4 (1998): 136-141. 
 
Stenlund, Peter. “Lessons in Regional Co-operation from the Arctic.” Oceans and Coastal 
Management 45 (2002): 835-839.  
 
Stokke, Olav Schram. “A Legal Regime for the Arctic?: Interplay with the Law of the Sea 
Convention.” Marine Policy 31, no. 4 (2007): 402-408.  
 
Schram Stokke, Olav. “Arctic Stakes and Arctic Governance.” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 
(2014): 770-783.  
 
Stokke, Olav Schram. “Examining the Consequences of Arctic Institutions.” International Co-
operation and Arctic Governance, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Honneland, 
13-26. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Tennberg, Monica. Arctic Environmental Co-operation: A Study in Governmentality. New York: 
Ashgate, 2000. 
 
Vigeland Rottem, Svein. “The Arctic Council and the Search and Rescue Agreement: The Case 
of Norway.” Polar Record 50 (2013): 284-292. 
 
Young, Oran R. “The Age of the Arctic.” Foreign Policy no. 61 (1985): 160-179. 
 
Young, Oran. “The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change.” International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24, no. 2 (2009): 423-443.  
 
  
 
324 
Young, Oran R. “Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and 
Next Steps.” Polar Journal 2, no. 2 (2012); 291-407. 
 
Young, Oran. “Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Co-operation.” 
Global Governance 11, no. 1 (2005): 9-15. 
 
Young, Oran. “Whither the Arctic? Conflict of Co-operation in the Circumpolar North.” Polar 
Record 45, no. 232, no. 1 (2009): 73-82.  
 
Primary Documents 
 
The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. “Documents.” Publications Online, 2012. 
http://www.amap.no/ (accessed March 1, 2013). 
 
The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. PCB in the Russian Federation: Inventory 
and Proposals for Priority Remedial Actions. Oslo, Norway: Arctic Council, 2000. 
 
Arctic Athabaskan Council. Letter to Prime Minister Stephen Harper – April 26, 2011. 
Whitehorse, Yukon: Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2011. 
 
Arctic Athabaskan Council. Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council: A 
Discussion Paper. Whitehorse, Yukon: Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2007). 
 
Arctic Athabaskan Council. RE: Oil Pollution in the Arctic Marine Environment. Whitehorse, 
Yukon: Arctic Athabaskan Council, 2011. 
 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Policy Document. 
Reykjavik, Iceland: Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2004. 
 
Arctic Council. Activities. Fairbanks, Alaska: April Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic. Nuuk, Greenland: Arctic Council, 2011. 
 
Arctic Council. Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic. Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2003. 
 
Arctic Council. “Aleut International Association.” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/aleut-
international-association-aia (accessed May 21, 2013).  
 
Arctic Council. “Arctic Athabaskan Council.” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/arctic-
athabaskan-council-aac (accessed May 21, 2013).  
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: Impacts of a Warming Climate. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
  
 
325 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic. Barrow, Alaska: 
Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Khanty-Mansiysk,  Russia, 
October 12-14, 2005: Minutes. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Inari, Finland, October 7-8, 
2002. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2002. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Oulu, Finland, May 15-16, 
2002: Minutes. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2002. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, April 9-10, 
2003: Minutes. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2003. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Reykjavik, Iceland, November 
22-23, 2004. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2004. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Svartsengi, Iceland, 23-24 
October, 2003. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2003. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Tromsø, Norway, 12-13 April 
2007. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2007. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 
2005: Minutes. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies. Tromsø. Norway: Arctic 
Council Secretariat, 2013. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Meeting, Espoo, Finland, November 6-7, 
2001: Minutes. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2001. 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials’ Meeting, Rovaniemi, Finland, June 12-
13, 2001. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2001. 
 
Arctic Council. “Arctic Economic Council.” Arctic Economic Council, January 28, 2014. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/aec (accessed July 
17, 2014). 
 
Arctic Council. Arctic Human Development Report. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council 
Secretariat, 2004. 
 
  
 
326 
Arctic Council. “Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.” Working Groups, April 15, 
2011. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/arctic-
monitoring-and-assessment-programme-amap (accessed July 11, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. “Arctic Pollution Prevention and Mitigation Fund Becomes Operational.” Arctic 
Council News, March 13, 2014. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/resources/news-and-press/news-archive/851-arctic-pollution-
prevention-and-mitigation-fund-becomes-operational (accessed June 16, 2014). 
 
Arctic Council. Barrow Declaration. Barrow, Alaska: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Chronological List of Meetings. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 
2012.   
 
Arctic Council. “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna.” Working Groups, April 15, 2013. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/conservation-of-
arctic-flora-and-fauna-caff (accessed July 11, 2013 
 
Arctic Council. Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Arctic Council Working Group Report 
to Senior Arctic Officials, Fairbanks, April 26-28, 2000. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic 
Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Deputy Ministers Meeting, May 2012. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council. 2012.   
 
Arctic Council. “EBM Experts Group.” Expert Groups, December 20, 2011. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/expert-groups (accessed July 17, 
2014). 
 
Arctic Council. “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response.” Working Groups, April 
15, 2013. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-
groups/emergency-prevention-preparedness-and-response-eppr (accessed July 11, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. The Future of Children and Youth of the Arctic: Report and Work Plan for 2000-
2002. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000 
 
Arctic Council. “History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants.” Arctic Peoples, 2012. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/568-
history-of-the-arctic-council-permanent-participants (accessed January 14, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. “Gwich’in Council International.” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/gwich-in-
council-international (accessed May 21, 2013).  
 
Arctic Council. The Inari Declaration. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2002. 
 
  
 
327 
Arctic Council. Interim Implementation Plan for Phase 2 of the Multilateral Co-operative 
Project for Phase-Out of PCB Use, and Management of PCB-Contaminated Wastes in 
the Russian Federation. Fairbanks, Alaska: April Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. “Inuit Circumpolar Council.” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/inuit-
circumpolar-council (accessed May 21, 2013). 
  
Arctic Council. The Iqaluit Declaration. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1998. 
 
Arctic Council. Joint Communique of the Governments of the Arctic Countries. Ottawa, Ontario: 
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1996. 
   
Arctic Council. The Kiruna Declaration. Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2011.  
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Deputy Ministers, Copenhagen, 27 May 2010, Final Report. Tromsø: 
Arctic Council Secretariat, 2010. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 12-13 November 2009, 
Copenhagen. Tromsø: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2009. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 19-20 November 2008, 
Kautokeino, Norway. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2008. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Lulea, 8-9 November 2011, Final Report. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2011. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 28-29 November 2007, Narvik, 
Norway. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2007.   
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 23-24 April 2008, Svolver, 
Norway. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2008. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Stockholm, 28-29 March 2012: Final Report. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2012.   
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials Final Report, 19-20 October 2010, Torshavn. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2010. 
 
Arctic Council. Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Stockholm, 28-29 March 2012: Final Report. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2012.   
 
Arctic Council. Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting, Barrow, Alaska, U.S.A., October 12-
13, 2000. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. The Nuuk Declaration. Tromsø. Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2011. 
  
 
328 
 
Arctic Council. “Observers.” About Us, April 27, 2011. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers (accessed July 17, 2014). 
 
Arctic Council. The Ottawa Declaration. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1996. 
 
Arctic Council. PAME Report to Senior Arctic Officials, Fairbanks, Alaska, April 27-28, 2000. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Participant List, Arctic Council’s SDWG and SAO Meeting, 13-16 May 2002, 
Oulu, Finland. Oulu, Finland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Participant List, Arctic Council’s SAO Meeting, 12-13 June 2001, Rovaniemi, 
Finland. Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. “Past Task Forces.” Task Forces, November 4, 2013. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces/811-past-task-forces 
(accessed July 17, 2014). 
 
Arctic Council. “Permanent Participant Article Series: The Saami Council.” Arctic Peoples, 
2012. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/589-
permanent-participant-article-series-saami-council (accessed January 14, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. “Permanent Participant Article Series: RAIPON.” Arctic Peoples, 2012. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/596-
permanent-participant-article-series-raipon (accessed January 14, 2013).  
 
Arctic Council. “Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment.” Working Groups, April 15, 
2013. http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/protection-
of-the-arctic-marine-environment-pame (accessed July 11, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. Report EPPR Working Group to the SAO meeting in Fairbanks 26-28 April 
2000. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Report of Senior Arctic Officials to the Ministers to the Fifth Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting. Salekhard, Russia: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2006. 
 
Arctic Council. Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting. Reykjavik, Iceland: Arctic Council, 2004.   
 
Arctic Council. Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers: Barrow, Alaska, 
United States of America, October 12, 2000. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council 
Secretariat/Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers. Inari, Finland: 
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2002. 
  
 
329 
 
Arctic Council. Rules of Procedure. Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998. 
 
Arctic Council. The Salekhard Declaration. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council 2006. 
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Fairbanks, Alaska, April 27-28, 2000. Tromsø, 
Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Officials Meeting, Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.A., May 5-6, 1999. 
Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1999. 
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Officials Meeting Highlights, November 17-19, 1999, Washington, 
D.C., U.S.A. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 1999. 
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Official Report to Ministers, Kiruna, Sweden, 15 May 2013. 
Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2013.  
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers, Nuuk, Greenland, May 2011. Nuuk, 
Greenland: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2011. 
 
Arctic Council. Senior Arctic Official Report to Ministers, Tromsø, Norway, April 2009. Tromsø, 
Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2009. 
 
Arctic Council. “Sustainable Development Working Group.” Working Groups, April 14, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sustainable-
development-working-group-sdwg (accessed July 11, 2013). 
 
Arctic Council. “Task Forces of the Arctic Council.” Task Forces, December 29, 2011. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces 
(accessed July 17, 2014). 
 
Arctic Council. Terms of Reference for a Sustainable Development Program. Tromsø, Norway: 
Arctic Council Secretariat, 2000. 
 
Arctic Council. The Tromsø Declaration. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 2009. 
 
Arctic Council. Vision for the Arctic. Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2013. 
 
Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat. Terms of Reference and Procedural Guidelines. 
Espoo, Finland: IPS Board, 2001. 
 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic 
Environment. Rovaniemi, Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991. 
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. Arctic Biodiversity Assessment: 
Status and Trends in Arctic Biodiversity. Odder, Denmark: Narayana Press, 2013. 
  
 
330 
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “About. ” Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment, 2013. http://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/about/authors (accessed September 9, 
2014). 
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “Acknowledgments.” Arctic 
Biodiversity Assessment, 2013. 
http://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/about/acknowledgements (accessed September 9, 2014). 
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “CAFF Assessments.” 
Assessments, 2013. http://www.caff.is/assessments (accessed March 1, 2013).  
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “Monitoring: The Circumpolar 
Biodiversity Monitoring Programme (CBMP).” Monitoring, 2013. 
http://www.caff.is/monitoring (accessed July 12, 2013). 
 
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “Policy.” Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment, 2013. http://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/policy (accessed September 9, 2014). 
 
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. “Press Release: Governments Must 
Strengthen the Arctic Council.” Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 
News & Activities, September 4, 2012. 
http://www.arcticparl.org/announcements.aspx?id=5286 (accessed January 7, 2013). 
 
The Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response Working Group. “Exercises.” 
Completed Projects, 2013. http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/completed-work/exercises/ 
(accessed March 1, 2013). 
 
The Emergency Preparedness, Prevention and Response Working Group. “Safety Projects, Map 
Products and Other Work.” Completed Projects, 2013. http://www.arctic-
council.org/eppr/completed-work/auto-draft/ (accessed March 1, 2013).  
 
Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSELS261_a. 
 
Diplomatic Cable, Department of State, February 24, 2009, 09BRUSSELS261_ . 
 
Diplomatic Cable, October 21, 2008, 08STATE111997_a. 
 
Diplomatic Cable, September 10, 2009, 09HELSINKI337_a. 
 
Government of Canada. Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council Program 
During Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15). Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2013. 
 
Haavisto, Pekka. Review of the Arctic Council Structures. Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council, 
2001. 
 
  
 
331 
The Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation. “New agreements pave the way for 
environmental co-operation in the Arctic.” NEFCO News, March 3, 2014. 
http://www.nefco.org/news/new_agreements_pave_the_way_for_environmental_co_oper
ation_in_the_arctic (accessed June 16, 2014). 
 
The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group. “About AMSA.” AMSA, 
2013. http://www.pame.is/about-amsa (accessed March 1, 2013). 
 
The Sustainable Development Working Group. “SDWG Project Reports.” Activities and 
Projects, 2011. http://www.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=23 (accessed March 1, 2013). 
 
The Sustainable Development Working Group. Sustainable Development Working Group 
Human Health Project Proposal. Barrow, Alaska: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 
2000. 
 
United Nations. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. New York: 
United Nations, 2006. 
 
United States. “United States Arctic Policy.” National Security Decision Directive 90, April 14, 
1983. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-090.htm (accessed September 2, 2014) 
 
Watt-Cloutier, Sheila. “Written Testimony of Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference, Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
Transportation Hearing on Climate Change.” Inuit Circumpolar Conference Media and 
Reports, March 3, 2004. http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=256&Lang=En 
(accessed May 14, 2014) 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Agence-France-Presse, news brief, September 19, 1996. 
 
Aleutian International Association. “About Us.” About Us, 2014. http://www.aleut-
international.org/Page1.html (accessed June 16, 2014). 
 
Alexeev, Igor. “Russia’s Arctic, NATO and Norway: A Post-Kirkenes Political Landscape.” 
Barents Observer, June 20, 2013. 
 
Arctic Athabaskan Council. “About Us.” About Us, 2014. 
http://www.arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/?q=about (accessed June 16, 2014).  
 
Arctic Bulk. “Northern Sea Route: A Shortcut Between Asia and Europe.” Arctic Bulk, 2014. 
http://www.arcticbulk.com/article/186/NORTHERN_SEA_ROUTE (accessed June 26, 
2014). 
 
Arctic Portal. “Agreement to Sign Oil Spill Response Treaty.” October 12, 2012.  
http://arcticportal.org/news/23-energy-news/861-agreement-to-sign-oil-spill-response-
treaty (accessed October 17, 2012). 
  
 
332 
 
Associated Press. “Arctic Council Grants China, Japan Observer Status.” May 15, 2013. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-council-grants-china-japan-observer-status-
1.1375121 (accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Axworthy, Lloyd and Mary Simon. “Is Canada Undermining the Arctic Council?” Globe and 
Mail, March 4, 2015. 
 
Axworthy, Lloyd. “Circumpolar Challenges Conference – Video of the September 27 Event.” 
Rideau Institute, November 22, 2012. 
http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/2012/11/22/circumpolar-challenges-conference-video-of-
the-september-27-event/ (accessed January 13, 2014). 
 
Barthos, Gordon. “New Envoy Tackles Challenge of Canada’s Last Frontier.” Toronto Star, 
November 25, 1994. 
 
Bell, Jim. “Aglukkaq Stresses People-First’ Approach to Arctic Council.” Nunatsiaq Online, 
October 29, 2012. 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674aglukkaq_stresses_people-
first_approach_to_arctic_council/%22%20%5Cl%20%22.UI_rp6KPjd8.twitter (accessed 
November 5, 2012). 
 
Bennett, Mia. “Arctic Council Finds Permanent Housing in Tromsø, Norway.” Alaska Dispatch, 
June 12, 2013. http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130612/arctic-council-finds-
permanent-housing-troms-norway (accessed July 2, 2013). 
 
Bennett, Mia. “China-Russia Gas Deal Creates Arctic Winners and Losers.” Alaska Dispatch 
News, July 5, 2014. http://www.adn.com/article/20140705/china-russia-gas-deal-creates-
arctic-winners-and-losers (accessed November 13, 2014).   
 
Bevington, Dennis. “Harper Should Have Appointed Foreign Affairs Minister to Head Up Arctic 
Council.” Hill Times Online, November 5, 2012. http://www.hilltimes.com/policy-
briefing/2012/11/05/harper-should-have-appointed-foreign-affairs-minister-to-head-up-
arctic/32676#.UJf9iYE65dw.twitter (accessed January 8, 2013). 
 
Blanchfield, Mike. “Clinton Rebukes Canada and Leaves Arctic Summit.” Canadian Press, 
March 30, 2010. 
 
Byers, Michael. Intent for a Nation: What is Canada For? Vancouver, British Columbia: 
Douglas & McIntyre, 2007. 
 
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. “Arctic Council: Canada Prepared For A New Era in 
Circumpolar Relations.” Northern Perspectives 19, no. 2 (1991): 
http://www.carc.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=174 
(accessed July 2, 2014).  
 
  
 
333 
Canadian Press. “Eight Nations Form Council to Protect, Develop Arctic.” Globe and Mail, 
September 20, 1996. 
 
CBC News. “Canada Focuses on Development at Arctic Council; Experts Fear Wrong 
Approach.” December 3, 2012, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2012/12/03/north-canada-arctic-council.html 
(accessed December 4, 2012). 
CBC News. “Nunavut Hunters Pull Helicopter Pilot from Icy Water.” January 9, 2013. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nunavut-hunters-pull-helicopter-pilot-from-icy-
water-1.1313266 (accessed November 26, 2013). 
CBC News. “EU Seal Product Ban Upheld in WTO Appeal.” May 22, 2014. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/eu-seal-product-ban-upheld-in-
wto-appeal-1.2650791 (accessed November 11, 2014). 
CBC News. “Search Underway for Baker Lake Man.” November 19, 2013. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/search-underway-for-baker-lake-man-1.2432051 
(accessed November 26, 2013). 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Arctic Horizons: Views from the Department of 
Defense and State on Future Opportunities in the Arctic.” CSIS Arctic Horizons, June 29, 
2011, http://csis.org/event/arctic-horizons (accessed August 4, 2011). 
 
Chen, Stephen. “Major Win For Ministry as China Joins Arctic Council.” South China Morning 
Post, May 19, 2013. 
 
Crary, David. “Eight Arctic Nations Band Together to Combat Pollution.” Associated Press, 
September 19, 1996. 
 
Curtis, Glenn E., editor. Russia: A Country Study. Washington: Library of Congress, 1996. 
Available:  http://countrystudies.us/russia/58.htm. 
 
Digges, Charles. “Russia Strangles International Indigenous Peoples Organization as War on 
NGOs Continues.” Bellona, November 15, 2012. 
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2012/raipon_closure (accessed January 9, 2013). 
 
Duggal, Sneh. “EU Head Accuses Inuit Group Official of ‘EU Bashing.’ ” The Embassy, 
October 10, 2012. http://www.embassynews.ca/news/2012/10/02/eu-head-accuses-inuit-
group-official-of-%e2%80%98eu-bashing%e2%80%99/42561 (accessed January 7, 
2013). 
 
Eade, Deborah. Capacity Building: An Approach to People-Centered Development. Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxfam, 1997. 
 
The Economist. “POP Goes The Theory.” The Economist, June 7, 2001. 
  
 
334 
 
Emmerson, Charles et. al. Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North. London, 
England: Chatham House and Lloyds, 2012. 
 
Environment Canada. “Sustainable Development.” Sustainable Development, July 7, 2014. 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/ (accessed July 22 2014). 
 
Gordon Foundation. A Brief History of the Creation of the Arctic Council. Toronto, Ontario: 
Gordon Foundation, 2010. 
 
George, Jane. “Arctic Council Officials Call for Reinstatement of Russian Indigenous Org.” 
Nunatsiaq News, November 15, 2012. 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_calls_for_russian_indi
genous_orgs_return/ (accessed January 9, 2013). 
 
Gwich’in Council International. “Gwich’in Council International.” About the GCI, 2014. 
http://www.gwichin.org/ (accessed June 16, 2014).  
 
Fakuda-Parr, Sakiko, Carlos Lopes and Khalid Malik. “Institutional Innovations for Capacity 
Development.” In Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems, edited by 
Sakiko Fakuda-Parr, Carlos Lopes and Khalid Malik, 1-21. New York: Earthscan 
Publications/United Nations Development Programme, 2002. 
 
Holter, Mikael. “Norway Embraces Chinese Cash in Race for Arctic Oil Resources.” Bloomberg 
News, November 12, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-
12/norway-embraces-chinese-cash-in-race-for-arctic-energy-riches (accessed March 9, 
2015).  
Huebert, Rob. Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World. 
Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009. 
Humpert, Matt. “Arctic Shipping: An Analysis of the 2013 Northern Sea Route Season.” The 
Arctic Institute, October 31, 2014. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/10/NSR-
Shipping-Report.html (accessed December 10, 2014). 
 
Humpert, Malte and Andreas Raspotnik. “The Future of Arctic Shipping.” Arctic Institute, 
October 11, 2012. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/10/the-future-of-arctic-
shipping.html (accessed January 8, 2013). 
 
Katakey, Rakteem and Will Kennedy. “Russia Lets China Into Arctic Rush As Energy Giants 
Embrace.” Bloomberg, March 25, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-
25/russia-cuts-china-into-arctic-oil-rush-as-energy-giants-embrace.html (accessed 
November 13, 2014) 
 
Keil, Kathrin and Andreas Raspotnik. “The Myth of Arctic Shipping – Why the Northern Sea 
Route is Still of Limited Geo-Economic Importance.” The Arctic Institute, September 8, 
  
 
335 
2013. http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/09/the-myth-of-arctic-shipping-why_8.html 
(accessed September 10, 2013). 
 
Korea Herald. “Asia Eyes New Shipping Routes As Arctic Ice Melts.” May 20, 2012.  
 
Koring, Paul. “Canada Signals New Era for Arctic Council.” Globe and Mail, May 15, 2013. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-signals-new-era-for-arctic-
council/article11951388/ (accessed November 10, 2014).  
 
Krauss, Clifford. “Shell Submits A Plan For New Exploration of Alaskan Arctic Oil.” New York 
Times, August 28, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/business/shell-submits-a-
plan-for-new-alaskan-arctic-oil-exploration.html?_r=0 (accessed December 10, 2014). 
 
Levring, Peter. “Simply Not Realistic: Greenland Abandons Dream of Raking In Oil Riches.” 
Financial Post, January 12, 2015. http://business.financialpost.com/2015/01/12/simply-
not-realistic-greenland-abandons-dream-of-raking-in-oil-riches/#__federated=1 (accessed 
March 9, 2015).  
 
Manicom, James and Whitney Lackenbauer. “Arctic Council Warms Toward Asia.” Open 
Canada, May 15, 2013. http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2013/05/arctic-council-warms-
toward-asia (accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Menon, Meena and Sandeep Dikshit. “India Gets Observer Status in Arctic Council.” The Hindu, 
May 16, 2013. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/india-gets-observer-
status-in-arctic-council/article4717770.ece (accessed November 10, 2014);  
 
Myers, Steven Lee. “Arctic Council Adds Six Nations as Observer States, Including China.” 
New York Times, May 15, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-six-members-
including-china.html?_r=0 (accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Myers, Steven Lee. “Co-operation is Pledged by Nations of the Arctic.” New York Times, May 
12, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13arctic.html (accessed July 
19, 2011). 
 
Nicholls, R. J. et. al. Ranking of the World’s Cities Most Exposed to Coastal Flooding Today 
and in the Future. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2007. 
   
Nilsen, Thomas and Trude Pettersen. “Oslo: Moseev Case Raises Concern.” Barents Observer, 
November 10, 2012. http://barentsobserver.com/en/society/oslo-moseev-case-raises-
concern-10-11 (accessed January 9, 2013). 
 
Nunatsiaq News. “Nunavut MP Picks Iqaluit for Arctic Economic Council’s Founding Meeting.” 
July 10, 2014. 
  
 
336 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavut_mp_picks_iqaluit_for_arctic
_economic_councils_founding_meeting/ (accessed July 17, 2014). 
 
Osthagen, Andreas. “In or Out Sympolism of the EU in the Arctic.” The Arctic Institute, 2013. 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/in-or-out-symbolism-of-eus-arctic.html 
(accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Palmer, Randall. “Arctic States Joint to Try to Protect Environment.” Reuters, September 19, 
1996. 
 
Reardon, Sara. “China Gains Observer Status on Arctic Council.” New Scientist, May 17, 2013. 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23553-china-gains-observer-status-on-the-arctic-
council.html#.VGEIcEtFON8 (accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Roach, John. “Who’s Driving That Tanker? New Polar Code For Sailing Emerges.” NBC News, 
August 23, 2014. http://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/whos-driving-tanker-
new-polar-code-sailing-emerges-n186106 (accessed December 10, 2014).  
 
Paehlke, Robert C. Some Like It Cold: The Politics of Climate Change in Canada. Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2008. 
 
Rekacewicz, Philippe. “Nuclear Activities in the Arctic Over the Last 50 Years.” United Nations 
Environmental Programme, 2006. http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/nuclear-
activities-in-the-arctic-over-the-last-50-years_12df# (accessed November 21, 2013). 
 
Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. “Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.” Ocean Development and 
International Law 42, no. 4 (2011): 368-382. 
 
Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. Multilateral Code to Govern Arctic Offshore Resource Development 
Toronto, Ontario: Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, Trinity 
College, University of Toronto, 2014. 
 
Rosborou, Linda. “Arctic Council a Lifesaver.” Winnipeg Free Press, September 23, 1996. 
 
Schneider, Greg and Renae Merle. “Reagan’s Defence Buildup Bridged Military Eras.” 
Washington Post, June 9, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A26273-2004Jun8.html  (accessed June 9, 2014). 
 
Schneider, Howard. “Facing World’s Pollution in the North: An Arctic Council is Created to 
Protect Native People, Wildlife.” Washington Post, September 21, 1996. 
 
Schneider, Howard. “Pollution Piercing ‘Ice Curtain’ of the North.” Washington Post News 
Service, September 24, 1996. 
 
Shadian, Jessica. The Politics of Arctic Sovereignty: Oil, Ice and Inuit Governance. London: 
Routledge, 2014. 
  
 
337 
 
Schwenke Fors, Bjarge. “Pomor Brotherhood.” Barents Observer, November 22, 2012. 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/opinion/2012/11/pomor-brotherhood-22-11 (accessed 
January 9, 2013). 
 
Simon, Mary. “ ‘Canada’s North and Beyond’ – the EU and the Arctic Council.” Mary Simon’s 
Blog, October 18, 2011. https://www.itk.ca/blog/6/mary-
simon/2011/oct/%E2%80%9Ccanada%E2%80%99s-north-and-beyond%E2%80%9D-
%E2%80%93-eu-and-arctic-council (accessed November 5, 2012). 
 
Smith, Matthew. “Chinese Icebreaker Set For Sixth Arctic Expedition.” Alaska Public Media, 
July 9, 2014. http://www.alaskapublic.org/2014/07/09/chinese-icebreaker-set-for-sixth-
arctic-expedition-2/ (accessed December 5, 2014). 
 
Staalesen, Atle. “Does China Seek Arctic Foothold at Iceland?” Barents Observer, September 5, 
2011. http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/does-china-seek-arctic-foothold-iceland 
(accessed March 9, 2015).  
 
Staalesen, Atle. “In Russia-China Alliance, an Arctic Dimension.” Barents Observer, November 
14, 2014. http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/11/russia-china-alliance-arctic-
dimension-14-11 (accessed March 9, 2015). 
 
United States Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered 
Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
the Interior/United States Geological Survey, 2008. 
 
Wallace, Ron. The Case for RAIPON: Implications for Canada and the Arctic Council. Calgary, 
Alberta: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2013. 
 
Weber, Bob. “Russian Stuns Arctic Council by Suspending Aboriginal Group from Meetings.” 
Globe and Mail, November 15, 2012. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/russia-stuns-arctic-council-by-
suspending-aboriginal-group-from-meetings/article5360638/?service=mobile (accessed 
January 9, 2013). 
 
Weiss, Andrew. “Russia’s Oligarcy, Alive and Well.” New York Times, December 30, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/opinion/russias-oligarchy-alive-and-well.html?_r=0 
(accessed July 7, 2014). 
 
Wen, Dale Jiajun. “Climate Change and China: Technology, Market and Beyond.” Bangkok, 
Thailand: Focus on the Global South, 2009. 
 
Willems, Stéphane and Kevin Baumert. Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions. Paris, 
France: OECD Environment Directorate International Energy Agency, 2003.  
 
  
 
338 
Williams, Howard. “Eight Circumpolar Nations Pledge to Cooperate in Cleaning Up the Arctic.” 
Agence France-Presse, September 19, 1996. 
 
Winnipeg Free Press. News brief. August 15, 1996. 
 
Zengerle, Patricia. “China Granted Observer Seat on Arctic Governing Council.” Reuters, May 
13, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/15/us-arctic-council-
idUSBRE94E0IJ20130515 (accessed November 10, 2014). 
 
Research Examples 
 
Graham, Erin R. “International Organizations as Collective Agents: Fragmentation and the 
Limits of Principle Control at the World Health Organization.” European Journal of 
International Relations 20, no. 2 (2014): 366-390. 
 
Mastanduno, Michael. “Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial 
Policy.” In Neorealism and Neoliberalism, edited by David Baldwin, 3-25. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
Mearsheimer, John and Steven M. Walt. “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis 
Testing is Bad For International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations 
19, no. 3 (2013): 427-457.  
 
Kim, Moonhawk. “Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO.” World Politics 
64, no. 3 (2012): 426-475.  
 
Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian. “Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive 
Realism.” International Relations 27, no. 2 (2013): 202-225. 
 
Schroeder, Michael. “The Politics of Change: The Evolution of UN Electoral Services, 1989-
2006.” Global Governance 19 (2013): 207-226.  
 
Slaughter, Steven. “The Prospects of Deliberative Global Governance in the G20: Legitimacy, 
Accountability and Public Contestation.” Review of International Studies 39 (2013): 71-
90.  
 
Snidal, Duncan. “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation.” In Neorealism 
and Neoliberalism, edited by David Baldwin, 170-208. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Webber, Douglas. “How Likely is it That The European Union will Disintegrate? A Critical 
Analysis of Competing Theoretical Perspectives.” European Journal of International 
Relations 20, no. 2 (2014): 341-365. 
 
  
  
 
339 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
ANDREW CHATER 
EDUCATION 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, 2015, University of Western Ontario 
o Dissertation title: Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council 
 Supervisor: Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon 
 Committee members: Adam Harmes and Gordon McBean 
o Comprehensive exam fields: international relations, global governance, Canadian 
regional politics 
 Master of Arts in Political Science, 2010, University of Waterloo 
 Honours Bachelor Degree of Arts with Distinction, 2009, University of Western Ontario 
o Honours Specialization in Political Science, Minor in Sociology 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
 Chater, Andrew. “Energy Prospects in Canada’s Northern Territories.” Energy@Nordex, 
November 1, 2014.  
 Chater, Andrew. “The Arctic Council: Understanding Its Role in Security Governance.” 
In Handbook on Governance and Security, edited by James C. Sperling. Cheltenham, 
United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2014. 
 Chater, Andrew and Wilfrid Greaves. “Arctic Security Governance.” In Handbook on 
Governance and Security, edited by James C. Sperling. Cheltenham, United Kingdom: 
Edward Elgar, 2014. 
 Chater, Andrew. “Beyond the ‘Golly Gee’ Stage: The Inspiration of Academics Who 
Study Arctic Sovereignty.” International Journal 67, no. 3 (2012): 799-816. 
 
ACADEMIC HONOURS AND AWARDS 
 
 2014-2015, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Graduate Scholarship 
(value $20,000)  
 2014-2015, Rotman Institute of Philosophy Resident Member (value $0) 
 2014-2015, Ontario Graduate Scholarship (value $15,000) (declined)  
 2013, Arctic Institute of North American Grant-In-Aid (value $1,000) 
 2013, Northern Scientific Training Program Grant (value $2,400) (declined) 
 2012, Graduate Student Thesis Award (value $750) 
 2012, Nominee, Graduate Student Teaching Assistant Award (value $0) 
 2011-2012, Ontario Graduate Scholarship (value $15,000) 
 2010-2014, University of Western Ontario Annual Research Fellowship  (value $44,800) 
 2009-2010, University of Waterloo Entrance Scholarship (value $5,000) 
 2008-2009, University of Western Ontario In-Course Scholarship (value $700) 
 2005-2009, University of Western Ontario Deans Honour List (value $0) 
 2005, University of Western Ontario Entrance Scholarship, 2005 (value $2,000) 
  
 
340 
CONFERENCE AND COLLOQUIUM PRESENTATIONS 
 
 2015 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Palmer House Hilton, 
Chicago, Illinois, April 16, 2015: “Non-Arctic States in the Arctic and the Reconstitution 
of Regional Boundaries” 
 2015 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Palmer House Hilton, 
Chicago, Illinois, April 16, 2015: “Assessing the International Response to Black Carbon 
Pollution”  
 2015 International Studies Association Annual Conference, Hilton Riverside, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, February 19, 2015: “Non-Arctic States in the Arctic and the 
Reconstitution of Regional Boundaries” 
 2014 International Studies Association Annual Conference, Toronto Ontario Sheraton 
Centre Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, March 27, 2014: “The Power of Aboriginals as 
Non-State Actors in International Institutions” 
 2014 International Studies Association Annual Conference, Toronto Ontario Sheraton 
Centre Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 2014: “The Policy Relevance of 
International Institutions: A Case Study of the Arctic Council” 
 27th Annual Western Research Forum, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 
Canada, March 19, 2014: “The Power of Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations as Non-State 
Actors in International Institutions” 
 2013 International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco Hilton Union 
Square, San Francisco, California, April 3, 2013: “Explaining the Expanding Role of the 
Arctic Council” 
 2012 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, The University of 
Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, June 15, 2012: “A New Tipping Point: The 
Government of Canada, Northern Residents and Climate Change” 
 25th Annual Western Research Forum, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 
Canada, March 27, 2012: “Beyond the ‘Golly Gee’ Stage: The Inspiration of Academics 
Who Study Arctic Sovereignty” 
 2011 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Wilfred Laurier 
University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, May 18, 2011: “Tardy Explorers: Academics and 
the ‘Problem’ of Canadian Arctic Sovereignty” 
 Eighth Annual Earth Day Colloquium, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 
Canada, April 15, 2011: Presentation – “A New Tipping Point: The Government of 
Canada, Northern Residents and Climate Change” 
 2010 Sharing Discovery: Graduate Student Research Conference, University of 
Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, April, 27, 2010: “Cultural Security in the Writings 
of Osama Bin Laden” 
 Eighth Annual Centre for International Peace and Security Studies Graduate Student 
Conference, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 27, 2010: “Needing a 
Tweak: The Global Governance of Illegal Drugs” 
 
  
  
 
341 
ACADEMIC WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
 2010-Present, research assistant, Bishops University, Trinity College, University of 
Western Ontario and Bishops University (six projects)  
o The Political Causes and Consequences of National Identity: An Experimental 
Study with Dr. Cameron Anderson and Dr. Michael McGregor (2015-present, 
Bishops University) 
o Multilateral Code to Govern Arctic Offshore Resource Development with Dr. 
Elizabeth Riddell Dixon (2013-present, Trinity College) 
o “Making Electoral Democracy Work” with Dr. Laura Stephenson (2013-2015, 
University of Western Ontario) 
o Electoral studies with Dr. Laura Stephenson (2012, University of Western 
Ontario) 
o Arctic governance with Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon (2010-2012, University of 
Western Ontario) 
o Former leaders as diplomats with Dr. Andrew Cooper (2010, University of 
Waterloo) 
 2009-Present, teaching assistant, University of Western Ontario, Kings College, Huron 
College and the University of Waterloo (ten courses)  
o Business and Government with Dr. Joseph Lyons (Political Science 2211) (2015, 
University of Western Ontario) (part-time) 
o Politics of the Environment with Dr. David Hoogenboom (Political Science 2235) 
2014-2015, Kings University College) (part-time) 
o Research Methods in Political Science with Dr. Vuk Radmilovic (Political 
Science 3324G) (2014, University of Western Ontario) 
o International Relations with Dr. Erika Simpson (International Relations 2701) 
(2012-2013, University of Western Ontario) 
o International Conflict Management with Professor Nigmendra Narain (Political 
Science 3366) (2011, University of Western Ontario) 
o Introduction to International Relations with Dr. Richard VandeWetering (Political 
Science 2231) (2011, Huron University College) (part-time) 
o Introduction to Politics with Professor Nigmendra Narain (Political Science 1020) 
(2011, University of Western Ontario) 
o Canadian Politics with Dr. Cameron Anderson (Political Science 2230) (2010, 
University of Western Ontario) 
o International Organizations with Professor Jennifer Jones (Political Science 357) 
(2010, University of Waterloo) 
o Introduction to Politics with Dr. Richard Nutbrown (Political Science 101) 2009, 
University of Waterloo) 
 
  
  
 
342 
GUEST LECTURES 
 
 Political Science 3324, University of Western Ontario, January 23, 2014 
o Presentation – Concepts, Operationalization and Measurement 
 Political Science 2231, University of Western Ontario, May 17, 2013 
o Presentation - Globalization 
 International Relations 2701, University of Western Ontario, March 29, 2012 
o Presentation – Environmental Problems in International Relations 
 Political Science 2231, University of Western Ontario, March 28, 2012 
o Presentation – Environmental Problems in International Relations 
 Political Science 3326, University of Western Ontario, March 5, 2012 
o Presentation – The Issue of Climate Change in Canada’s Arctic 
 Political Science 3333, University of Western Ontario, March 5, 2012 
o Presentation – The Issue of Climate Change in Canada’s Arctic 
 Geography 2010A, University of Western Ontario, May 31, 2011 
o Presentation – The Political Geography of Canada 
 
INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS 
 
 Arctic Athabaskan Council delegation member at Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials 
Meeting, October 18-20, 2013, Whitehorse, Yukon 
 Arctic Athabaskan Council delegation member at Arctic Council Sustainable 
Development Working Group Meeting, October 21-23, 2013, Whitehorse, Yukon 
 
STUDENT GOVERNMENT 
 
 2014-2015, Rotman Institute of Philosophy Events Planning and Outreach Committee 
 2013-2014, Graduate Association of Political Science PhD representative, University of 
Western Ontario 
 2012-2014, PSAC Local 610 representative, University of Western Ontario 
 2012-2013, PSAC Local 610 Bylaw Committee, University of Western Ontario 
 2011-2012, PSAC Local 610 Political Action/Social Justice Committee, University of 
Western Ontario 
 2009-2010, reviewer for graduate journal “Inquiry and Insight,” University of Waterloo  
 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING 
 
 University of Western Ontario Certificate in University Teaching, December 9, 2013 
 University of Western Ontario’s Teaching Support Centre Teaching Mentorship Program, 
September-December 2012  
 University of Western Ontario’s Teaching Support Centre Future Professor Series, 
September 2010-December 2012 
 University of Western Ontario “Introduction to Quantitative Methods,” winter 2012 
 University of Western Ontario’s Teaching Support Centre Teaching Assistant Training 
Program, August 27-August 29, 2010 
